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ABSTRACT
Even when related claims are not aggregated by any formal
procedural mechanism, the lawyers involved in the separate lawsuits
often coordinate their efforts. Such “informal aggregation” raises
important questions about the boundaries of a dispute and the
boundaries of the lawyer-client relationship. As an ethical matter, the
central question is whether a lawyer owes ethical duties to a
coordinating lawyer’s client. Looking at confidentiality, loyalty,
conflicts of interest, and malpractice, Professor Erichson suggests that
ethical safeguards for clients of coordinating lawyers are neither
strong enough nor explicit enough to provide adequate protection,
and the problem inheres in the nature of informal aggregation.
Written cooperation agreements, however, alleviate some of the risks.
As a procedural matter, Professor Erichson considers the virtual
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representation argument for nonparty preclusion when lawyers have
worked together, and concludes that such coordination generally
cannot justify binding a nonparty with a judgment. Based on the
inadequacy of ethical safeguards and the lack of nonparty preclusion,
combined with the decline in litigant autonomy that accompanies
counsel coordination, Professor Erichson contends that the rise in
informal aggregation suggests the need for more thorough formal
mechanisms for aggregating related claims or, at least, greater
attention to formalizing counsel coordination through written
agreements.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .............................................................................................383
I. The Rise of Informal Aggregation.............................................386
A. Plaintiffs’ Coordination........................................................386
B. Defense Coordination ..........................................................401
II. The Inadequacy of Formal Aggregation ...................................408
A. True Aggregation: Party Joinder and Class Action..........409
B. Consolidated Handling: Consolidation and
Multidistrict Litigation Transfer .........................................414
III. Informal Aggregation and the Boundaries of the LawyerClient Relationship ......................................................................417
A. Confidentiality.......................................................................419
B. Loyalty ...................................................................................429
C. Conflicts of Interest ..............................................................432
D. Legal Malpractice .................................................................441
E. The Problem of Informal Ethics in Informally
Aggregated Litigation ..........................................................445
IV. Informal Aggregation and Nonparty Preclusion......................448
A. The Argument for Nonparty Preclusion Based on
Informal Aggregation...........................................................449
B. Against Nonparty Preclusion ..............................................456
V. The Worst of Both Worlds..........................................................464
A. Neither True Litigant Autonomy nor True
Aggregation ...........................................................................464
B. A Better Way ........................................................................465
Conclusion ...............................................................................................469

ERICHSON.DOC

2000]

11/21/00 12:11 PM

INFORMAL AGGREGATION

383

INTRODUCTION
What the law cannot achieve formally, lawyers achieve
informally. Consider how claims of multiple parties are connected in
litigation—“aggregated,” to use the procedural parlance. Claims may
be aggregated through procedural mechanisms such as class action,
consolidation, or joinder. Often related claims remain formally
independent, and proceed as separate lawsuits, but the lawyers act as
though the separate suits were formally aggregated, coordinating
their efforts to such an extent as to amount to a treatment of the
litigation as a single, integrated whole. This phenomenon—call it
“informal aggregation”—raises important questions about the
boundaries of a dispute and the boundaries of the lawyer-client
relationship.
Imagine a rather ordinary products liability case. A Texas
consumer purchases a widget and is injured. The consumer has reason
to believe the injury resulted from exposure to widgium, a substance
contained in widgets. The consumer brings an action in Texas state
court against the retailer, the widget manufacturer, and the widgium
supplier. Although the suit may present tricky issues of proof or
substantive law, it is straightforward as a matter of party structure—a
simple action against three defendants.
Now imagine that a California consumer is similarly injured
using a widget. She sues in California state court. Her complaint
names the same widget manufacturer and widgium supplier, plus a
different retailer. Now a third consumer files suit, this one in federal
court in Virginia, naming as defendants the manufacturer and
widgium supplier for a different brand of widget.
They look like three separate lawsuits: one in Texas, one in
California, and one in federal court in Virginia. Each has its own
docket number. The plaintiffs are entirely different in each action;
some defendants differ as well. The cases are handled by different
lawyers and presided over by different judges.
Now picture one thousand such lawsuits. Each is brought by a
plaintiff, or perhaps several plaintiffs, asserting claims against various
defendants based on exposure to widgium. Each looks like a freestanding individual lawsuit. But in fact, all thousand lawsuits are part
of a single litigation, linked together much more closely than it
appears at first glance. The plaintiffs’ lawyers are working together to
coordinate their efforts. Many of them belong to the Widgium
Litigation Group sponsored by the Association of Trial Lawyers of
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America, and receive the Widgium Newsletter, which keeps them
abreast of litigation developments. The leading plaintiffs’ lawyers—
each of whom represents dozens or even hundreds of individual
widgium plaintiffs—have presented training sessions to teach other
lawyers how to try a widgium case. The plaintiffs’ lawyers have
pooled resources to hire experts and have shared the costs of
discovery.
The defense has coordinated as well. Counsel for the widget
manufacturers and widgium suppliers have held joint defense
meetings to share information and discuss strategy, pursuant to a
written joint defense agreement. They have jointly commissioned a
scientific study into the toxicity of widgium. The widgium suppliers
have entered into indemnification and cooperation agreements with a
number of the retailers and distributors. Not only have lawyers for
different defendants worked together, counsel for each defendant has
coordinated the handling of its own batch of lawsuits. For defendants
sued in multiple jurisdictions, local counsel in each jurisdiction
handles the representation in consultation with national lead counsel,
while strategic decisionmaking and information-gathering are
centralized with lead counsel. Although the thousand widgium claims
have not been aggregated through any formal procedural mechanism,
the lawsuits of these widget consumers against the various defendants
are informally aggregated through the coordinated efforts of the
lawyers. Lawyers, judges, politicians, the press, and the public understandably refer to this mass of cases in the singular, as “the widgium
litigation.”
Informal aggregation, just as it brings together our hypothetical
widgium claims, brings together the claims of countless litigants in a
wide variety of litigation. This Article considers this phenomenon of
informal aggregation and its implications.1 Part I examines

1. Given the vast attention paid by the academic literature to the formal mechanisms of
complex litigation, the dearth of scholarly attention to informal aggregation is noteworthy. As
Judith Resnik has pointed out, informal practitioner conduct is “less visible to the academy”
than formal procedures documented in rules and judicial opinions. Judith Resnik, From “Cases”
to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 39 (Summer 1991). While lawyer coordination
has never been given the sustained attention it deserves as a litigation-aggregating phenomenon,
several scholars have commented valuably on it in the context of aspects of complex litigation.
Professor Resnik raised the issue of informal aggregation in her thought-provoking discussion of
aggregate litigation, see id. at 36-38, and, with others, has continued to consider lawyer
cooperation, especially in the context of fee calculation in mass torts. See Dennis E. Curtis &
Judith Resnik, Contingency Fees in Mass Torts: Access, Risk, and the Provision of Legal Services
When Layers of Lawyers Work for Individuals and Collectives of Clients, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
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coordination among counsel in multi-suit litigation and shows the
extraordinary and growing extent to which lawyers in related cases
coordinate their efforts. Approaching the topic anecdotally, with a
variety of examples to illustrate how lawyers coordinate, it shows that
lawyers involved in formally separate lawsuits often work so closely
together as to amount to a treatment of the litigation, by the lawyers,
as a single judicial action. Part II briefly surveys current formal
mechanisms for aggregating claims, explaining why related claims
often proceed as judicially independent actions. Readers already
familiar with the practice of lawyer coordination and current
aggregation mechanisms may prefer to skip Parts I and II, and turn
directly to Part III.
Parts III through V examine informal aggregation’s ethical and
procedural implications, focusing particularly on the implications for
defining the boundaries of a dispute. Part III considers the
phenomenon’s ethical implications. It asks whether a lawyer, by
virtue of coordinated efforts with another lawyer, owes any ethical or
fiduciary duties to that other lawyer’s client. Looking at
confidentiality, loyalty, conflicts of interest, and malpractice, it
425, 429 (1998) (outlining the impact of informal aggregation on the “allocat[ion] [of] costs and
fees”); Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and
Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 300-01 (1996) (commenting on the “impact of aggregation on the
financial incentives of lawyers. . . . some of whom may work solely for individual plaintiffs, . . .
for individual clients, . . . [or] for the plaintiff group as a whole”). Mitchell Lowenthal and I
addressed counsel coordination in mass tort litigation to analyze the admissibility of prior-action
depositions. See Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Howard M. Erichson, Modern Mass Tort Litigation,
Prior-Action Depositions and Practice-Sensitive Procedure, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 989, 996-1008
(1995). Deborah Hensler, who has done so much to inject research on the realities of law
practice into the academic commentary on procedure, has raised the issue of informal
aggregation several times. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS:
PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 31 (1999); Deborah R.
Hensler, A Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1609-12 (1995) [hereinafter Hensler, A
Glass Half Full] (cataloguing examples of aggregated mass tort suits); Deborah R. Hensler,
Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 104 [hereinafter
Hensler, Myths and Realities] (comparing “formal aggregative procedures” with more “ad hoc”
informal aggregation). In fact, the earliest use of the phrase “informal aggregation” to refer to
counsel coordination, as far as I am aware, is in Professor Hensler’s 1989 article. See Hensler,
Myths and Realities, supra, at 104. Others have mentioned counsel coordination in various
contexts as well. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative
Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 708-09 (1986) (describing the creation of “‘ad hoc’ law firm[s]
. . . [to] litigate the plaintiff’s side of a [class action] subject to court oversight”); Michael J. Saks
& Peter D. Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling
in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 840 (1992) (“[L]awyers informally aggregate
cases by representing hundreds of thousands of clients.”).
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suggests that ethical safeguards for clients of coordinating lawyers are
neither strong enough nor explicit enough to provide adequate
protection to such clients, and concludes that the problem is inherent
in the nature of informal aggregation. Finally, Part III suggests that
written cooperation agreements can alleviate some of the these risks
by making duties explicit and by forcing counsel to consider up front
the ramifications of coordinating with other lawyers.
Part IV turns to the implications of informal aggregation on the
binding effect of a judgment. It explores the “virtual representation”2
argument for nonparty preclusion based on counsel coordination and
concludes that informal aggregation generally cannot justify binding a
nonparty with a judgment. Based on the inadequacy of ethical
safeguards and lack of nonparty preclusion, combined with the
decline in litigant autonomy that accompanies counsel coordination,
Part V contends that the rise of informal aggregation suggests the
need for more thorough formal mechanisms for aggregating related
claims or, at least, greater attention to formalizing counsel
coordination through written agreements that make explicit the
relationships among lawyers, clients, and lawsuits.
I. THE RISE OF INFORMAL AGGREGATION
Complex litigation often proceeds as a number of formally
independent lawsuits, yet we refer to multi-suit litigations in the
singular: “the tobacco litigation,” “the TWA Flight 800 litigation,”
“the Microsoft antitrust litigation.” Likewise, the lawyers involved
often treat the litigation as a whole. The growth of lawyer
coordination has been so dramatic, and its implications so profound,
that it warrants a close examination of the ways in which lawyers
coordinate, both for the plaintiffs and for the defense.
A. Plaintiffs’ Coordination
On the plaintiffs’ side, lawyers coordinate to achieve efficiencies
and to try to level the playing field with defendants, who generally
command greater resources than any individual plaintiff. By
coordinating their efforts, lawyers for similarly situated plaintiffs can
access more thorough information, avoid working at cross-purposes,

2. Virtual representation refers to the theory that a nonparty “may be bound by a
judgment . . . if one of the parties . . . [was] so closely aligned with his interests as to be his
virtual representative.” Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1975).

ERICHSON.DOC

2000]

11/21/00 12:11 PM

INFORMAL AGGREGATION

387

and finance the litigation more powerfully and efficiently. Plaintiffs’
coordination takes a number of forms. It can flow from
representation of multiple plaintiffs by a single lawyer or firm or from
cooperative efforts among separate plaintiffs’ lawyers.
1. Coordination of Multiple Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits by a Single
Lawyer or Firm. Particular plaintiffs’ lawyers or their firms may
represent numerous similarly situated claimants, allowing easy
coordination of those claims even if asserted in separate suits.
Through niche marketing, lawyers can attract substantial numbers of
clients with similar claims, and economies of scale give lawyers a
3
mighty incentive to do so. As a lawyer develops a track record in a
4
particular type of claim, similarly situated clients flock to the lawyer.
For a single lawyer or firm representing multiple similarly
situated plaintiffs in separate suits, coordinated handling occurs
3. Some law firms, for example, have represented tens of thousands of asbestos plaintiffs.
See Roger Parloff, The Tort That Ate the Constitution: Over Ethical and Constitutional
Objections Four Lawyers Hope to Enact a Nationwide Asbestos Compensation System, AM.
LAW., July-Aug. 1994, at 77 (describing the handling of asbestos claims by Ronald Motley and
Joseph Rice of South Carolina’s Ness Motley Loadholt Richardson & Poole); Profiles in Power:
The 100 Most Influential Lawyers, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 28, 1997, at C4 (noting that Baltimore’s Law
Offices of Peter G. Angelos has represented nearly 20,000 asbestos plaintiffs). The Ness Mottley
firm established affiliate relationships with lawyers throughout the United States, sharing
responsibility for and fees from thousands of asbestos cases filed by such “affiliated counsel.”
Parloff, supra, at 77. As the lead firm, Ness Mottley focused on national discovery and issues of
general liability, while the local lawyers or firms handled such case-specific matters as proving
individual exposure and damages. See Karen Dillon, Only $1.5 Million a Year: Asbestos King
Ron Mottley Takes Home Far Less than His Enemies Suspect, AM. LAW., Oct. 1989, at 41.
4. Melvin Belli, for example, parlayed a single victory in a Bendectin case into a successful
marketing campaign for new clients with Bendectin claims. See Richard L. Marcus, Reexamining
the Bendectin Litigation Story, 83 IOWA L. REV. 231, 236 (1997) (describing Belli’s use of a
partial success in the first Bendectin trial to attract new Bendectin clients). Veteran mass tort
lawyer Paul Rheingold has stated that he accumulated several thousand potential clients in the
products liability litigation concerning the “fen-phen” diet drug combination. See Jeremy
Laurance, Thousands to Sue Over Slimming Pills, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 21, 1998, at 1 (“We have
3,000 cases we are looking into and we are filing five or six a day. We don’t know how many will
translate into law suits but we have 100 so far.”). Florida lawyer Norwood S. “Woody” Wilner,
one of the few lawyers to win a trial verdict against a tobacco company, has attracted hundreds
of individual tobacco plaintiffs. See Milo Geyelin, Behind Giant Tobacco Verdicts, a Legal
SWAT Team, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1999, at B1 (describing Wilner’s leadership role in tobacco
litigation); Suein L. Hwang et al., Smoke Signal: Jury’s Tobacco Verdict Suggests Tough Times
Ahead for the Industry, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1996, at A1 (noting that Wilner’s small firm had
filed about 200 tobacco claims by 1996). Some lawyers pursue such niches rather aggressively.
New York lawyer Ronald Benjamin, who has filed at least five suits for clients alleging personal
injuries caused by the drug Viagra, held a press conference to announce a filing and ran a
newspaper advertisement seeking additional Viagra plaintiffs. See Bob Van Voris, Self-Made
King of Viagra Suits?, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 10, 1998, at A6.
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inevitably. Knowledge gained through the representation of each
client inures to the benefit of other clients. Generally applicable legal
research and factual investigation are conducted once on behalf of all
the clients,5 lawyers may meet with their clients in large groups rather
than individually,6 and settlements may be negotiated during a single
negotiating session with opposing counsel.7
2. Coordination Among Separate Plaintiffs’ Lawyers. The more
interesting phenomenon, however, is the informal aggregation that
occurs without any single, unifying lawyer or law firm, instead arising
when separate plaintiffs’ lawyers coordinate their efforts in related
cases. Particularly when prosecuting similar claims against a common
defendant, plaintiffs’ attorneys benefit greatly from teamwork. By
pooling resources, counsel not only save money but also enhance
8
their ability to finance litigation at the highest level. Plaintiffs’
5. See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF
MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 240-41 (1996) (observing that the accumulation of
Bendectin cases by Melvin Belli and others enabled the lawyers to achieve some of the same
economies of scale provided by formally aggregated litigation).
6. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 1, at 840 (“Even in the absence of formal aggregative
procedures, lawyers informally aggregate cases by representing hundreds or thousands of clients
and meeting with them in large groups.”).
7. While lawyers with multiple related cases naturally prefer to address multiple
settlements during a single meeting, rather than schedule multiple meetings, ethical problems
arise if the lawyers negotiate the settlements as a block rather than on their individual merits.
See Paul D. Rheingold, Ethical Constraints on Aggregated Settlements of Mass-Tort Cases, 31
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 395 (1998). The pertinent Model Rule of Professional Conduct provides:
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an
aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client
consents after consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the
claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(g) (1995). Nevertheless, such block
settlements are not uncommon. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT
LITIGATION 74 (1995) (“Even though bulk settlements may technically violate ethical rules,
judges often encourage their acceptance to terminate a large number of cases.”); Resnik, supra
note 1, at 38 (“While in theory and in form each case is separate, in practice lawyers on both
sides deal with the cases as a group, sometimes making ‘block settlements’—in which
defendants give a lawyer representing a group of plaintiffs money that is then allocated among a
set of clients.”); Rheingold, supra, at 401 (observing that despite the ethical prohibition,
aggregated settlements occur with some frequency).
8. See GREEN, supra note 5, at 241; WEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 76-79. A lawyer handling
a personal injury claim against Wal-Mart, for example, began coordinating with other lawyers
handling similar claims against Wal-Mart and found important gaps in the defendant’s discovery
responses, substantially strengthening the plaintiffs’ claims for liability and opening up the
possibility of sanctions. See Chad Terhune, Florida Journal, Economic Report: Injury Case Has
Become Headache for Wal-Mart, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1997, at F1.
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lawyers work together to plan strategy, conduct discovery, hire
experts, develop scientific evidence, conduct jury focus groups, and
join efforts in countless other ways.9
Above all, in large-scale multi-suit litigation, plaintiffs’ counsel
10
share information. They have used everything from newsletters to e11
12
mail to communal online databases. In several mass litigations,
13
including Dalkon Shield and MER/29,14 plaintiffs’ counsel held
“schools” where leading trial lawyers trained others on how to try the
particular type of case. In a number of litigations, plaintiffs’ counsel
have put together trial handbooks or trial packets, which contain all
of the documents needed to present a case on liability, with
instructions. According to one defense lawyer, “It used to be that
defense counsel sometimes had an advantage in access to information
when cases were scattered . . . . Formal and informal cooperation
among plaintiffs’ counsel and the explosion of information

9. See GREEN, supra note 5, at 175-77 (reporting that discovery in MDL-486 cases
resulted in cooperation among counsel); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD)
§§ 20.22 (decribing organizational structures of counsel), 33.24 n.1033 (describing cooperation
among plaintiffs’ counsel in mass tort litigation) (1995) [hereinafter M.C.L.3d]; Daniel S.
Chamberlain, Truck Cases: Rules of the Road, TRIAL, Feb. 1998, at 20, 22 (explaining how the
Motor Vehicle Collision, Highway, and Premises Liability Section of the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America provides its members with information); Lowenthal & Erichson, supra note
1, at 998-1007 (describing coordination of plaintiffs’ counsel in mass tort litigation); David Ranii,
How the Plaintiffs’ Bar Shares Its Information, NAT’L L.J., July 23, 1984, at 1 (summarizing how
plaintiffs’ lawyers have established networks for sharing and disseminating information);
Resnik, supra note 1, at 38-39 (referring to efforts of plaintiffs’ attorneys to coordinate in mass
tort cases through newsletters, shared discovery, shared experts, and the formation of
organizations and training programs); Paul D. Rheingold, The Development of Litigation
Groups, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 5 (1982) (describing the work of plaitiffs’ litigation groups);
Richard A. Seltzer & Margaret Z. Johns, Winning Punitive Damages in Environmental Cases, in
PREPARATION AND TRIAL OF A COMPLEX TOXIC CHEMICAL OR HAZARDOUS WASTE CASE
1986, at 303, 308-09 (PLI Litigation & Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series, 1986)
(instructing plaintiffs’ attorneys that the major focus of discovery efforts should be the
decisionmaking process of the defendant and that plaintiffs’ attorneys can often obtain company
documents not produced in discovery from the ATLA Exchange and other plaintiffs’ attorney
organizations).
10. See Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story—An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster
Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116, 122-23 (1968).
11. See J. Stratton Shartel, Small-Firm Litigators Say Technology Is Key to Managing Big
Cases, INSIDE LITIG., May 1995, at 7, 8 (indicating that, particularly in large law firms, “advice is
only a few steps or an e-mail message away”).
12. See Paul Bernstein, Hunting for Buried Treasures, TRIAL, July 1998, at 104, 105; Paul
Bernstein, Read All About It: ATLA Goes Online, TRIAL, July 1995, at 104.
13. See Rheingold, supra note 9, at 8.
14. See Rheingold, supra note 10, at 131.

ERICHSON.DOC

390

11/21/00 12:11 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:381

technology, however, have rendered this factor less significant than it
once was.”15
Frequently, these efforts are coordinated by a central group of
lawyers. Where a class action or multidistrict litigation forms part of
the litigation, there may be a judicially appointed lead counsel or
plaintiffs’ steering committee that takes the lead in coordinating the
16
lawyers’ efforts. Often, however, the efforts are orchestrated by
groups of lawyers without formal judicial recognition. A few
examples will give the flavor of such groups and of the types of
coordination prevalent in modern multi-suit litigation.
In the tobacco litigation, for example, Woody Wilner heads a
group called the Tobacco Trial Lawyers Association. The lawyers in
the group—each of whom pay $5000 to cover administrative costs—
share information and documents to enable each other to prosecute
17
tobacco claims more efficiently and effectively. When attorney
Madelyn Chaber was preparing for a San Francisco trial against Philip
Morris, she sought the input of Wilner, who had won jury verdicts
against Brown & Williamson in Florida. “I said to Woody, ‘Download
your brain to me,’” she recalled.18 She credits Wilner’s input with
19
helping her win a $51.5 million verdict in the San Francisco case.
Shortly thereafter, lawyers representing a tobacco plaintiff in Oregon
were caught off guard by the trial testimony of a Philip Morris
medical expert, who opined that the decedent died from
mucoepidermoid carcinoma, a cancer not caused by smoking. The
testimony troubled the plaintiff’s lawyers until they received an email from Chaber with a prior deposition of the doctor revealing that
in previous smokers’ suits he had invariably diagnosed cancer types
unrelated to smoking. The deposition weakened the problematic

15. Mark Herrmann, To MDL or Not to MDL? A Defense Perspective, LITIGATION,
Summer 1998, at 43, 44-45.
16. See M.C.L.3d, supra note 9, at § 20.22.
17. See Geyelin, supra note 4, at B1; Milo Geyelin, Philip Morris Hit with Record Damages,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1999, at A3 (noting Oregon lawyers’ “affiliation with a network of
plaintiffs’ lawyers brought together by Norwood S. ‘Woody’ Wilner to share tobacco-litigation
strategies”); see also Richard A. Daynard & Mark Gottlieb, Keys to Litigating Against Tobacco
Companies, TRIAL, Nov. 1999, at 18, 20 (noting that “[o]ne reason these trials are now winnable
is that one need not reinvent the wheel with every case,” and mentioning both the Tobacco
Trial Lawyers Association and ATLA’s Tobacco Litigation Group).
18. Geyelin, supra note 4.
19. See id.
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testimony, and the Oregon lawyers went on to win an $80.3 million
verdict.20
In the fen-phen products liability litigation, a number of lawyers
formed a “plaintiffs’ consortium” for handling state court cases
21
around the country. This consortium established an Internet site for
22
sharing information about the litigation, while a group of plaintiffs’
law firms from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York privately
arranged for the primary defendant to produce documents on CDROM. For this document production, the plaintiffs’ lawyers
contributed money toward the cost of putting the documents in
optical character recognition form, worked collaboratively to code
the documents, and allowed other plaintiffs’ firms to buy into the
arrangement.23 Not only did such multistate coordination proceed
independently of the federal diet drug multidistrict litigation (MDL),
the state court lawyers actively resisted control by the MDL judge
and the MDL Plaintiffs’ Management Committee.24
20. See id. Under Oregon state court rules, the lawyers could not depose the defense expert
before trial, nor could they see a written report by the expert. Compare id. (describing Oregon’s
procedural rules regarding expert witnesses), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2) (requiring a written
report, signed by the expert, disclosing—among other things—all opinions to be expressed and
justifications for such opinions), and FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4) (allowing counsel before trial to
take depositions of the opposing party’s experts expected to be witnesses). The Oregon
plaintiffs’ lawyers acknowledged that their trial success built on “‘other cases and what other
attorneys have done.’” Geyelin, supra note 17 (quoting one of those lawyers who specifically
acknowledged similar litigation in Minnesota as a building block of the Oregon success).
21. See Attorneys Debate Merits of Fen-Phen Multi-District Litigation, 1 MEALEY’S LITIG.
REP.: FEN-PHEN/REDUX, Feb. 1998 (discussing the formation of a “loose confederation” of
attorneys to pursue discovery); More Than 400 Lawyers Learn How Diet Drugs Work, Who to
Sue, and How to Defend in Fen-Phen Litigation, 1 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: FEN-PHEN/REDUX,
Dec. 1997 (describing a “day-long crash course in neuroscience and . . . plaintiff and defense
strategies”); Paul D. Rheingold et al., State Courts Provide New Forum for Mass Torts, NAT’L
L.J., Feb. 22, 1999, at C28, C29 (discussing the work of the plaintiffs’ consortium in state court
fen-phen cases).
22. See Multistate Litigation Diet Drugs/Fen-Phen Website and Bulletin Board, at
http://www.lawtomation.com/%7Eleflaw/fenphen (last visited Aug. 29, 2000) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
23. See Rheingold et al., supra note 21, at C29.
24. See id. (highlighting the tensions between the state court litigation and the federal
steering committee); Bob Van Voris, Bickering in Fen-Phen Litigation, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 28,
1998, at A1, A25 (discussing the state court lawyers’ misgivings concerning the federal judge’s
decisions in the federal diet drug mass litigation). According to three of the lawyers involved in
the consortium:
Perhaps the most startling aspect of this coordinated work among the states is that
there are no leaders. Neither any state nor any individual law firm is the “head” of
this group. There are not even leaders within a state. Rather, the lawyers seem
enthusiastic about working toward the common goal of preparing their cases jointly
and without having to pay anyone else to do it.
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Plaintiffs’ lawyers similarly coordinated their efforts in the
Bendectin litigation,25 the L-tryptophan litigation,26 the breast implant
27
28
litigation, and the World Trade Center bombing litigation. In
another area of large-scale litigation, lawyers handling claims of bad
faith denials of insurance coverage have shared information and
29
discovery materials concerning insurance companies.
In the history of plaintiff coordination, arguably the two
collaborative efforts of greatest significance were the MER/29 group
30
in the 1960s and the tobacco litigation’s Castano group in the 1990s.
In 1963, thirty-three lawyers pursuing claims against the manufacturer
of the anti-cholesterol drug MER/29 formed the first major plaintiffs’
group,31 through which the plaintiffs’ lawyers tightly coordinated their
Rheingold et al., supra note 21, at C29.
25. See GREEN, supra note 5, at 170-73 (discussing lawyer structure within the Bendectin
multidistrict litigation); id. at 240-41 (discussing informal mechanisms for coordinating among
Bendectin plaintiffs’ lawyers); Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the
Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 309, 354 (1992) (discussing the holistic benefits
of coordinated litigation and citing the areas, including Bendectin, in which such coordination
has had significant impact).
26. See ATLA’s L-tryptophan Group Provides Model for National Litigation Efforts,
ATLA ADVOC., Mar. 1993, at 11.
27. In the breast implant litigation, counsel put together a “Master Complaint,” filed in the
multidistrict litigation, and a “Complaint and Adoption by Reference” that could be filed by
any individual plaintiff in the plaintiff’s chosen federal district court. See Aaron M. Levine,
Fundamental Issues in Litigating Breast Implant Cases, in LITIGATING BREAST IMPLANT
CASES—A SATELLITE PROGRAM 53, 53-86 (PLI Litigation & Administrative Practice Course
Handbook Series, 1992). The individual plaintiff’s counsel filled in the blanks on the complaint
with the plaintiff’s name, surgery date, and other information, and counsel checked off the
defendants and claims from a list of thirty-five potential defendants and twenty-eight potential
causes of action. See id. at 81-86; Lowenthal & Erichson, supra note 1, at 1004.
28. See Daniel Wise, Lawyers Pack World Trade Center Hearing, 211 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1994).
29. See GUIDE TO ATLA LITIGATION GROUPS, July 1998, at 7 (describing the database
compiled by ATLA’s Bad Faith Insurance Litigation Group).
30. I do not mean that these were the largest-scale coordination efforts, although the
Castano group undoubtedly would be competitive by that measure. Rather, I mean that these
two efforts represented milestones in the history of plaintiff coordination. The MER/29 group
was the first substantial, organized plaintiffs’ group in mass tort litigation and set the stage for
coordination in future mass torts. The Castano group represents the power of plaintiffs’ lawyers,
united to take on even the most intimidating of legal foes, and the reversal of momentum that
can be achieved by the accumulation and focused application of lawyer energy and pooled
financial resources. In the public law setting, one can find examples of plaintiff coordination
with far greater general historical significance, such as the attack on institutional segregation
coordinated under the auspices of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund. See JACK
GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT
FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994).
31. See Rheingold, supra note 10, at 122; see also Ranii, supra note 9, at 9 (stating that the
group was formed in 1962).
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discovery efforts. The group provided its member lawyers with copies
of key liability documents, trial transcripts, and other materials,32
submitted a standard set of interrogatories, and reached an
agreement with the defendant that discovery could be carried out by
the group’s representatives on behalf of all the group’s cases.33 The
MER/29 group kept attorneys up to date with a newsletter and ran
34
the “MER/29 School” to teach lawyers how to try the cases. The
MER/29 litigation has been called “one of the great success stories of
voluntary cooperation among litigants.”35 The importance of the
MER/29 group lies in the fact that it laid the groundwork for the
growth of coordinated efforts by a cadre of elite lawyers in mass tort
litigation. This corps of repeat players, many of whom handled
MER/29 cases in the 1960s, then Dalkon Shield and asbestos cases,
then breast implants, and most recently fen-phen and tobacco,
succeeds by creating “a high degree of informal coordination,
36
continuity, and learning across different mass torts.”
The Castano group was an extraordinary gathering of plaintiffs’
lawyers who joined forces in 1994 to pursue the tobacco industry.
After years of failed attempts by individual plaintiffs against the wellfinanced tobacco defense, the lawyers decided to try to level the
playing field by creating a team of leading lawyers and amassing a
37
huge litigation war chest. The group grew to include sixty firms, each
contributing at least $100,000 toward expenses.38 Although the
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Rheingold, supra note 10, at 122-24.
See id. at 127-30.
See id. at 131.
AMERICAN
LAW
INSTITUTE,
COMPLEX
LITIGATION:
STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS & ANALYSIS 10 (1994).
36. Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 941, 952 (1995).
37. See Andrew Blum, Tobacco Fight Grows Hotter: An Alliance of Plaintiffs’ Firms Tries
New Tactics to Battle Big Tobacco, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 18, 1994, at A6; Claudia MacLachlan,
Tobacco Foes Force Industry Showdown, NAT’L L.J., May 2, 1994, at A1, A21 (referring to
tobacco executives’ description of the “anti-smoking ‘industry’”); see also David Ranii, New
Group Takes Aim at the Tobacco Industry, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 11, 1985, at 4 (describing an earlier
tobacco plaintiffs’ lawyers group).
38. See Andrew Blum, $4M Pledged to Fight Nicotine, NAT’L L.J., May 2, 1994, at A4;
Douglas McCollam, Long Shot, AM. LAW., June 1999, at 86, 88. The list of attorneys in the
coordinating tobacco group reads like a Who’s Who of plaintiffs’ lawyers: Peter Angelos, John
W. (Don) Barrett, Melvin Belli, Turner Branch, Elizabeth Cabraser, Stanley Chesley, John
Coale, Wendell Gauthier, Russ M. Herman, Ron Motley, Dianne Nast, John O’Quinn, and
many other of the most successful lawyers in the United States. See Blum, supra note 37, at A6;
McCollam, supra, at 88, 91; see also Profiles in Power: The 100 Most Influential Lawyers, NAT’L
L.J., Apr. 28, 1997 at C4-C19 (listing Angelos, Cabraser, Chesley, Gauthier, and O’Quinn
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group’s primary litigation effort, a nationwide tobacco class action
filed in Louisiana federal court, was ultimately decertified,39 the
formation of such a powerful coalition against the tobacco industry
helped turn the tide in the tobacco litigation and set the stage for
subsequent state attorney general lawsuits, settlement negotiations,
and legislative battles.40
The Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA), the
leading organization of United States plaintiffs’ lawyers, plays a
central role in lawyer coordination. ATLA provides opportunities for
41
networking lawyers to coordinate work on similar cases. In addition
to sponsoring annual seminars, programs and panels, ATLA sections
provide, according to one lawyer, “an invaluable source for locating
experts, getting the low-down on opposing experts, and sharing
technical information.”42
ATLA sponsors sixty-six “litigation groups” that focus on
particular types of cases, ranging from bad faith insurance denials to
43
defective vehicle back-up alarms. These litigation groups give
among the hundred most powerful lawyers in the United States).
39. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996). Inasmuch as
the Castano group focused its effort on a class action, it differs from many of the other examples
of lawyer coordination in this Article, which involve lawyer coordination in judicially separate
lawsuits. Nevertheless, the Castano group stands out as an example of the power that lawyers
can amass when they coordinate their efforts. The Castano group has evolved into a multi-suit
operation. Since the defeat of the nationwide class action, Castano group members have filed a
number of statewide class actions, and many of the Castano lawyers have recently joined forces
to pursue litigation against handgun makers. See McCollam, supra note 38, at 89-91.
40. See PETER PRINGLE, CORNERED: BIG TOBACCO AT THE BAR OF JUSTICE 10 (1998);
Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 2020-22
(1999).
41. See ATLA Section Steers Attorneys in Right Direction, TRIAL, Mar. 1994, at 20
(highlighting ATLA’s Motor Vehicle Collision, Highway and Premises Liability section);
Professional Negligence Section Has Widespread Appeal, TRIAL, May 1998, at 32 (“[S]ection
members have an enormous networking advantage . . . . [M]embers across the country work
together . . . . ”). Each month, ATLA publishes classified advertisements in which lawyers seek
to contact lawyers handling related cases. One recent notice, for example, sought “info re Slim
Fast causing diabetes/gall bladder problems,” and another sought “information regarding
[driving range] patrons being injured by ricocheting golf balls.” ATLA ADVOC., Feb. 2000, at 9,
11.
42. Professional Negligence Section: Extending a Helping Hand to Members, TRIAL, May
1995, at 40 (quoting ATLA Professional Negligence Section Chair Denise Young).
43. See GUIDE TO ATLA LITIGATION GROUPS, supra note 29. The list includes the
following litigation groups: AIDS; Abortion Malpractice; Albuterol; Automatic Doors; Bad
Faith Insurance; Battery Explosion; Benzene/Leukemia; Birth Defect; Birth Trauma; Breast
Cancer; Breast Implants; Carbon Monoxide; Cardiac Devices; Child Sex Abuse; Complex
Regional Pain Syndrome/“RSD”; Computer Vendor Liability; Construction Site Accidents;
Construction Site Accidents Subgroup: Nailguns; Contraceptive Implants; Crane & Aerial Lift
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plaintiffs’ lawyers access to a wealth of otherwise obscure evidence.44
The transmissions/sudden acceleration group, for example, brings
together lawyers who represent clients injured when automobiles
suddenly accelerate or shift into reverse. Members of the group
receive a large packet including “‘smoking gun’ documents . . . and
depositions of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ expert witnesses,” as well as
interrogatories, lists of lawyers and experts, legal memoranda and
briefs, and a videotape in which “an attorney explains the defects to a
jury using a model transmission and provides tips on trial
techniques.”45 These groups have become so prominent in products
liability litigation that the absence of an ATLA litigation group is
touted as evidence of product safety.46

Injury; DES; Diet Product: Fen-Phen; Domestic Violence; Electrical Accidents;
ERISA/Employee Benefits; Firearms & Ammunition; Funeral Services; Gammagard; Gas
Water Heater Safety; Gas Fire & Explosions; Health Care Finance; Healthcare Management
Organization; Herbicide & Pesticide; Imitrex; Inadequate Security; Inadequate Security
Subgroup: Wal-Mart Task Force; Interstate Trucking; Laparoscopy; Latex Allergy; Lead Paint;
Liquor Liability; Low Impact Collisions; Mining & Oil Field Products & Accidents; Mis-Read
Pap Smears; Nursing Homes; Orthopedic Implants; Parlodel; Patient Abuse in Psychiatric
Hospitals; Pharmacy Liability; Railroad/Highway Crossing & Derailment; Steroids; Tabloid
Outrage; Tap Water Burns; Theophylline; Tire/Rim Mismatches; Tobacco Products; Toys &
Recreational Equipment; Transmissions/Sudden Acceleration; Traumatic Brain Injuries; Truck
Underride; Tylenol & NSAIDS; Vaccines; Vehicle Back-Up Alarms; Vending Machines;
Workplace Injury; and the following subgroups of the Attorney’s Information Exchange Group:
ATV; Air Bags; Aquatic Injuries; Brakes; Child Restraints; Defective Firearms; Forklifts,
Industrial & Agricultural Equipment; Fuel System Integrity; Helmets; Leisure Boats/Personal
Watercraft; Motorcycles; Roof Crush; School Buses; Seat Belts; Seat Design; and Vehicle
Rollovers. See id. at 5. According to ATLA’s literature, “[l]itigation groups provide a network
for ATLA members handling similar cases to exchange information and share successful
strategies.” Litigation Groups Offer Winning Support to Members, ATLA ADVOC., Feb. 2000,
at 5.
44. See David Jaroslawicz, Identifying the Products Liability Case, Preparing It for Trial,
and Some Pointers During Trial from the Plaintiff’s Point of View, in TRIAL MECHANICS AND
DISCOVERY IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, AND PERSONAL INJURY
CASES 111, 120-21 (PLI Litigation & Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series, 1986)
(acknowledging the benefit of ATLA litigation groups in the preparation of products liability
cases).
45. GUIDE TO ATLA LITIGATION GROUPS, July 1998, at 22. For another example,
members of the nursing homes litigation group, who represent plaintiffs suing nursing homes for
negligent care, receive a “litigation manual” and a “compendium report of nursing home
litigation verdicts and settlements nationwide.” Id. at 18-19. In truly massive litigation, the
litigation groups grow accordingly. The breast implant group, for example, “maintains a full
time staffed office to exchange information on litigation and various settlement programs.” Id.
at 9.
46. See Ross D. Petty, Regulation vs. the Market: The Case of Bicycle Safety, 2 RISK: ISSUES
IN HEALTH & SAFETY 93, 112 (1991) (comparing the existence of an All-Terrain Vehicle
Litigation Group with the absence of a bicycle litigation group as evidence of bicycle safety).
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ATLA also maintains the ATLA Exchange, a members-only
Internet site boasting over 300,000 documents in eleven databases
47
and indexes. The Exchange allows plaintiffs’ attorneys to search the
databases for documents, depositions, pleadings, verdict and
settlement data, expert witness information, and names and
telephone numbers of other lawyers who have handled similar cases.
Lawyers who participate in the Exchange pledge to share their
experiences to assist other ATLA members who contact them.48
The Attorney’s Information Exchange Group (AIEG), a
nonprofit cooperative comprised of ATLA members representing
plaintiffs in products liability cases, provides members with extensive
49
discovery information. AIEG describes its primary objective: “to
provide plaintiffs’ counsel with the same collaborative benefits that
defense attorneys have long enjoyed.”50 AIEG information has been
credited with aiding plaintiff victories against manufacturers of all51
terrain vehicles and other products. One products liability lawyer
called AIEG “the first and least expensive step in evaluating
52
[product] design.”

47. See The Association of Trial Lawyers of America Exchange Web Site, at
http://exchange.atla.org (last visited Aug. 28, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Paul
Bernstein, Hunting for Buried Treasures, TRIAL, July 1998, at 104; Paul Bernstein, Read All
About It! ATLA Goes Online, TRIAL, July 1995, at 104; Gerry Miller, Director’s Corner, ATLA
EXCHANGE Q., July 1999, at 1; Prepare Your Auto Case with Documents from the ATLA
Exchange, TRIAL, Jan. 2000, at 24. The ATLA Exchange demonstrates the power of technology
to facilitate lawyer coordination. For other examples, see Mark Gottlieb, Finding the Smoking
Guns in Tobacco Litigation, TRIAL, Nov. 1999, at 22 (describing numerous electronic collections
of tobacco litigation documents), and The Tobacco Trial Lawyers Association Home Page, at
http://ttlaonline.com (last visited Aug. 28, 2000) (offering links to online information sources for
tobacco plaintiffs’ lawyers) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
48. See Miller, supra note 47, at 1; The Association of Trial Lawyers of America Exchange
Web Site, supra note 47. In addition to the searchable databases, the ATLA Exchange offers
prepared litigation packets dealing with such topics as fen-phen claims and firearms litigation.
See ATLA EXCHANGE Q., May 1999, at 1.
49. See GUIDE TO ATLA LITIGATION GROUPS, supra note 29, at 6-7; see also Ward v.
Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579 (D. Colo. 1982) (removing a broad protective order aimed at
preventing dissemination of discovery to AIEG).
50. GUIDE TO ATLA LITIGATION GROUPS, supra note 29, at 6.
51. See Gail Diane Cox, Alleged GM Belt Defect Revealed by California Court, NAT’L L.J.,
Sept. 2, 1996, at A6 (citing attorney coordination and AIEG as sources of damaging information
used by plaintiffs); Timothy S. White, Conveying Corporate Misconduct: The Time Line,
DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE, Supplement to MASS. LAW. WKLY., Mar. 15, 1993, at S1
(describing the importance of AIEG data in ATV litigation).
52. James R. Pratt III, Motor Vehicle Products Liability Litigation—The Basics, TRIAL,
Nov. 1997, at 47.
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Coordination may involve not only private attorneys but
government lawyers as well. Separate federal agencies, for example,
53
sometimes coordinate their investigations in legal actions. State
attorneys general have shared resources in pursuing their claims
against the tobacco companies.54 In the antitrust legal battle involving
Microsoft Corporation, lawyers from the U.S. Department of Justice
55
shared information with state attorneys general. Finally, lawyers
may work together on parallel criminal and civil cases, as prosecutors
and civil litigators may both reap the benefits of joint preparation.56
The line between formal and informal aggregation can become
rather fuzzy, as when lawyer coordination in related cases is
prompted by a court, or when it takes the form of judicially
57
designated steering committees or lead and liaison counsel. The
Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) advises federal judges
handling complex cases how to deal with related lawsuits:
If related litigation is pending in other federal or state courts, the
judges should consider the feasibility of coordination among counsel
in the various cases. . . . It may be possible through consultation with
other judges to bring about the designation of common committees
or of counsel and to enter joint or parallel orders governing their
function and compensation. Where that is not feasible, the judge
may direct counsel to coordinate with the attorneys involved in the
other cases to reduce duplication and potential conflicts and to

53. See Joel deJesus, Comment, Interagency Privity and Claim Preclusion, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 195 (1990) (describing interagency cooperation as a response to the threat of claim
preclusion).
54. See More States Consider Suing Firms to Recoup Smoking’s Costs, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 25, 1996, at 16 (discussing an information clearinghouse organized by fifteen states).
55. See Danny Westneat & Thomas W. Haines, Justice Puts More Heat on Microsoft,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 19, 1997, at D1.
56. See Robert K. Huffman et al., The Perils of Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings: A
Primer, HEALTH LAW., Mar. 1998, at 1, 4. One controversial example is the reported
consultation between independent counsel Kenneth Starr and the lawyers representing Paula
Jones in her civil lawsuit against President Clinton. See Peter Baker & Juliet Eilperin, Inquiry
May Turn Table on Starr, Jones Lawyers, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1998, at A8.
57. See M.C.L.3d, supra note 9, § 20.22 (addressing lead counsel and committee structures
for coordination of counsel in multiparty litigation); see also Informal Consolidation for
Discovery Purposes in West Virginia Cases, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO, Jan. 22, 1998, at
15 (describing the “informal consolidation” of three West Virginia tobacco actions). Professors
Curtis and Resnik noted that either judicial action or litigant coordination can create informal
aggregation: “Informal aggregation may occur when defendants or plaintiffs deal with cases as a
‘block’ or when courts apply uniform pretrial orders to cases officially distinct or assign a set of
cases to a single judge or special master for case management.” Curtis & Resnik, supra note 1,
at 429.
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further efficiency and economy through coordination and sharing of
58
resources.

Partial formal aggregation—the judicial aggregation of some but
not all related claims—breeds more extensive informal aggregation.
In large-scale class actions, the court appoints lead counsel or a group
of lead counsel, who supervise and coordinate the work of teams of
59
lawyers on behalf of the class. Similarly, the judge overseeing a
federal multidistrict litigation generally appoints a steering committee
or management committee, as well as lead and liaison counsel.60
Although the formal judicial structure for the lawyer team applies
only to formally aggregated claims, in practice that structure touches
outlying claims as well, affecting the representation of non–class
members or opt-outs, as well as state cases that fall outside of the
MDL.61 Whether the impetus for coordination comes from the bench
or from the lawyers, judges embrace lawyer coordination for the
62
coherence it brings to multi-suit litigation.
Whether engineered by attorneys or judicially imposed,
coordination among plaintiffs’ lawyers often emerges as a hub-andspoke structure. Individual lawyers retain control over the day-to-day
handling of their clients’ cases but coordinate strategy and
information-gathering through a central litigation group, steering
63
committee, or lawyer. Plaintiffs’ lawyers often resist ceding control
58. M.C.L.3d, supra note 9, § 20.225. For a sample court order addressing the roles of
designated lead and liaison counsel in related lawsuits, see id. § 41.51.
59. See Resnik et al., supra note 1, at 321-26 (describing the ad hoc law firms that develop
in large-scale tort litigation).
60. See GREEN, supra note 5, at 170-73 (describing the organization of plaintiffs’ lawyers in
the Bendectin multidistrict litigation); M.C.L.3d, supra note 9, § 20.221; WEINSTEIN, supra note
7, at 83-84.
61. See Rheingold et al., supra note 21, at C28.
62. See JAMES G. APPLE ET AL., MANUAL FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 16-18 (1997) (noting that some judges allow joint discovery and describing its
advantages); M.C.L.3d, supra note 9, § 20.22 (maintaining that coordination avoids unnecessary
burdens on courts); Francis E. McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass Tort
Litigation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1851, 1865-66 (1997) (describing circumstances in which
coordination among lawyers is likely to occur); William W Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism
in Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689, 1732-33
(1992) (describing the benefits of coordination); Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural and Substantive
Problems in Complex Litigation Arising from Disasters, 5 TOURO L. REV. 1, 12 (1988)
(maintaining that judicial involvement in coordinated discovery is advantageous).
63. See Myron J. Bromberg & Anastasia P. Slowinski, Pay or Play in Mass Torts: Alleviate
Backlogs with an Expanded Court System or Joinder Methods for Mass Tort Cases, 45 RUTGERS
L. REV. 371, 385-86 (1993) (maintaining that formal coordination of discovery among
defendants is preferable); Rheingold, supra note 9, at 3 (describing the formation of litigation
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over their clients’ cases;64 thus, coordinated efforts at the hub may
dominate discovery, research, and strategy, but tend not to extend to
the ends of the spokes, into individual case management.
We can follow the rise of informal aggregation among plaintiffs
by noting the frequency and aggressiveness of defendants’ measures
to combat it. Plaintiffs routinely face efforts by defendants seeking to
prevent the plaintiffs from sharing information with each other. In
providing discovery responses in litigation involving multiple related
lawsuits, defendants often ask the court for protective orders to
prohibit dissemination of discovery information to plaintiffs or
65
potential plaintiffs in other cases. Although some defendants have
66
received such protection, most courts have rejected attempts to

groups); Rheingold, supra note 10, at 125 (describing the consolidation of cases arising from a
mass disaster); Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL
L. REV. 779, 811 (1985) (describing the informal coordination of discovery).
64. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 83 (describing struggles among lawyers to gain control
of mass tort litigation); Bromberg & Slowinski, supra note 63, at 385-86 (maintaining that
unwillingness to cede such control usually precludes coordination of discovery); Lowenthal &
Erichson, supra note 1, at 1006 (“Notwithstanding the benefits of coordination, plaintiffs’
lawyers usually insist on retaining ultimate control over their individual cases.”); Rheingold,
supra note 9, at 3 (listing money and power as the primary motivations for this resistance);
Rheingold, supra note 10, at 125 (describing such resistance in a mass tort litigation case);
Trangsrud, supra note 63, at 811 (stating that fear of losing such control usually prevents
coordinated discovery).
65. See Thomas M. Flemming, Annotation, Propriety and Extent of State Court Protective
Order Restricting Party’s Right to Disclose Discovered Information to Others Engaged in Similar
Litigation, 83 A.L.R.4th 987, 990 (1991) (noting that defendants often seek protective orders);
Stuart E. Rickerson, Corporate Counsel’s Guide to the New Rules, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 192, 196
(1994) (maintaining that pursuit of protective orders is advisable for defendants); Daniel Boyd
Smith, Anti-Dissemination Orders in Product Liability Suits, 5 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 507, 512
(1982) (describing defendants’ attempts to curtail dissemination of information); James A.
Campbell, Protective Orders Are Vital, Promote Fairness, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Mar. 29, 1993, at
11 (arguing that judges’ discretion to grant protective orders should not be limited); Nicolas J.
Wittner & Richard P. Campbell, Protective Orders Under Attack, ACCA DOCKET, Winter 1990,
at 14 (describing the advantages of protective orders).
66. See, e.g., Grace v. Center for Auto Safety, 72 F.3d 1236, 1237 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting
that a protective order was in force). In one recent securities class action, for example, a federal
judge ordered the plaintiffs’ lawyers not to communicate with lawyers pursuing a related action
in state court. See Phyllis L. Mason, Is California’s Ethical Discovery Firewall Here to Stay?,
ANDREWS CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LIABILITY LITIG. REP., Dec. 8, 1997, at 19. In the
latex gloves products liability litigation, the MDL court established a document depository but
ordered elaborate security systems to protect the confidentiality of various documents. See
Document Depository Established by MDL Court, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: LATEX, Mar. 27,
1998, at 10; see also California Latex Plaintiff Asks High Court to Review Protective Order,
Citing Lack of Factual Showing, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: LATEX, Jan. 30, 1998, at 5 (describing a
plaintiff’s attack on an MDL protective order allowing discovery sharing only on condition of
confidentiality by each receiving party).
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restrict plaintiffs’ information-sharing.67 In an action involving an
exploding fuel tank, for example, an Ohio judge rejected General
Motors’ demand for the return of documents at the close of trial,
noting that GM’s main motivation “is that it fears these documents
might fall into the hands of a similarly situated plaintiff.”68
Defendants’ fear of plaintiff coordination manifests in another
way: defendants try to learn the extent of plaintiffs’ informationsharing. In a number of cases, defendants have sought to discover
documents obtained by plaintiffs through litigation groups or other
69
coordinated efforts. Defendants want the discovery because plaintiff
coordination affects defendants’ strategic decisions.70 Plaintiffs’

67. See Flemming, supra note 65, at 991 (noting that both federal and state courts generally
permit sharing of information among litigants); see, e.g., Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 160 F.R.D. 625, 629
(D. Kan. 1995) (holding that no good cause for a protective order was shown); Ward v. Ford
Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982) (vacating a magistrate’s granting of a protective
order); Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152, 154 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (noting that full use
of discovered information ordinarily may be made in other forums); Krahling v. Executive Life
Ins. Co., 959 P.2d 562, 568 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing an order denying a motion to lift a
protective order); Earl v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 366 N.W.2d 160, 165 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (noting
that “the movant must show a positive reason (i.e., ‘good cause’) for the entry of [a protective]
order”); Blanket Confidentiality Order Found Improvident by New Mexico Appeals Court,
MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: INS. INSOLVENCY, May 20, 1998, at 6 (discussing Krahling); see also
Francis H. Hare, Jr. et al., Confidentiality Orders in Products Liability Cases, 13 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 597, 601 (1989) (noting that courts have held that plaintiffs’ counsel may be prejudiced
by such restrictions); Teresa M. Hendricks & Joseph W. Moch, Protective Orders: The Industry’s
Silencer on the Smoking Gun, 73 MICH. BAR J., May 1994, at 425 (arguing that defendants seek
protective orders to force individual plaintiffs into isolation). See generally Richard L. Marcus,
The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457 (denying the necessity and
desirability of judicial and legislative efforts to make discovery presumptively public).
68. Koval v. General Motors Corp., 610 N.E.2d 1199, 1202 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
69. See, e.g., Hendrick v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 916 F. Supp. 256, 258-59 (W.D.N.Y.
1996) (citing and following Bartley v. Isuzu Motors Ltd., 158 F.R.D. 165 (D. Colo. 1994) and
Bohannon v. Honda Motor Co., 127 F.R.D. 536 (D. Kan. 1989)); Bartley, 158 F.R.D. at 166
(compelling disclosure of a list of documents obtained from the defendant in earlier litigation
but noting that the defendant had access to the documents themselves); Bohannon, 127 F.R.D.
at 538 (compelling discovery of documents obtained from the defendant by other plaintiffs and
holding that it is not the work product of counsel in the instant case); see also Where Did You
Get That Information?, FED. LITIG., Mar. 1995, at 52 (summarizing Bartley).
70. See Richard A. Mueller, The Use of Standardized Materials and the Role of Local
Counsel, in EFFECTIVE COORDINATION OF MULTIPLE PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION 99,
101 (PLI Litigation Course Handbook Series, 1988) (noting that the sharing of legal theories
among plaintiffs requires defendants to become familiar with those theories and to anticipate
their assertion by additional plaintiffs); Richard A. Rothman & Eric Ordway, Coordinating the
Defense of Multiple Litigations Relating to the Same Product or Problem, in EFFECTIVE
COORDINATION OF MULTIPLE PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION 117, 124-25 (PLI Litigation
Course Handbook Series, 1988) (describing cooperation among plaintiffs’ attorneys and noting
that what defendants say in one case will be known to counsel in future cases).
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attorneys have actively resisted,71 arguing with some force that even if
the documents themselves are neither privileged nor work product,
the grouping or packaging of the documents reveals attorneys’ mental
72
impressions and, therefore, triggers work product protection. Such
arguments have not met with much success, and defendants generally
have been able to learn the contents of information shared among
73
coordinating plaintiffs’ lawyers. Even without looking directly at the
phenomenal extent of plaintiff coordination in multi-suit litigation,
we could surmise it by observing the worried reaction of defendants.
B. Defense Coordination
On the defense side, as well, counsel coordination occurs in many
types of lawsuits and takes several forms. Informal aggregation can
occur where a single defendant faces multiple related lawsuits, or
where multiple defendants are named in related lawsuits. First, a
single party defending multiple similar actions naturally handles the
defense on a coordinated basis. In major multi-jurisdictional
litigation, local counsel in various states coordinate with the
defendant’s national lead counsel and, through lead counsel, with
each other. Second, defendants to related lawsuits often work
cooperatively to respond to plaintiffs’ claims, using joint defense
agreements and many of the same devices employed by coordinating
plaintiffs. In cases involving a primary or central defendant and other
more tangential defendants, the defendants sometimes coordinate
their efforts under the leadership of the primary defendant.
1. Coordination of Multiple Lawsuits by a Single Defendant.
Various legal settings present a defendant with multiple suits that
demand a coordinated response. For example, an antitrust defendant
may face actions by multiple business competitors and consumers, as
71. See GUIDE TO ATLA LITIGATION GROUPS, supra note 29, at 2-3 (“Each litigation
group member must affirm that he/she . . . will make every reasonable effort to oppose any
motion or request by a defendant to produce documents and information received from the
Litigation Group or its members.”).
72. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (instructing the court to “protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney”).
73. See, e.g., Hendrick, 916 F. Supp. at 258-59 (allowing the defendant in a products liability
case to discover information obtained by the plaintiff’s counsel from other attorneys with claims
against the same manufacturer); Bartley, 158 F.R.D. at 167 (rejecting the plaintiff’s contention
that documents obtained through ATLA are protected under the work product doctrine);
Bohannon, 127 F.R.D. at 538-40 (same); see also Where Did You Get That Information?, supra
note 69, at 52 (discussing Bartley).

ERICHSON.DOC

402

11/21/00 12:11 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:381

well as by the federal and state governments; a products liability
defendant with an alleged design defect or failure to warn generally
faces actions by multiple victims, as may a securities or consumer
fraud defendant; an employer charged with systematic discrimination,
or any institution accused of systematic civil rights violations likewise
may face multiple lawsuits. In each situation, defense counsel must
view the litigation as a whole for purposes of legal research, factual
investigation, resource allocation, and overall strategy.
Where related lawsuits are filed in multiple jurisdictions, a
defendant’s in-house counsel or outside law firm typically cannot
handle the defense alone. Each major defendant’s lead counsel
generally hires local counsel in each state where lawsuits have been
filed.74 To supervise local counsel effectively, and to make informed
strategic decisions, lead counsel must receive a regular stream of
information from local counsel regarding suit-specific happenings in
each state. To handle each case effectively and efficiently, local
counsel must be kept abreast of developments in the broader
litigation. Lead and local counsel, therefore, establish lines of
communication for sharing information.75 The larger the litigation, the
more formalized the mechanisms. In addition to simply keeping in
touch by telephone, mail, and e-mail, defense counsel have used more
structured techniques including periodic seminars and regular
mailings,76 as well as Internet-based networking.77 The result is a hub-

74. See Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982) (noting that the
defendant “coordinate[d] its defenses in the cases filed against it throughout the United
States”); Patricia L. Glaser, Case Management and Depositions in Complex Litigation, in
MANAGEMENT OF COMPLEX MASS TORT LITIGATION: PREPARING FOR TRIAL 1986, at 301,
305 (PLI Litigation & Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series, 1986); Hare et al.,
supra note 67, at 598.
75. See Mueller, supra note 70, at 101.
76. See Lowenthal & Erichson, supra note 1, at 996.
77. See, e.g., TrialNet, at http://www.trialnet.com (last visited Aug. 29, 2000) (providing an
internet resource for defense counsel) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). TrialNet markets
itself as a provider of “collaborative lawyer networks” for corporations and insurance
companies. Its web page emphasizes the need for coordination of multiple matters by multiple
lawyers:
TrialNet’s typical client is an organization with many outside counsel involved in
representation of matters that involve commonality. Anytime the work of such
counsel bring them in contact with similar factual, legal, technical issues, the same
experts, opposing counsel or fact witnesses, or involve the necessity for close
coordination of discovery or presentment of similar strategies, there is a need for
TrialNet.
TrialNet Model, at http://www.trialnet.com/about/what.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2000) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
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and-spoke network—not unlike the plaintiffs’ party control
structure78—with lead or in-house counsel at the hub and various local
counsel at the spokes, for coordinating the defense of dispersed
79
lawsuits.
2. Coordination Among Multiple Defendants. Defense
coordination can emerge in any multi-defendant litigation, including
products liability, patent infringement, and insurance defense.
Complex products liability litigation, for example, ordinarily involves
multiple defendants along the distribution chain, such as
manufacturer, distributor and retailer, and may involve multiple
manufacturers as well. Such defendants, by working together rather
than pointing fingers, may focus their attention on jointly defeating
plaintiffs’ theories concerning such key issues as product defect,
80
causation, and market share liability.
In multi-defendant patent litigation, where multiple alleged
infringers find themselves pursued by a patentee, the defendants
often enter joint defense arrangements to combat the patentee’s
81
claims. Such arrangements vary, but may involve contributing
money to a common fund to further the defense, exchanging
information, and discussing such defense issues as patent validity,
claim interpretation, and prior art.82
Insurance defense lawyers routinely find themselves litigating
matters involving up to twenty or thirty other insurance companies,

78. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
79. See Lowenthal & Erichson, supra note 1, at 1007-08 (describing the hub-and-spoke
structure of both plaintiffs’ and defense counsel in mass tort litigation).
80. See Charles S. Cassis & Donald L. Miller II, Coordinating the Multiple Product Liability
Litigation: Avoid the Pitfalls, in EFFECTIVE COORDINATION OF MULTIPLE PRODUCT LIABILITY
LITIGATION 151, 161-63 (PLI Litigation & Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series,
1988); Lawrence G. Cetrulo, The Lead Pigment Litigation: An Example of a Successful
Coordinated Defense, in THE THIRD ANNUAL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT SUPERCOURSE 485,
489-93 (PLI Litigation & Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series, 1992). In the
dibromochloropropane litigation, which involved thousands of claims against a half-dozen
chemical manufacturers and banana growers based on exposure to an agricultural pesticide, the
defendants jointly removed the litigation from Texas and Florida state courts to federal court
and jointly moved for dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens. See Cabalceta v. Standard
Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1555-56 (11th Cir. 1989); Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1216
(11th Cir. 1985); Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1334, 1335-39 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Rojas v.
DeMent, 137 F.R.D. 30, 31-32 (S.D. Fla 1991).
81. See John E. Daniel, Joint Defense Arrangements Raise Antitrust Issues, NAT’L L.J., Oct.
19, 1998, at C36.
82. See id.
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all of whose interests are closely aligned. The insurance companies
often form a “joint defense consortium” in which lawyers for the
various insurance companies work together to advance their clients’
united interests.83 For court hearings, lawyers for the insurers often
agree to have one lawyer speak on behalf of the entire consortium.84
In multi-defendant litigation, counsel for the various defendants
commonly hold joint defense conferences to strategize, share
85
86
information, and divvy up work on legal issues. Defendants gain a
number of advantages from a coordinated defense. First, each
defendant saves money by avoiding duplication of effort. With joint
briefs, shared experts, and cooperative factual investigations, each
87
defendant need not reinvent the wheel. Second, by sharing
information, each defendant finds itself better able to anticipate and
resist plaintiffs’ arguments.88 Third, defense coordination decreases
83. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95395 (1995) (discussing ethical implications of such insurance defense consortiums).
84. See id. at 1.
85. Like plaintiffs’ counsel, defense lawyers increasingly use the Internet to share
information. See Lee H. Glickenhaus, Extranets Merge Virtues of Internet and Intranets, NAT’L
L.J., Mar. 9, 1998, at B14; see, e.g., TrialNet Model, supra note 77 (offering to create Internet
lawyer networks for corporate clients, including mechanisms for sharing information with other
defense counsel handling related matters).
86. See Michael M. Gordon, Juggling Demands of Mass Litigation: Defendants See Ways of
Working Together, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 20, 1993, at S3 (discussing the use of an informal consortium
of attorneys for defendants in similar cases, in which “each firm . . . participates in some aspect
of the overall defense effort”); Albert H. Parnell, The Coordinated Group Defense, FOR THE
DEFENSE, Nov. 1980, at 16 (describing the course and structure of the coordinated defense);
Peter N. Sheridan & Bradley S. Tupi, Joint Arrangement Results in Victory for Chemical and
Insurance Companies, LEADER’S PROD. LIAB. NEWSL., Oct. 1984, at 3, 6 (discussing
cooperative defense efforts in a pesticide exposure case by lawyers for five chemical companies,
three insurers, and one pest-control operator); O.J. Weber, Mass Tort Litigation: The Pot Boils
Over, 6 J. PROD. LIAB. 273, 280 (1983) (noting the development of “[m]ore effective and
economical use of multi-defense counsel by organization within the group, by periodic meetings,
delegation of particular tasks to specific attorneys, formation of deposition and trial teams,
widespread and effective use of paralegals, and the use of one attorney or firm to represent,
where appropriate, more than one defendant”).
87. See Cassis & Miller, supra note 80, at 154 (describing the manner in which a
coordinated structure of national, regional, and local counsel may be employed to minimize the
duplication of effort common in complex product liability litigation); Edward Lowenberg,
Consolidated Defense Experience: Working with Co-Defendants to Minimize Costs, in THE
THIRD ANNUAL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT SUPERCOURSE, supra note 80, at 485, 489-93;
Angela D. Slater & Aney Chandy Kurien, Joint Defense Agreements: A Cautionary Tale, N.J.
LAW., June 1998, at 12 (noting that joint defense agreements “afford multiple defendants the
opportunity to assert a cohesive, cost-effective defense position,” and emphasizing that
“[d]efendants can share litigation costs, including the often hefty expense of retaining experts”).
88. See Of Big Kahuna Days, Matlock and Ambushed Plaintiff Experts, FOR THE DEFENSE,
Oct. 1996, at 6 [hereinafter Big Kahuna].
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the risk of finger-pointing89 and hostile cross-claims.90 The Corporate
Counsel Section of the New York State Bar Association offered this
advice to corporate litigators:
From a corporate defendant’s perspective, a unified defense effort
often makes sense, unless the defendant has a winning defense that
is unavailable to other defendants. The alternative to a joint defense
is sometimes destructive anarchy, with each defendant presenting a
different theory of the case while blaming each other. Frequently,
the only litigant who benefits from a fractionalized “every-man-for91
himself” defense is the plaintiff.

Finally, by coordinating during the discovery process, defendants
strive for a uniform understanding of the scope, meaning, and
propriety of plaintiffs’ discovery requests, so that no single defendant
will stand out as particularly forthcoming or particularly resistant.
Defense coordination is so valuable in complex multi-defendant
matters that one leading treatise comments that “it is frequently
advisable . . . to devote as much time to coordination as to any other
92
substantive aspect of the case.”
89. See R. Benjamine Reid, A View from the Bottom: Musings of Local Trial Counsel in a
Highly Regulated Industry—Nationally Coordinated Products Litigation, in EFFECTIVE
COORDINATION OF MULTIPLE PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION 183, 187 (1988) (arguing that
defense coordination can minimize the risk of “mistakes on a local level which can create
problems in the same litigation throughout the nation”); Peter N. Sheridan, An Alternative to
Disaster: Cooperation Among Defendants, in PRODUCT LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS 1987:
PREVENTION AND DEFENSE 395, 408-09 (1987) (discussing a case in which, because the defense
attorneys did not cooperate, each damaged the case of the other defendant); Slater & Kurien,
supra note 87, at 12 (“[W]ith respect to product liability actions, defendants can develop a
unified, structured theory of defense rather than engaging in piece-meal litigation with every
defendant pointing the finger upstream in the distribution chain.”); Sheridan & Tupi, supra note
86, at 3 (crediting defense counsel cooperation with a defense verdict in a pesticide case,
explaining that “[t]he defendants, by declining to adduce evidence against each other,
compelled the plaintiffs to attempt to meet their normal burden of proving causation”).
90. See Edward Lowenberg, Consolidated Defense Experience: Working with CoDefendants to Really Minimize Costs, in 2 FIFTH ANNUAL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT
SUPERCOURSE 75, 77-78 (PLI Litigation & Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series,
1994) (“The ineffective use of multiple trial counsel with its attendant ‘risk spreading’
conglomeration of cross-claims, third party actions and indemnity claims increases the
likelihood of plaintiff verdicts.”); Sheridan & Tupi, supra note 86, at 3 (noting defendants’
agreement neither to prosecute cross-claims nor to conduct discovery against each other).
91. Corporate Counsel Section of the New York State Bar Association, Report on CostEffective Management of Corporate Litigation, 59 ALB. L. REV. 263, 309 (1995) (footnotes
omitted).
92. JAMES L. STENGEL & ANDREW M. CALAMARI, COMPLEX LITIGATION 1-21 (1994); see
also Corporate Counsel Section of the New York State Bar Association, supra note 91, at 30812 (discussing the greater efficiency that can be achieved by a coordinated defense).
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As with plaintiff coordination, defense coordination may be
93
imposed by the court. But “even where the court does not mandate
the organization of a joint defense group, it is likely that the
94
defendants will organize one anyway.”
Where one defendant emerges as the plaintiffs’ primary target, a
95
multi-defendant network sometimes emerges around that defendant.
The primary manufacturer in a mass products liability litigation, for
example, may develop a cooperative litigation relationship with the
distributors and retailers who have been named as defendants. Such
relationships can range from casual cooperative communications to
formal written indemnification and cooperation agreements, in which
the manufacturer agrees to indemnify the downstream defendants in
exchange for their cooperation in the litigation defense.
96
Although some defense arrangements operate on a handshake,
coordinating defense counsel may formalize their relationship with a
written joint defense agreement. Most commentators advise
97
defendants to put joint defense agreements in writing, and the use of
93. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF
MASS TOXIC TORTS 75 (1985) (“In some jurisdictions, the lawyers themselves created these
roles [of lead counsel in coordinated asbestos litigation defense]; in others, they were mandated
by the court.”); Slater & Kurien, supra note 87, at 14 (“[J]udges presiding over complex product
liability cases sometimes compel multiple defendants to engage in joint defense arrangements,
such as utilizing a defense liaison counsel, for the sake of efficiency.”); see also supra notes 57-62
and accompanying text (discussing judicially imposed plaintiff coordination and the connection
between formal and informal aggregation).
94. Mark D. Plevin, Avoiding Problems in Joint Defense Groups, LITIGATION, Fall 1996, at
42.
95. See Robert L. Haig & Steven P. Caley, Effective Representation of the “Deep Pocket” or
Target Defendant, FED. LITIG. GUIDE REP. 687 (1996).
96. See Sheridan & Tupi, supra note 86, at 6 (“The defendants [in a pesticide exposure
case] as a group eschewed either a formal contract or a less formal letter agreement. There was
a handshake kind of cooperation, with the understanding that the chips—liability
apportionment—would fall as they might.”).
97. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Professional
Responsibility, Ethical Implications of Joint Defense/Common Interest Agreements, in 51 THE
RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 115, 116 (1996)
(“[W]e conclude that the ethical issues involved among the participants in a joint defense are
sufficiently complex that a lawyer should not normally rely on an unwritten or implied
agreement, but should instead ensure that each participant has agreed in writing to the specific
terms of the joint defense.”); Corporate Counsel Section of the New York State Bar
Association, supra note 91, at 310 (“It is often a good idea for the joint defense group to execute
a written joint defense agreement.”); Peter N. Sheridan, Sharing Agreements: One Method of
Managing Mass Tort Litigation, in MANAGEMENT OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 89, 102 (1983)
(recommending formal written cooperation agreements, because informal understandings can
buckle under the weight of defendants’ urge to avoid or minimize liability by pointing the
liability finger at each other); Sheridan & Tupi, supra note 86, at 6 (suggesting that “a more
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formal written agreements appears to be increasing.98 The terms of
such agreements vary considerably.99 Formalized defense
arrangements can range from simple contracts for limited joint efforts
to such ambitious operations as the Center for Claims Resolution
(CCR), a consortium of twenty asbestos defendants, which maintains
a database tracking 100,000 claims and over one million documents,100
101
and litigates and negotiates as a single entity.
organized and formal arrangement” would have been preferable to the “informal arrangement”
used by defendants in a successful pesticide defense); Slater & Kurien, supra note 87, at 12
(stating “it generally is advisable to engage in a written agreement as opposed to an oral one
due to privilege concerns”).
98. See Jeffrey R. Parsons & David K. Williams, Considerations Regarding Consolidated
Defense Arrangements in Environmental Litigation, in THE THIRD ANNUAL LITIGATION
MANAGEMENT SUPERCOURSE, supra note 80, at 523, 526 (“Historically, joint defense
arrangements were more frequently informal gentlemen’s understandings as opposed to
agreements reduced to writing. . . . Increasingly, these gentlemen’s agreements have been more
difficult to attain and to retain throughout the litigation. Thus, parties have turned to more
formal, written joint defense agreements.”); Jo S. Kerlinsky, Beyond the Bounds of the Joint
Defense Agreement, PRACTICAL LAW., Mar. 1998, at 51, 59 (“Courts and counsel have long
recognized joint defense agreements as a powerful tool to promote efficiency in civil litigation
and encourage early settlements. In recent years, the use of written agreements to memorialize
the intentions of the parties has become commonplace in mass tort litigation.”).
99. See Corporate Counsel Section of the New York State Bar Association, supra note 91,
at 310:
[A joint defense agreement] can be as simple as a one page letter signed by all
defendants stating defendants’ willingness to work together, cooperate on the case,
share litigation costs and preserve confidential and privileged information. A joint
defense agreement can also be more elaborate, delegating to particular defendants in
the group various tasks and responsibilities, e.g., lead trial counsel responsibility,
document management, expert witness retention and preparation, etc.
See also Slater & Kurien, supra note 87, at 12 (“Joint defense agreements need not conform to
any specific standard. Instead, they can be tailored to address the particular needs of individual
cases.”). For a model joint defense agreement, see Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, supra note 97, at 125-28.
100. See Jo McIntyre, Handling the Monster Case, LAW OFFICE COMPUTING, June-July
1992, at 33, 34.
101. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 599-601 & n.2 (1997)
(describing the legal efforts of the CCR in the case before the Court and listing the participating
companies). The Center for Claims Resolution was established as a mechanism for alternative
dispute resolution of asbestos claims. See Lawrence Fitzpatrick, The Center for Claims
Resolution, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 13 (Autumn 1990). In the massive asbestos
litigation, cooperation among defendants has been essential. See Myra Alperson, Asbestos
Defendants Begin to Cooperate in Litigation, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 19, 1983, at 3. Not all asbestos
defense coordination can be considered successful, however. See, e.g., Gold v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068, 1075 (3d Cir. 1983). The Gold case
is an example of defense coordination gone awry. Defendant Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., pursuant to the defendants’ informal arrangement, was to gather evidentiary
material for use at trial by all of the defendants. When Johns-Manville filed a
bankruptcy petition shortly before trial, the other defendants were left with
inadequate discovery. The court refused to postpone the trial.
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To the extent defendants have an equivalent to ATLA, it is the
Defense Research Institute (DRI). Although its lawyer-coordinating
operations pale in comparison to ATLA’s, the DRI offers defense
counsel seminars, research, litigation groups, an expert witness index,
102
a brief bank, and other resources. Its expert witness bank contains
information on over 41,000 witnesses,103 which defense counsel find
particularly useful for locating inconsistencies in the testimony of
plaintiffs’ experts.104 Whether through ATLA or DRI, written
agreements or ad hoc initiatives, lawyers for aligned parties in related
lawsuits coordinate their efforts, despite the formal separateness of
the lawsuits.
II. THE INADEQUACY OF FORMAL AGGREGATION
What gives rise to informal aggregation is the failure of formal
aggregation mechanisms to achieve a unified handling of
controversies involving large numbers of claimants. Procedural rules
offer ways to aggregate related claims, but do not achieve fully
unified treatment. Permissive joinder, compulsory joinder,
intervention, consolidation, and multidistrict litigation transfer suffer
from their inability, in most mass litigation scenarios, to reach all
related claims. Class actions potentially cure the problem of
inadequate reach, but strict requirements for class certification render
them unusable much of the time. Above all, the existence of parallel
federal and state court systems, with little opportunity for formal
intersystem coordination,105 leaves many related cases pending as
separate judicial actions.

Lowenthal & Erichson, supra note 1, at 998 n.38 (citations omitted).
102. See Kathryn Dix Sowle, Toward a Synthesis of Product Liability Principles: Schwartz’s
Model and the Cost-Minimization Alternative, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 38 n.174 (1991); David
Ranii, For the Other Side, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 13, 1982, at 1.
103. See DRI’s Expert Witness Bank: The Numbers, FOR THE DEFENSE, Mar. 1996, at 5
(“The Expert Witness Bank, as of January 31, 1996, had files on 41,890 experts.”).
104. See Big Kahuna, supra note 88, at 6.
105. On the cooperation of state and federal judges in the absence of formal intersystem
aggregation, see Schwarzer et al., supra note 62.
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A. True Aggregation: Party Joinder and Class Action
Joinder of parties106 and the class action device107 can combine the
claims of multiple parties, or against multiple parties, into a single
action. In this regard, they constitute the purest versions of formal
aggregation. Neither mechanism, however, fully aggregates the
various types of related claims that prompt lawyers to coordinate
their work.
1. Party Joinder. Joinder of parties is generally permitted when
claims arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
108
109
transactions or occurrences. The test is easy to satisfy, and there is
no numerical ceiling, so it is possible to use joinder to aggregate
massive litigation. The shortcoming of permissive joinder is that it is
just that—permissive. Plaintiffs themselves control the use of
permissive joinder as an aggregation mechanism. Moreover, joinder
may not be feasible in some cases, especially where plaintiffs’ lawyers
practice in different states.110 In litigation against geographically
dispersed defendants, the requirements of personal jurisdiction111 and
venue112 further complicate joinder and often doom it to
incompleteness.
Compulsory joinder of parties takes control over aggregation
113
away from the plaintiffs and offers it to defendants and to the court.

106. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (governing compulsory joinder of parties); FED. R. CIV. P. 20
(governing permissive joinder of parties); see also Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335,
1397, 2361 (1994) (governing statutory interpleader); FED. R. CIV. P. 14 (governing impleader);
FED. R. CIV. P. 22 (governing rule interpleader); FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (governing intervention).
107. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
108. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 20; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 378-79 (West 1973); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 1002 (McKinney 1976).
109. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1653
(1986).
110. One would hope to explain this based on each lawyer’s careful choice of the most
appropriate and advantageous forum for the particular plaintiff. The phenomenon probably
flows just as much, however, from lawyers’ concerns over losing clients if lawsuits are filed in a
forum where they are not admitted to practice.
111. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980)
(dismissing two of the four permissively joined defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction).
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1994) (delineating venue options in federal court).
113. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 19; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 389 (West 1973); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
1001 (McKinney 1976). Another way defendants control party structure is impleader, which
allows a defending party to bring in a third-party defendant who may be liable for indemnity or
contribution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 14.
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Compulsory joinder, however, is exceedingly limited. It requires
joinder, where feasible, of such inextricably linked claims as those
involving ownership of jointly held property.114 It does not apply to
115
joint tortfeasors, nor does it apply in general to multiple plaintiffs
harmed by a single occurrence.116 Despite some calls for greater use of
compulsory joinder,117 its use remains the exception. For the vast
majority of claims on which lawyers coordinate, none of the parties
are “necessary parties” within the meaning of the compulsory joinder
rule.118

114. See, e.g., Haas v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 442 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 1971) (requiring
joinder when one alleged co-owner of a bank’s stock sought a mandatory injunction directing
the bank to issue him a certain number of shares).
115. See Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498 U.S. 5, 7 (1990) (per curiam) (holding that, in the case
of alleged defective design and manufacture of a device implanted in the plaintiff’s spine, failure
to join the doctor and hospital as defendants with the manufacturer was not error).
116. “Simply because a prospective party could properly be joined under the permissive
joinder rules does not mean that it must be joined under the compulsory joinder rules.”
FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.11 (4th ed. 1992). Professors James,
Hazard and Leubsdorf offer the following example:
[T]wo persons injured in the same accident may join as plaintiffs in the same action
against the alleged tortfeasor or tortfeasors. But this does not mean that they must
join; hence, it does not mean that either of them is a necessary party in an action
brought by the other. Thus, a parent and child, or spouses, injured in the same
accident may bring separate suits for their injuries. It is ordinarily not in their interest
to bring separate suits because duplication of effort is involved, and the incentives to
join as co-plaintiffs usually result in proceeding through a single suit. But the rules as
to joinder of parties generally do not require such joinder.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 1998)
(“Multiple victims of air disasters, multiple stockholders of companies that have committed
securities violations, and multiple holders of rights in pensions, normally may all bring their own
suits even if the defendant engaged in a single course of action that affected everyone
similarly.”), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1036 (1999).
117. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff
Autonomy and the Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 822-37
(1989) (advocating the compulsory joinder of some Rule 20 parties).
118. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). In addition to Federal Rule 19 and corresponding state rules,
certain preclusion rules function as compulsory party joinder doctrines, but they too are quite
limited. See Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 979-83
(1998) [hereinafter Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion]. Kansas’s “one-action rule” compels
joinder of defendants in comparative negligence cases. See Mick v. Mani, 766 P.2d 147, 151
(Kan. 1988). Until recently, New Jersey’s “entire controversy doctrine” mandated joinder of
related defendants. See Cogdell v. Hospital Ctr., 560 A.2d 1169, 1178 (N.J. 1989). Rule
amendments in 1998 largely eliminated preclusion-based mandatory party joinder in New Jersey
but still allowed for trial judges to order joinder of parties under certain circumstances. See
Howard M. Erichson, Of Horror Stories and Happy Endings: The Rise and Fall of PreclusionBased Compulsory Party Joinder Under the New Jersey Entire Controversy Doctrine, 9 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 757, 768-69 (1999).
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Interpleader, in particular statutory interpleader under the
119
Federal Interpleader Act, solves some of the jurisdiction and venue
problems that limit permissive and compulsory joinder as aggregation
120
devices. It applies, however, only in the relatively uncommon
situation where a stakeholder wishes an adjudication of the rights of
multiple claimants,121 and interpleader cannot pull together the claims
122
involved in most litigation.
If an interested person is neither voluntarily joined in the action
by the plaintiff, nor ordered joined as a necessary party, that absentee
123
may seek to become a party to the action through intervention. Like
joinder, however, intervention’s limitations doom it to
124
incompleteness. First, intervention is voluntary; it occurs only if the
absentee applies to intervene, just as permissive joinder occurs only if
the plaintiff chooses to join additional parties.125 Second, an absentee
119. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1994); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 22 (governing rule
interpleader).
120. The Federal Interpleader Act expands federal subject matter jurisdiction by permitting
jurisdiction based on minimal diversity among claimants, with an amount in controversy of $500
or more. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (1994); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523,
530 (1967). The statute expands personal jurisdiction by allowing nationwide service of process.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1994). Finally, it provides for venue where any claimant resides. See id.
§ 1397.
121. See, e.g., Cohen v. Republic of the Philippines, 146 F.R.D. 90, 90-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(involving an interpleader action to determine the ownership of various paintings).
122. The Supreme Court recognized exactly this, in the leading decision on modern
interpleader:
We recognize, of course, that our view of interpleader means that it cannot be used to
solve all the vexing problems of multiparty litigation arising out of a mass tort. But
interpleader was never intended to perform such a function, to be an all-purpose “bill
of peace.” . . . None of the legislative and academic sponsors of a modern federal
interpleader device viewed their accomplishment as a “bill of peace,” capable of
sweeping dozens of lawsuits out of the various state and federal courts in which they
were brought and into a single interpleader proceeding.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967) (footnote omitted).
123. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (governing intervention of right and permissive
intervention).
124. I use “voluntary” here rather than “permissive” to avoid confusion with Rule 24(b)
permissive intervention. “Permissive intervention” refers to intervention that the court may
permit or deny as a matter of discretion, as distinguished from “intervention as of right” which
the court must allow if the rule’s requirements are satisfied. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)
(intervention as of right), with FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) (permissive intervention). Both
“intervention as of right” and “permissive intervention” are voluntary in the sense that the
absentee is not compelled to intervene, but rather chooses to do so.
125. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (“Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) (“Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to
intervene . . . .”); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763 (1989) (“[T]he drafters cast Rule 24,
governing intervention, in permissive terms.”). But see Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.
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has no right to intervene if the absentee’s interests are adequately
represented by a party to the action.126 In sum, joinder and
intervention mechanisms leave many related claims formally
unaggregated.
2. Class Action. The extreme aggregation mechanism of class
action represents both the most promising device for achieving a truly
unified handling of complex litigation—and the most troubling.
Because it constitutes representative litigation, class action can pull
together vast numbers of claims for decisive, one-fell-swoop
resolution. In the recent litigation concerning sales practices by
Prudential Insurance Company, for example, the claims of eight
million insurance policy holders were settled as a federal class
127
action.
Class certification, however, has been rejected in numerous
cases, most significantly in a string of recent mass products liability
cases. Although several years ago class certifications in such cases
128
appeared to be trending upwards, that trend has been squelched for
the time being by a number of appellate decertifications,129 including
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Amchem Products v. Windsor130 and
131
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. Class actions have fared better outside of
§ 2000e-2(n)(1) (1994) (creating a form of mandatory intervention in Title VII employment
discrimination cases by providing that absentees may be bound by a judgment if they had actual
notice and an opportunity to intervene); Andrea Catania & Charles A. Sullivan, Judging
Judgments: The 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Lingering Ghost of Martin v. Wilks, 57 BROOK. L.
REV. 995, 1031-47 (1992) (discussing the implications of the statute).
126. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
127. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 309 (3d Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999).
128. See, e.g., Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1021 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding class
certification in an oil refinery explosion case); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 710 (4th Cir.
1989) (upholding class certification in a Dalkon Shield case); see also Paul D. Rheingold, Tort
Class Actions: What They Can and Cannot Achieve, TRIAL, Feb. 1990, at 63 (“[T]he trend in the
courts seems toward the use of mandatory classes in tort actions as a means of disposing of mass
litigation areas that threaten to clog the courts.”).
129. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying a
class in a tobacco action); In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1089 (6th Cir. 1996)
(decertifying a class in a penile implants action); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 779 (3d Cir. 1995) (decertifying a class in an action
regarding pickup trucks); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995)
(decertifying a class in an action regarding HIV-tainted blood).
130. 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997) (decertifying a settlement class in an asbestos action under
Rule 23(b)(3)).
131. 527 U.S. 815, 830 (1999) (decertifying a settlement class in an asbestos action under
Rule 23(b)(1)(B)). As I have discussed elsewhere, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Amchem
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the mass tort arena. They have proved effective for aggregating and
resolving certain claims involving securities law violations,132
consumer fraud,133 and civil rights.134 In class actions seeking primarily
135
money damages, class members may opt out of the class. Thus, even
if a class action proponent succeeds in persuading a court to grant
class certification, opt-outs may render the formal aggregation
incomplete.
Class action’s major shortcoming as an aggregation mechanism—
the refusal of courts to certify classes without a proper showing of
Rule 23’s prerequisites—follows naturally from class action’s inherent
aggressiveness. A class action can achieve unified handling of related
claims because it aggressively binds absentees to the judgment.
Appropriately, courts look to protect the interests of absent class
members. The nature of class actions as representative litigation—the
very attribute that makes class actions so effective for achieving

and Ortiz do not rule out the use of class actions for mass tort cases, although they may render
class certification difficult in the most sprawling cases. See Erichson, supra note 40, at 1997-2000
(addressing Amchem); Howard M. Erichson, Taking a Closer Look: Justices Reaffirm Need for
Judicial Scrutiny of Mass Tort Settlement Class Actions, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 16, 1999, at 18
(addressing Amchem and Ortiz).
132. See In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy Litig., 175 F.R.D. 202, 207 (E.D. Pa.
1997); see also Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 785 (3d Cir. 1985) (“Class actions are a
particularly appropriate and desirable means to resolve claims based on the securities laws,
‘since the effectiveness of the securities laws may depend in large measure on the application of
the class action device.’”) (quoting Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 1970)). But
see Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (burdening
securities class actions with statutory hurdles and limitations).
133. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 328 (3d Cir. 1998)
(approving a settlement of a class action involving claims of deceptive insurance sales practices),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999); Elkins v. Equitable Life Ins., No. CivA 96-296-Civ-T-17B,
1998 WL 133741, at *33 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 1998) (same). In Amchem Products v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591 (1997), the Supreme Court found that the asbestos settlement class lacked
predominance as required by Rule 23(b)(3), but noted that “[p]redominance is a test readily
met in certain cases alleging consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws.” Id.
at 625. The Third Circuit, in upholding class certification in the Prudential Insurance litigation,
distinguished Amchem as a mass tort case in which predominance was not established: “This
case, involving a common scheme to defraud millions of life insurance policy holders, falls
within that category” of cases in which predominance is satisfied. Prudential, 148 F.3d at 314.
134. See, e.g., Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir.) (concerning employment
discrimination claims under Title VII), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1033 (1998); Neff v. VIA Metro.
Transit Auth., 179 F.R.D. 185, 191 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (concerning claims for public
transportation access under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
135. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (requiring that class members be notified of their right to
exclude themselves from a class action under Rule 23(b)(3)); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding that the opt-out right was constitutionally required
under the Due Process Clause).
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aggregation—renders their fairness suspect in many cases, and
necessitates the vigilant attention of courts.136
B. Consolidated Handling: Consolidation and Multidistrict Litigation
Transfer
Consolidation of related cases and multidistrict transfer of cases
to a single federal district for pretrial handling both offer formal
mechanisms that allow courts to handle related actions together.
Unlike joinder and class action, however, neither consolidation nor
multidistrict litigation (MDL) merges the claims into a single action.
Thus, while consolidation and MDL reasonably can be viewed as
formal aggregation mechanisms, they do not achieve the true
aggregation of joinder or class action.137
1. Consolidation. Even if claims are filed originally as separate
138
lawsuits, they can be consolidated for aggregated handling.
136. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. 815; Amchem, 521 U.S. 591; Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. 797;
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Settlement class actions—also called “settlement-only”
class actions—are a breed of class actions with great potential for achieving global resolution of
liability, but with equally great risks of collusion and unfairness. In a settlement class action, the
parties reach a negotiated settlement before seeking class certification and then move jointly for
class certification conditioned on approval of the settlement. I have discussed elsewhere the use
of settlement class actions and the need for vigilant court supervision in such cases. See
Erichson, supra note 40, at 1995-2005. It suffices to note here that a settlement class action
cannot occur without the negotiated agreement of the parties, and that even when the parties
reach agreement, courts often reject settlement class actions. See Ortiz, 525 U.S. at 864
(rejecting an asbestos settlement class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625
(rejecting an asbestos settlement class action under Rule 23(b)(3)); Walker v. Liggett, 175
F.R.D. 226, 232 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) (rejecting a tobacco settlement class action).
137. Cf. David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 913, 918-19 (1998) (distinguishing between the “entity model” of class actions and the
“aggregation model” of joinder devices).
138. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a). Consolidation under Rule 42 does not make the two actions
one. As the Supreme Court explained in language that predated Rule 42 but continues to be
widely quoted as authoritative, “consolidation is permitted as a matter of convenience and
economy in administration, but does not merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights
of the parties, or make those who are parties in one suit parties in another.” Johnson v.
Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933); see also, e.g., Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., 135
F.3d 389, 412 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Johnson). Thus, although consolidated actions may be
tried together, each action requires the entry of a separate judgment. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 109, § 2382. This Article treats consolidation as a type of formal aggregation, because
consolidation involves formal judicial recognition and imposition of unified handling of the
actions, in contrast to informal aggregation, where lawyers achieve a unified or coordinated
handling of the actions independent of any formal judicial action. As a practical matter,
although a party to a consolidated action is not made a party to the other action, the outcome of
any consolidated trial or dispositive motion has the effect of binding each of the parties to the
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Consolidation, however, is limited to cases pending in the same court.
A federal court may transfer an action to a district where related
litigation is pending to permit consolidation,139 but consolidation often
140
remains impossible for actions pending in different courts.
Moreover, a state court action cannot be consolidated with a federal
court action unless the state court action is first removed to federal
141
court, which in many cases cannot be accomplished. Due to these
restrictions, consolidation has limited utility as a method of
aggregating dispersed cases. Nevertheless, under the right
circumstances consolidation can aggregate massive litigation
effectively, especially when used in conjunction with joinder, venue
transfer, and removal.142
2. Multidistrict Litigation. Federal MDL has been used
143
effectively in many massive multi-party litigations. The MDL
consolidated actions. Nevertheless, it is worth keeping in mind the distinction between the total
formal aggregation of joinder and class actions, in which the litigants are formally parties to a
single action, and the non-total formal aggregation of consolidation or MDL, in which the
litigants are not formally parties to a single action.
139. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994) (permitting transfer to another district); id. § 1404(b)
(permitting transfer to another division within a district); Ginsey Indus., Inc. v. I.T.K. Plastics,
Inc., 545 F. Supp. 78, 80 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (transferring an action to the District of Massachusetts
to permit consolidation with a related action pending there); see also Continental Grain Co. v.
Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960) (“To permit a situation in which two cases involving
precisely the same issues are simultaneously pending in different District Courts leads to the
wastefulness of time, energy and money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent.”).
140. Venue transfer depends on the court’s discretion; transfer is unlikely when each
plaintiff files in his or her home state. See Pava v. Drom Int’l, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1064-65
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that where an Illinois resident brought an action in his home forum,
that choice “weighs heavily against transfer”); Cerasoli v. Xomed, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 152, 154-55
(W.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the importance of the plaintiff’s choice of forum “is heightened
when the plaintiff resides in his chosen forum”).
141. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994) (providing that an action is removable only if there is
original federal subject matter jurisdiction); id. § 1441(b) (providing that an action is removable
on the basis of diversity of citizenship only if no defendant is a citizen of the state in which the
suit was filed); Johnson v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 892 F.2d 422, 423 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the removal procedure statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446, allows removal only if all non-nominal
defendants agree to removal).
142. In the DBCP pesticide litigation, for example, the claims of over 10,000 plaintiffs were
addressed by a single federal judge. See Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1335-40
(S.D. Tex. 1995). The plaintiffs had filed their claims in seven state court lawsuits in five
different Texas counties. The lawsuits ranged in size from a single plaintiff to thousands of
plaintiffs suing together as a matter of permissive joinder. The defendants removed the cases to
federal district courts in multiple districts and divisions. See id. Eventually, the cases were
consolidated, transferred, and further consolidated until all of the pending claims were before a
single judge in the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. See id.
143. See Sara D. Schotland, Multidistrict Litigation Presents Litigators with Range of Strategy
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statute allows the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer
related cases to a single federal district court for consolidated pretrial
proceedings.144 In cases involving mass disasters, products liability,
antitrust, securities, and other areas of the law, MDL transfer has
pulled together anywhere from dozens to thousands of federal
lawsuits for consolidated handling.145
MDL, however, has several important limitations. First, MDL
146
The Supreme Court
applies only to pretrial proceedings.
reemphasized this limitation in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad
Hynes & Lerach,147 holding that an MDL transferee court may not
transfer a case to itself for trial, rather than remanding the case to the
148
original transferor court. Thus, while many cases are resolved within
MDL by summary judgment or settlement, MDL does not provide
for a formally aggregated trial.
149
Second, MDL reaches only federal court cases. Inasmuch as
multi-plaintiff litigation often involves cases filed in state court rather
than, or in addition to, federal court, and because many of the state
court cases are not removable to federal court or simply are not
removed, MDL cannot achieve full formal aggregation of most largescale multi-suit litigation. In the diet drugs products liability litigation,
Choices, 6 INSIDE LITIG., Feb. 1992, at 22; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 35, at 28-31
(addressing the effectiveness of § 1407 transfer for pretrial proceedings); Trangsrud, supra note
63, at 803-04 (discussing the use of MDL in mass litigation).
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994).
145. See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, on July 17, 1996, 965 F. Supp. 5, 6-7
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (consolidating 25 cases resulting from the crash of TWA Flight 800); In re
NASDAQ Mkt. Makers Antitrust Litig., 894 F. Supp. 703, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (consolidating
more than two dozen antitrust complaints); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 875, C-923137-DLJ, C-92-2930-DLJ, C-92-2929-DLJ, 1993 WL 463301, at *1 (J.P.M.L. Nov. 2, 1993)
(consolidating more than 39,000 asbestos actions); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods.
Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098, 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992) (consolidating 78 breast implant cases); In
re American Continental Corp. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 475, 476 (J.P.M.L.
1990) (consolidating 20 securities cases); In re A.H. Robins Co. “Dalkon Shield” IUD Prods.
Liab. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 540, 541 (J.P.M.L. 1975) (consolidating 54 Dalkon Shield cases).
146. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994) (permitting MDL transfer “for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings,” and providing that “[e]ach action so transferred shall be
remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district
from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated”).
147. 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
148. See id. at 40. A bill has been introduced in Congress that would overrule Lexecon on
this point and amend § 1407 to allow an MDL transferee court to transfer actions to itself for
trial “in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses.” H.R. 1852,
106th Cong. (1999).
149. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994) (permitting consolidation of federal civil actions for
pretrial proceedings).
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for example, over 760 federal actions have been aggregated by MDL
transfer to a federal district court in Pennsylvania,150 but much of the
litigation remains in state courts.151
Formal aggregation mechanisms such as joinder, intervention,
class action, consolidation, and MDL often allow related claims to be
handled on a formally coordinated basis. Each mechanism, however,
leaves substantial gaps. Despite the opportunities for formal
aggregation of claims, many related claims proceed as formally
independent lawsuits, leaving the lawyers to aggregate the claims
informally by working together and treating the separate suits as one.
III. INFORMAL AGGREGATION AND THE BOUNDARIES OF THE
LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
Informal aggregation practices have filled the void left by formal
procedures that do not achieve full aggregation of related claims. This
raises important questions about, to borrow Robert Bone’s phrase,
152
“mapping the boundaries of a dispute.” If separate lawsuits are
treated by the participating lawyers as a single litigation, should the
legal system recognize that the essential dispute is not the individual
lawsuit but rather the wider litigation?
This question incorporates two related but distinct aspects. First,
what are the boundaries of the lawyer-client relationship? By
coordinating with other lawyers, does a lawyer forge some sort of
lawyer-client relationship with those other lawyers’ clients, and
thereby take on ethical obligations to those clients? I address this
question here. Second, what are the boundaries of the dispute
150. See Judge Bechtle Grants AHP’s Request to Dismiss Class Action Allegations,
MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: FEN-PHEN/REDUC, Mar. 19, 1999, at 29 (citing Conditional Transfer
Order, In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 1999) (No. MDL 1203)); see also
Verilaw, The MDL 1203 Web Site, at http://www.fenphen.verilaw.com (last visited Aug. 28,
2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
151. See Rheingold et al., supra note 21, at C28-29 (“For the first time in the history of mass
tort cases, state courts have been playing a significant, if not dominant, role in their organization
and operation.”).
152. Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of the Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit
Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1989). In terms of
Professor Bone’s historical taxonomy of normative views about lawsuit structure, I suppose my
analysis —defining the boundaries of a dispute in part by examining the actual litigation conduct
of lawyers—would fall within the “pragmatic view,” which came into dominance between 1910
and 1938, rather than either the more formalistic “rights-centered view” or “right-remedy view”
or the emerging postrealist view. See id. at 79 (describing early “pragmatic view” reformers as
“analyz[ing] procedural problems by evaluating practical consequences, including institutional
and broader social effects as well as consequences for the individual parties to the suit”).
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resolved by a judgment? In other words, does a judgment rendered in
one action carry any binding effect, as a matter of claim preclusion or
issue preclusion, in lawsuits that were informally aggregated? Can a
nonparty to an action be bound by the judgment on the grounds of
informal aggregation? That question I address in Part IV.
The ethical implications of lawyer coordination warrant much
fuller exploration than I offer here. For purposes of this discussion of
informal aggregation, I will try to highlight some of the wide-ranging
ethical dilemmas presented by lawyer coordination, demonstrate the
inherent inadequacy of ethical protections for clients in informally
aggregated litigation, and suggest ways to enhance client protection
through legal doctrine or private ordering. The overarching question
is this: If LX and LY, lawyers for clients X and Y respectively, work
together as part of a group effort, does LX thereby form some sort of
lawyer-client relationship with client Y, or otherwise take on ethical
or fiduciary obligations to Y? Despite occasional language suggesting
such a relationship,153 most authorities expressly reject the idea that
154
group effort forges a new attorney-client relationship. Nevertheless,
duties grounded in contract and agency law impose obligations on
coordinating lawyers, and lawyers and judges can enhance client
protection by making these duties explicit, rather than relying on
implicit understandings or assumptions of interest alignment.
Regarding the ethics of lawyer coordination, at least four aspects
deserve consideration: confidentiality, loyalty, conflicts of interest,
155
and malpractice. As to each aspect, clients in informally aggregated
litigation, though dependent upon the coordinating lawyers, lack

153. See, e.g., Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253
(5th Cir. 1977) (agreeing with the defendants’ argument that “in a joint defense of a conspiracy
charge, the counsel of each defendant is, in effect, the counsel of all for purposes of invoking the
attorney-client privilege”); Ageloff v. Noranda, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 72, 76 (D.R.I. 1996) (“[A]n
attorney who serves his or her client’s codefendant for a limited purpose becomes the
codefendant’s attorney for that purpose.”); Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822,
841-42 (1871) (noting that, in joint defense meetings among conspiracy defendants and their
separate lawyers, “the counsel of each was in effect the counsel of all”).
154. See, e.g., Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 97, at 116 (“[T]he
Committee concludes that, unless otherwise expressly stated to the contrary, a joint defense
agreement does not create an attorney-client relationship among all participants.”).
155. This Article considers the duties owed by a coordinating lawyer to the clients of the
other lawyers. Another question worth asking is whether a coordinating lawyer may be
vicariously responsible for the unethical conduct or negligent performance of the other lawyers
in the group. See generally Mary Twitchell, The Ethical Dilemmas of Lawyers on Teams, 72
MINN. L. REV. 697, 762-64 (1988) (discussing vicarious responsibility for the acts of team
lawyers).
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some of the ethical protections they would have if the claims were
aggregated formally.
A. Confidentiality
If there is a single critical component to counsel coordination, it
is the sharing of information.156 Lawyers share factual information,
legal research, and litigation strategies. The lawyers and their clients,
of course, consider much of this information confidential. Defense
counsel share information with each other that they would never
share with plaintiffs, and plaintiffs’ counsel likewise share information
with each other that they would never share with defendants.157
Coordinating lawyers take care to protect the confidentiality of
their shared information. Plaintiffs’ litigation groups have gone to
158
great lengths to protect information from defendants and to keep
159
their meetings secret. Joint defense agreements typically require
participants to agree to keep shared information confidential.160 Even

156. See supra notes 10-15, 85-86 and accompanying text.
157. As long as the client consents to the sharing of such information with aligned parties,
such arrangements do not themselves violate the lawyer’s ethical duty of confidentiality. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1995).
158. The ATLA Exchange web page states, in its introductory paragraph, “This information
is not available to defense lawyers.” ATLA Exchange, at http://exchange.atla.org (last visited
Aug. 29, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The “Terms and Conditions of Use”
provide, in pertinent part:
These materials are confidential trade secrets of the ATLA Exchange prepared in
anticipation of litigation and are intended for the exclusive use of ATLA member
lawyers representing plaintiffs in personal injury or criminal defense actions.
Materials may not be furnished to a defendant, defense interest, criminal prosecutor,
or any other person not assisting in a case. Exchange materials may not be resold
under any circumstance. If the materials are requested during discovery, we
recommend asserting attorney-client privilege as to the inquirers list and work
product protection as to the remainder of the materials.
Id.; see also supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing plaintiffs’ resistance to
defendants’ discovery requests concerning shared information).
159. To protect meetings from defense infiltrators, plaintiffs’ groups sometimes make it
difficult for outsiders to locate the meeting or to get inside. See Rheingold, supra note 9, at 4-5.
For a meeting of plaintiffs’ lawyers in the swine flu vaccine litigation, known members of the
plaintiffs’ litigation group were mailed a form on odd-colored paper, and returned that form in
order to receive a ticket on a different odd-colored paper. See id. at 5. A police officer
controlled admission at the event. See id. “In addition, the location of strategy meetings
sometimes is kept ‘so secretive that the people who are supposed to be there don’t know where
it is going to be’ until the last minute . . . .” Ranii, supra note 9 (quoting plaintiffs’ lawyer
Jonathan T. Zackey).
160. See Waller v. Financial Corp. of Am., 828 F.2d 579, 581 (9th Cir. 1987) (describing a
joint defense agreement in a shareholder derivative suit providing that the defendants who
settled or were dismissed must maintain the confidentiality of the joint defense information);
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in the absence of a written confidentiality provision, coordinating
attorneys expect their shared information to remain confidential
within the group, given the nature of the communications.161
Do coordinating counsel owe an ethical obligation not to reveal
the confidences of the other lawyers’ clients? From a number of
angles, both legal and prudential, it is clear that coordinating counsel
must maintain the secrecy of the group’s shared information. No
doubt, most such information remains confidential, as lawyers take
seriously their shared interest in preventing outside access to sensitive
information. Yet most authorities stop short of identifying any ethical
duty of confidentiality running from a coordinating lawyer to another
lawyer’s client, relying instead on the lawyer’s ethical duty to her own
client, or on contractual or agency-based duties owed to the other
lawyer or client.
One indicator that coordinating lawyers consider themselves
bound to keep shared information confidential is their treatment of
the attorney-client privilege. If coordinating lawyers believe their
communications are privileged—a point on which they insist and on
which many courts agree—then arguably they have a corresponding
duty to maintain the confidentiality of those communications. The
attorney-client privilege is a matter of the law of evidence, unlike the
ethical duty of confidentiality which represents a significantly
162
narrower professional duty owed by a lawyer to a client. Thus, much

Daniel, supra note 81:
Typically, joint defense agreements [in patent infringement litigation] require
signatories to promise to keep information exchanged within the group confidential.
Thus, if it appears that a defendant’s proposed settlement agreement would breach
this provision, the members of the group would have a legitimate interest—which
which would not implicate the antitrust laws—in insisting that confidential
information not be disclosed to the patentee.
161. Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 98-411 (1998)
(stating that a confidentiality agreement in lawyer-to-lawyer consultation can be inferred where
“the information imparted may be of such a nature that a reasonable lawyer would know that
confidentiality is assumed and expected”). Apparently lawyers have not always had
expectations of confidentiality in joint efforts, nor are lawyer expectations uniform. See Note,
The Attorney-Client Privilege in Multiple Party Situations, 8 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 179,
181 (1972) (reporting survey findings that “[a]lthough some attorneys believe that all joint
conferences are privileged, others assume that any statement made at a joint conference is
potentially subject to discovery”); Note, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege on Inter-Attorney
Exchange of Information, 63 YALE L.J. 1030, 1030 (1954) (“Lawyers may hesitate to pool
information freely . . . fearing that it might cause loss of immunity for material ordinarily
privileged from either evidentiary use or pretrial discovery.”).
162. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995) (describing a lawyer’s
ethical duty of confidentiality).
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information is protected by the duty of confidentiality—that is, an
attorney is ethically forbidden to reveal the information voluntarily—
even though the same information is not covered by the attorneyclient privilege.163 If information is covered by the privilege, however,
then generally the information should be subject to the broader
ethical duty of confidentiality.164 Without an expectation of
165
confidentiality, the attorney-client privilege would fail by definition.
Thus, if communications within the coordinating counsel group are
protected by the attorney-client privilege, a strong argument follows
that the lawyers in the group owe a duty to maintain confidentiality.
A number of courts have held that communications among
166
counsel for aligned parties are privileged. Likewise, and perhaps
more importantly, courts have held that if a lawyer-client
communication is otherwise privileged, the lawyer does not waive
167
that privilege by sharing the communication with the aligned group.

163. For example, if information is related to the representation of a client but not acquired
by an attorney-client communication, it generally is not considered privileged as an evidentiary
matter, but is nonetheless confidential as an ethical matter. Likewise, the presence of
unnecessary third parties during an attorney-client communication may waive the privilege but
does not negate the duty of confidentiality. See Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261, 266
(Tex. App. 1991) (holding that lawyers breached their fiduciary duty by revealing confidential
information “regardless of whether from an evidentiary standpoint [due to the presence of
unnecessary third parties] the privilege attached”).
164. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS
23 (5th ed. 1998) (“Much information that is ethically protected will not be privileged. On the
other hand, virtually all information considered privileged under the rules of evidence will also
be ethically protected.”).
165. See In re Grand Jury Testimony of Attorney X, 621 F. Supp. 590, 593 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(denying attorney-client privilege protection to a non-confidential communication shared by
attorneys, as “[t]he addition of another attorney to the chain of communicators does not change
the non-confidential nature of the information transmitted”); 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (defining attorney-client privilege to require that
the communication be “made in confidence”).
166. See Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787-88 (3d Cir. 1985) (protecting
communications between a defendant and another defendant’s counsel made to advance a
common defense strategy); United States ex rel. Burroughs v. DeNardi Corp., 167 F.R.D. 680,
685-86 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (granting work product protection for documents shared by a plaintiff’s
attorney with government lawyers); Schacher v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc.,
106 F.R.D. 187, 191-92 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (allowing privileged communications between plaintiffs’
counsel handling separate lawsuits against the same defendant); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D.
595, 604 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (allowing privileged communications among aligned defendants and
counsel).
167. See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336 (7th Cir. 1979) (stating that the
criminal defendant did not waive the privilege by sharing confidential information with the
codefendant’s attorney); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 213
B.R. 433, 435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (describing the common interest doctrine as “an
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The law in this area is far from clear, however, and courts have not
defined clearly whether the doctrine functions as an extension of the
privilege to common interest arrangements, or as an exception to
waiver of the privilege.168 Despite the lack of definition, many courts
appear inclined to protect shared communications within an aligned
group. Under a doctrine variously called the “common interest
169
170
doctrine,”
the “allied lawyer privilege,”
the “joint defense
171
172
privilege,” and endless other names, communications within a
coordinating group of aligned parties and lawyers may receive the
protection of the attorney-client privilege. The American Law

exception to the general rule that the attorney-client privilege is waived when privileged
information is disclosed to a third party”); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. at 604 (holding that
the privilege was not waived by sharing with aligned defendants and counsel).
In the Woburn contaminated water litigation, chronicled in A Civil Action, counsel for
defendant W.R. Grace Company made precisely this argument concerning a communication
shared in confidence by counsel for codefendant Beatrice Foods:
The judge looked at Cheeseman. “Where’s the privilege supposed to be?”
Cheeseman stood to explain. “There was a communication from Beatrice Foods’
client to their attorney, which was then communicated to me.”
“Well, then,” said the judge, “the confidentiality of that is destroyed, isn’t it?”
“I think not,” said Cheeseman.
“Why not?”
“Because we’re engaged jointly in the defense of an action.”
JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION 112-13 (1995).
168. See James M. Fischer, The Attorney-Client Privilege Meets the Common Interest
Arrangement: Protecting Confidences While Exchanging Information for Mutual Gain, 16 REV.
LITIG. 631, 644-45 (1997).
169. See In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp. 1334, 1365 (D.D.C.
1986), aff’d, 944 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
170. See 24 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5493 (1986 & Supp. 2000).
171. See United States v. Hsia, No. Cr. 98-0057 (PLF), 1998 WL 634646, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept.
10, 1998). The phrase “joint defense privilege,” although sometimes used interchangeably with
the common interest doctrine, applies more aptly to communications among a lawyer and two
or more defense clients jointly represented by that lawyer. See Dome Petroleum Ltd. v.
Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 131 F.R.D. 63, 66 (D.N.J. 1990); see also 24 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 170, § 5493, at 121 & n.91 (Supp. 2000) (suggesting that the “allied lawyer
doctrine” applies when parties with separate lawyers consult together, that the “joint client
doctrine” applies when two clients share the same lawyer, and that the “joint defense privilege”
mangles the two concepts).
172. See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 685 F.2d 857, 862 (3d Cir. 1982)
(“common purpose theory”); In re Imperial Corp. of Am., 174 F.R.D. 475, 478 (S.D. Cal. 1997)
(“joint prosecution privilege”); Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687, 693 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (“joint
client doctrine”); Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987)
(“‘pooled information’ exception”).
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Institute’s Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers includes a
common interest privilege provision,173 as did the 1974 proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence.174 Of great importance to participants in
informally aggregated litigation, the common interest privilege need
not be limited to aligned parties within a single lawsuit, but may
extend to communications with “friendly litigants in related cases or
175
to others with friendly interests.” The law in this area is far from
clear, however, and courts rarely define the doctrine with precision.
To facilitate counsel coordination, some judges rule in advance
that shared communications remain privileged. One MDL judge
included the following provision in his first order in the litigation:
The Court recognizes that cooperation and coordination by and
among plaintiffs’ counsel and by and among defendants’ counsel are
essential for the orderly and expeditious resolution of this litigation.
The communication of information among and between plaintiffs’
counsel and among and between defendants’ counsel shall not be
deemed a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or the protection
176
afforded attorneys’ work product.

173. Section 126, “Common-Interest Arrangement,” states in pertinent part:
If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or non-litigated matter are
represented by separate lawyers and they agree to exchange information concerning
the matter, a communication of any such client that otherwise qualifies as
privileged . . . that relates to the matter is privileged as against third persons. Any
such client may invoke the privilege, unless it has been waived by the client who made
the communication.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 126(1) (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1996); see also id. cmt. c (“Communications of several commonly interested clients
remain confidential against the rest of the world, no matter how many clients are involved.”).
174. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503 included the following provision:
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from
disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the
rendition of professional legal services to the client, . . . (3) by him or his lawyer to a
lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest . . . .
MODEL RULES OF EVID. Rule 503(b) (1973). The detailed privilege provisions of the proposed
evidence rules were scrapped, due to concerns about the proper scope of state and federal law
governing privileges. See S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 7052-55 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7051, 7053.
175. Western Fuels Ass’n v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 102 F.R.D. 201, 203 (D. Wyo. 1984); cf.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 126 cmt. c (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996) (stating that the common interest privilege applies even in non-litigated
matters).
176. In re L-tryptophan Litig., MDL No. 865, Order No. 1, at 9-10 (D.S.C. Feb. 25, 1991) (on
file with author); see also M.C.L.3d, supra note 9, § 20.222 (“Communication among the various
counsel on one side and their respective clients should not be treated as waiving work-product
protection or the attorney-client privilege, and a specific court order on the point may be
helpful.”).
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The judge understood that the privilege was necessary for
achieving “cooperation and coordination” among counsel on each
side, and that such coordination, in turn, was necessary for achieving
an “orderly and expeditious resolution” of the many related lawsuits
involved in the litigation.
If shared information is privileged, who “owns” the privilege? If
the privilege is owned by all of the litigants in the coordinating group,
177
may a single litigant waive it? Litigants’ interests are bound to
diverge, in some cases after their lawyers share sensitive
information.178 Suppose LX and LY, lawyers for clients X and Y
respectively, have been working together and sharing information
with a clear understanding that the information will remain
confidential. May LY seek an advantageous settlement with the
opposing party by offering the opponent information about X’s
strategy? As a zealous advocate on behalf of Y, is LY not only
permitted, but ethically obligated to do so, assuming Y is prepared to
waive the privilege as to that information? One court, in a case
involving communications among counsel representing several
defendant railroads in separate but related quiet title actions,
reasoned that waiver should require unanimity “to assure joint
defense efforts are not inhibited or even precluded by the fear that a
party to joint defense communications may subsequently unilaterally

177. The Restatement would give each member of the group standing to invoke the
privilege, but would allow waiver of the privilege only by the one who made the communication.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 126(1) (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996) (“Any such client [in a common interest arrangement] may invoke the
privilege, unless it has been waived by the client who made the communication.”). The
Restatement comments note:
Any member of a common-interest arrangement may invoke the privilege against
third persons, even if the communication in question was not originally made by or
addressed to the objecting member. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
any member may waive the privilege with respect to that person’s own
communications. Correlatively, a member is not authorized to waive the privilege for
another member’s communication.
Id. cmt. g.
178. See Rex Bossert, A Splintered Privilege, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 7, 1997, at A1 (discussing the
Liggett Group’s withdrawal from the tobacco industry’s joint defense, and quoting an R.J.
Reynolds attorney’s concerns about possible disclosures from joint defense meetings);
Christopher M. Jaarda, Note, CERCLA the Wagons, Our Attorney Just Switched Sides and Now
Fights for Apache: GTE North Inc. v. Apache Products Co., 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 599, 600 (1997)
(“Parties who initially have an interest in sharing information may later have divergent interests
as liability is assessed and apportioned.”).
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waive the privileges of all participants, either purposefully in an effort
to exonerate himself, or inadvertently.”179
With the common interest privilege, shared confidential
communications enjoy some security, yet legal authorities do not, as a
general matter, assert that a lawyer owes an ethical duty of
180
confidentiality to the clients of coordinating lawyers. Formal
179. Western Fuels, 102 F.R.D. at 203 (citations omitted). More precisely, the court held on
this basis that “waiver of privileges relating to information shared in joint defense
communications by one party to such communications will not constitute a waiver by any other
party to such communications.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Securities Investor Protection
Corp. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 213 B.R. 433, 436 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that the
privilege exists until voluntarily waived by all participating parties, or until the filing of an action
between the former allied parties).
180. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 213 cmt. g(ii)
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (noting that if a lawyer has a duty of non-disclosure, it arises
out of another area of law, principally agency, rather than the law governing lawyers); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 395 (1995) (advising that a
lawyer representing one party in a joint defense consortium does not have an ethical obligation
to other parties except any fiduciary obligations otherwise undertaken).
The position of coordinating lawyers sharing sensitive information somewhat resembles
the common situation in which one lawyer consults an outside lawyer about a client matter. In
the latter situation, the ABA has opined that although the consulted lawyer does not form an
attorney-client relationship by virtue of the consultation alone, the lawyer may acquire a duty of
confidentiality under certain circumstances. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 411 (1998). The opinion offers the following guidance
concerning the consulted lawyer’s duty of confidentiality:
A consulting lawyer may request and obtain the consulted lawyer’s express
agreement to keep confidential the information disclosed in the consultation. There
also may be situations in which an agreement to preserve confidentiality can or
should be inferred from the circumstances of the consultation. If the consulting
lawyer conditions the consultation on the consulted lawyer’s maintaining
confidentiality, the consulted lawyer’s agreement should be inferred if she goes
forward even in the absence of an expression of agreement. Similarly, the information
imparted may be of such a nature that a reasonable lawyer would know that
confidentiality is assumed and expected.
Id. at 6; see also Va. State Bar Ass’n, Legal Ethics Op. 1642 (June 9, 1995), reprinted in NAT’L
REP. ON LEGAL ETHICS & PROF. RESP., VA. OPS. 65, 66 (1996) (opining that lawyer-to-lawyer
consultation through an anonymous advice network does not create an attorney-client
relationship but may nevertheless give rise to a duty of confidentiality and attendant conflicts of
interest). By extension, a lawyer consulted as part of a coordinating group arguably owes a duty
to keep shared information confidential, if there was an express or implied confidentiality
agreement, or if such an expectation can be inferred from the nature of the communications. As
the Virginia ethics opinion put it, “the committee recognizes a duty to keep confidential those
consultations that occur outside formal attorney-client relationships which nonetheless create an
expectation of confidentiality.” Id. at 66.
There is, however, an important distinction between lawyer coordination and the sort
of lawyer consultation addressed in ABA Opinion 411 and Virginia Opinion 1642. These ethics
opinions deal with a consulted lawyer who has no separate client in the matter. In the
coordinating lawyer groups addressed in this Article, each lawyer has her own client, making the
analysis much more difficult by creating tension between duties to the original client and duties
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Opinion 95-395 presented the American Bar Association with a
conflict of interest question that depended upon the duty of
confidentiality among coordinating lawyers. The ABA was asked to
define the ethical obligations of an insurance defense lawyer who had
regularly participated in a joint defense consortium as counsel for an
insurance company, and who now has been approached by a client
that wants him to file suit against other members of the consortium.
Despite assuming that the consortium shared work product and that it
is “likely that the consortium involved the sharing of attorney-client
confidences,” the ABA opined:
A lawyer who has represented one, but only one, of the parties in a
joint defense consortium does not thereby acquire an obligation to
the other parties to the consortium that poses an ethical bar to the
lawyer thereafter taking on a related representation adverse to any
181
of the other parties.

The ABA instead found the lawyer’s confidentiality obligation
elsewhere, cautioning that “the lawyer’s obligations to the party he
represented may present such a bar, and the lawyer will almost
certainly have undertaken fiduciary obligations to the other parties
182
that have the same effect.”
Thus, the lawyer in Opinion 395 owed a duty of confidentiality to
his own client, inasmuch as the information gained in the joint
defense consortium constituted “information relating to
183
representation of a client.” That confidentiality obligation, however,
could be waived by the lawyer’s own client,184 the possibility of which
apparently did not worry the ABA:
If Insurance Company did consent to disclosure, then Lawyer would
be freed of the obligation imposed by Rule 1.6(a). As a practical
matter, however, it is likely that under the consortium agreement
Insurance Company would have undertaken the obligation to have
its lawyer preserve such confidences, and so could not give such

to the coordinating lawyers and their clients.
181. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 395 (1995).
182. Id.
183. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1995).
184. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 395 (1995)
(noting that Rule 1.6(a) would prohibit the lawyer from disclosing consortium information
“unless his former client consented, after consultation, to such disclosure”).
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consent without exposing itself to liability to the members of the
185
consortium whose confidences were involved.

Of course, the other members of the consortium might not share
the ABA’s comfort that Insurance Company’s liability exposure
suffices to protect their confidences. Although on the facts presented,
it may appear unlikely that the former client would consent to a
disclosure of confidential consortium information, one can imagine
other situations in which the interests of the consortium members
might diverge. Because interests in confidentiality often do not lend
themselves to dollar figures, the promise of money damages may not
adequately protect confidentiality. Thus, even if Opinion 395 is
correct that the former client would expose itself to liability by
consenting to disclosure—a point the opinion does not purport to
decide and which, in any event, the ABA is powerless to dictate—
consortium members may feel less secure in the confidentiality of
their communications than if the consortium lawyers owed each of
the clients an ethical duty of confidentiality, enforceable through the
disciplinary process. Still, the former client’s potential liability
exposure to consortium members, combined with the lawyer’s
confidentiality duty to his own client, offers some measure of
protection.
In addition to the lawyer’s ethical duty to his own former client,
Opinion 395 points out that the lawyer “would almost certainly have
a fiduciary obligation to the other members of the consortium . . . . He
would not, however, owe an ethical obligation to them, for there is
simply no provision of the Model Rules imposing such an
186
obligation.” Even if the coordinating lawyer owes no ethical duty of
confidentiality to the other clients, he nevertheless may owe a duty to
the other coordinating lawyers or to their clients under principles of
187
agency. As a matter of agency law, the coordinating lawyer may be
185. Id.
186. Id. (citations omitted). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit considered a possible conflict of
interest amid allegations that confidential information had been exchanged among cooperating
defendants, and held that “[i]n such a situation, an attorney who is the recipient of such
information breaches his fiduciary duty if he later, in his representation of another client, is able
to use this information to the detriment of one of the co-defendants.” Wilson P. Abraham
Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added). Despite
phrasing this as a breach of fiduciary duty rather than as a breach of an ethical duty, the court
also stated that it agreed with the defendants’ argument that “in a joint defense of a conspiracy
charge, the counsel of each defendant is, in effect, the counsel of all for the purposes of invoking
the attorney-client privilege in order to shield mutually shared confidences.” Id.
187. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 395 n.3 (1995).
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considered a subagent of the other lawyer’s client. Specifically, if
client X shares confidential information as part of an aligned effort
with client Y, then Y may be viewed as X’s agent, and Y’s lawyer as a
subagent with attendant fiduciary duties running to X.188
Similarly, under contract principles, a lawyer who participates in
a common interest agreement with other lawyers, such as a plaintiffs’
group or a joint defense agreement, may owe contractual duties to the
other lawyers pursuant to the agreement, and thus may be liable for
189
breach of those duties. Alternatively, the contractual duties may run
among the clients themselves in the coordinating group, as Opinion
395 assumed.190 If the duty is merely contractual,191 then arguably the
lawyer could take advantage of an efficient breach, betraying other
members of the group for the benefit of her client. Such betrayal is
unlikely, however, given both the client’s and the lawyer’s potent
prudential interests, including fear of ostracism for breaching an
explicit confidentiality agreement among a coordinating group.
Shared communications within a coordinating group, in sum,
enjoy confidentiality protection from several angles. Many courts
consider such communications privileged as an evidentiary matter.
Shared information is protected by a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality
to his own client. A lawyer may also owe agency or contractual duties
of confidentiality to the members of a coordinating group. Finally,
coordinating lawyers and clients share powerful prudential interests
in maintaining the confidentiality of shared information. However, a
coordinating lawyer probably does not owe an ethical duty of
confidentiality directly to the other lawyers’ clients, and thus probably
faces neither the risk of disciplinary sanctions nor the value judgment
implicit in ethical commands. Unlike in an ordinary client-lawyer
188. See id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 213 cmt. g(ii)
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
189. Indeed, Professors Curtis and Resnik have referred to “informal or contractual
aggregation” to distinguish aggregation based on agreement among parties, lawyers or judges,
from aggregation based on legislation or court intervention. Curtis & Resnik, supra note 1, at
429. On the increasing tendency of coordinating parties to enter written cooperation
agreements, see supra note 98.
190. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
191. It is worth noting that the common interest privilege may apply even in the absence of
any formal agreement, written or otherwise, which suggests that the confidentiality duty
probably is not merely contractual. See In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 138990 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (applying the common interest privilege despite the lack of any explicit
agreement); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 126 cmt. c
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (“Exchanging communications may be predicated on an
express agreement, but formality is not required.”).
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relationship, where the ethical duty of confidentiality need not be
stated explicitly because it inheres in the nature of the professional
relationship, participants in coordinating counsel groups are well
advised to protect their clients’ information with an explicit
confidentiality provision in a written cooperation agreement.
B. Loyalty
Beyond some duty to keep information confidential, do
coordinating lawyers owe any loyalties to the clients of the others in
the group? The lawyer owes her own clients, among other things, a
duty of competence,192 a duty of diligence,193 and a duty to inform and
194
advise. In the canonical language of the Model Code, the lawyer
“should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.”195
Does she owe similar duties to the other clients? Coordinating
lawyers frequently divvy up legal work. If a lawyer does her share of
the work incompetently or tardily, has she breached any ethical duties
owed to the other parties who were counting on her? If in the course
of doing her share of the work, the lawyer learns something that all of
the coordinating parties reasonably would want to know, has she any
ethical obligation to inform them, or does she owe that duty only to
her own client?
Judge Jack Weinstein, addressing the ethical duty to
communicate with clients, has written of the importance of
communication between the “national leaders” at the hub of a mass
196
tort plaintiffs’ group and the “outlying single practitioners.” “It is
submitted that those placed in charge of the national litigation have a
responsibility to keep these lawyers apprised of developments,” he
writes.197 But what is the source of this “responsibility,” and what is its
scope? Although Judge Weinstein mentions this responsibility in the
context of communications through “the Association of Trial Lawyers
of America and ad hoc attorney organizations,”198 which suggests that
it may apply to informally aggregated litigation, his examples come
largely from the Agent Orange class action and other formally

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1995).
See id. Rule 1.3.
See id. Rule 1.4.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1983).
WEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 58.
Id.
Id.
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aggregated cases.199 Especially in the absence of any formal
aggregation mechanism, it remains unclear whether and to what
extent coordinating lawyers owe each other and each other’s clients a
responsibility to inform and advise and, if so, whether this
responsibility is an ethical duty, enforceable under the rules of
professional conduct.
As a more general matter, if a coordinating lawyer sees an
advantageous strategy for her client that would work to the detriment
of another coordinating party, does the relationship constrain her
from pursuing her client’s advantage? Some lawyers accept that joint
litigation relationships may impose such constraints. “Depending
upon the type and form of agreement, all defendants may be required
to consult on and approve of all actions undertaken by individual
defendants. Thus, a singular defendant may be constrained from
pursuing an advantageous strategy for the sake of the majority,” note
200
a pair of products liability defense lawyers. Again, however, these
constraints arguably flow from contractual or fiduciary duties, and not
201
from ethical duties owed to the coordinating lawyers’ clients.
In contrast to the foggy loyalty duties of coordinating counsel in
informally aggregated litigation, formal aggregation mechanisms give
courts the power to impose clearer responsibilities on counsel. The
Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) observes that attorneys in
leadership roles “must understand that their responsibilities in the
litigation extend beyond the resolution of their own clients’
202
involvement.” “The functions of lead, liaison, and trial counsel, and

199. See id. at 58-60.
200. Slater & Kurien, supra note 87, at 12 (footnote omitted); see also Peter N. Sheridan &
John J. McGraw, A Strategy for Defending Multidefendant Lawsuits, in LITIGATION 427, 429-38
(PLI Litigation Course Handbook Series, 1987) (suggesting that defendants go along with the
group strategy, although more out of enlightened self-interest than out of duty).
201. See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text; cf. GILLERS, supra note 164, at 267:
[W]hen the two lawyers for each of Jones and Smith confer on a matter of common
interest to their clients (or confer with the client of the other lawyer), the
communications may be privileged, but Jones’s lawyer does not thereby become
Smith’s lawyer. (Even that could happen on the right facts, as when Smith is
encouraged to view Jones’s lawyer as her lawyer too. . . .)
(citing Trinity Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. G. & L. Ambulance Servs., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1280 (D.
Conn. 1984)).
202. M.C.L.3d, supra note 9, § 20.222; see also id. § 23.21 (“[L]ead counsel, members of a
trial team, and other attorneys who have accepted responsibilities on behalf of other parties and
attorneys should bear in mind that their fiduciary obligations may survive the dismissal of their
own clients.”). For a sample court order defining the responsibilities of designated counsel in
formally aggregated litigation, see id. § 41.31.
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of each committee,” the Manual advises, “should be stated in either a
court order or a separate document drafted by counsel and reviewed
and approved by the court. This writing will inform other counsel and
parties of the scope of authority conferred on designated counsel and
define responsibilities within the group.”203 The duty to communicate
with the other coordinating attorneys, in particular, lends itself to
204
clear statements of responsibility. Moreover, in formally aggregated
litigation, the court can offer at least some front-end safeguards of
attorney competence by controlling the appointment of lawyers as
205
lead counsel and steering committee members.
Few clients would want their lawyers to owe equal loyalty to all
of the clients in a coordinating group. As a New York bar association
committee aptly put it: “The notion that, merely because of the desire
to engage in such brainstorming, an attorney takes on a duty to
zealously represent each participant and owes each participant the
highest duty of loyalty far exceeds what either attorney or the
206
individual participant could reasonably expect.” Of course, a lawyer
should focus primarily on her duty to her own client, even as she
teams up with other lawyers.
The key is to strike a balance between the advantages of counsel
coordination and the client’s need for a lawyer with undivided loyalty.
The best way to strike that balance is not to impose the full panoply
of attorney-client ethical duties on coordinating lawyers. Nor is it to
leave such duties unstated, which would render duties so vague as to
be largely unenforceable. Rather, the best way to strike the balance is
by a considered, written cooperation agreement specifying the duties
and relationships among the coordinating clients and lawyers. A
written agreement would not provide the inherent ethical protection
provided to a lawyer’s original client, nor would it provide the judicial
oversight of formally aggregated litigation, but a written agreement
203. Id. § 20.222.
204. See id. (“Counsel selected for a position of leadership have an obligation to keep the
other attorneys in the group advised of the progress of the litigation and consult them about
decisions significantly affecting their clients.”).
205. See id. § 20.224:
[T]he judge needs to take an active part in making the decision on the appointment of
counsel. . . . The court should take the time necessary to make an assessment of the
qualifications, functions, organization, and compensation of designated counsel. The
court should satisfy itself . . . that the attorneys to be designated are competent for
their assignments, that clear and satisfactory guidelines have been established for
compensation and reimbursement, and that the arrangements for coordination among
counsel are fair, reasonable, and efficient.
206.

Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 97, at 122.
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provides guidance to lawyers and gives participating lawyers and
clients an important opportunity to consider what they are getting
themselves into.
C. Conflicts of Interest
Not only does lawyer coordination present problems of
confidentiality and loyalty, it also can give rise to both concurrent and
successive conflicts of interest. A concurrent client-client conflict may
arise whenever two clients within a coordinating group have
materially divergent interests. Initially, such conflicts should be rare
inasmuch as parties with divergent interests ought not to be engaged
in the kind of close, confidential, coordinated relationship discussed
in this Article.207 If a lawyer were to pursue a coordinated relationship
notwithstanding such a conflict, however, there would be little or no
ethical protection for the client. Unlike with formal aggregation
procedures, the court exercises no oversight power to ensure against
conflicts.208 Unless the coordinating lawyer has formed a lawyer-client
relationship with the other clients in the group, the usual concurrent
209
client-client conflict of interest rules do not apply.
More likely, client-client conflicts within a coordinating group
may arise during the course of litigation, despite what initially
appeared to be aligned interests. Conflicts may be created by
aggregate settlements, pitting one plaintiff against another for slices
210
of a fixed pie. Conflicts may arise as multiple cases approach trial
207. Parties with some divergent interests, of course, may also have interests that are aligned
as to some aspect of a dispute, and may coordinate their efforts concerning that aspect. For
example, a plaintiff and a defendant may share an interest in establishing the liability of a thirdparty defendant, and may work together towards that end. See, e.g., Visual Scene, Inc. v.
Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (protecting documents shared by
the plaintiff and the third-party plaintiff concerning alleged manufacturing defects by the thirdparty defendant).
208. See infra notes 244-51 and accompanying text (addressing the court’s role in protecting
against conflicts of interest in class actions, MDL, and consolidated litigation).
209. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7(a), 1.7(b) (1995).
210. See id. Rule 1.8(g):
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients . . . unless each client
consents after consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the
claims . . . involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
See also WEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 74-76 (summarizing the ethical challenges raised by
aggregate settlements). Paul Rheingold points out the reasons for the rule, which reflect
primarily lawyer-client conflicts:
A law firm with a large inventory has some cases referred to it, whereby it has to give
up a forwarding fee. Other cases came directly from the client. The more the
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dates, if coordinating lawyers and clients cannot agree on which case
should be tried first. For issue preclusion strategic advantage, a group
of coordinating lawyers generally would prefer to bring the strongest
case to trial first.211 A particular plaintiff, however, may desire her
own case to move forward speedily, perhaps due to a need for prompt
compensation, or due to a particularized concern about the
212
unavailability of key witnesses with the passage of time. Conflicts
may arise concerning trial strategy, although such conflicts are more
likely to arise in formally aggregated matters headed for joint trial
than in informally aggregated litigation. In the Bendectin litigation,
for example, “the plaintiffs’ lawyers in the multidistrict trial were
grappling with an ‘ethical dilemma’ caused by conflicts among their
clients because those who had taken certain drugs, or had certain
birth defects, might be better or worse off by given strategies at
trial.”213 Indeed, in that litigation, “some witnesses who would be
helpful to plaintiffs with certain birth defects would be harmful to
214
other plaintiffs with other birth defects.”
settlements are paid to those who have no forwarder, the more the law firm makes.
The law firm will, therefore, be more inclined to favor those clients who came directly
to the law firm. Other examples of favoring one client over another include favoring a
“squeaky wheel” client, favoring a relative, or favoring a friend of the family.
Rheingold, supra note 7, at 396-97.
211. See Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 118, at 950-53.
212. Plaintiff Betty Mekdeci, for example, sparred with her lawyers in the first Bendectin
case to go to trial, eventually persuading them but ultimately failing to persuade the jury. A new
trial was granted on appeal, but her lawyers wanted to postpone retrial to allow other cases to
be tried first, because of difficulties presented by Mekdeci’s case that the other cases did not
present. Mekdeci refused, and the lawyers unsuccessfully sought to withdraw. See Mekdeci v.
Merrell Nat’l Lab., 711 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1983); Marcus, supra note 4, at 236, 250-51.
Professor Marcus suggests that the coordinating lawyers owe some duty to each other’s clients,
or at least that a coordinating lawyer’s duty to his own client can be tempered by considerations
of the good of the others: “Mekdeci’s case provides some reason for feeling that client desires
may legitimately be conditioned on the ‘greater good’ of the overall plaintiff group in some
litigations involving multiple claimants.” Id. at 252-53.
213. Marcus, supra note 4, at 239.
214. Id. Such client-client conflicts tend to take on an aspect of lawyer-client conflict, as
well, when the lawyer is handling multiple related cases. The lawyer’s interest in maximizing
total return in the litigation may be inconsistent with the interests of a particular client such as
Betty Mekdeci. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1995)
(concerning the conflict of interest where a lawyer’s representation of a client “may be
materially limited . . . by the lawyer’s own interests”). Some conflicts in coordinated mass
litigation are more clearly lawyer-client. A conflict of interest may arise between a lawyer and
the clients of the other coordinating lawyers. In the Bendectin litigation, for example, lawyer
Stanley Chesley found himself so heavily invested—he had spent about $1 million out-of-pocket
and $3.3 million in hours—that settlement class action appeared the only sufficiently certain way
to recoup his investment. Although many individual clients may have preferred to go to trial,
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Successive client-client conflicts, too, may develop from
215
coordinated lawyer efforts. Two scenarios raise serious concerns.
The first involves a former client representation as part of a
coordinated group effort, and a subsequent representation adverse to
one of the other coordinating parties. The second involves a former
client representation, and a subsequent participation in a coordinated
group effort adverse to the former client.
May a lawyer accept a representation materially adverse to a
former client’s cooperating party in a substantially related matter? In
other words, if LX and LY, representing plaintiffs X and Y
respectively, have worked together and shared confidences as part of
a coordinating plaintiffs’ lawyer group, may LX later represent a party
being sued by Y in a matter in which Y’s shared confidential
information may prove useful? Or if lawyers representing defendants
have worked together and shared confidences in a defense group,
may one of the lawyers later represent someone suing one of the
other defendants in a related matter? That was precisely the issue
raised in ABA Formal Opinion 95-395,216 which stated that no ethical
duty prevented the lawyer from accepting the representation, but that
fiduciary obligations based on agency law may accomplish the same
thing.217
Several cases have held that duties to the coordinating clients
may prevent a lawyer from accepting a representation adverse to a
party whose confidences the lawyer had gained as part of a
coordinated legal effort. The Texas Supreme Court recently upheld
the imputed disqualification of a plaintiff’s lawyer because another
lawyer in the same firm had previously engaged in a joint defense
218
agreement with the plaintiff’s current adversary. In another case,

whether to hold out for a bigger trial verdict, or to have the opportunity to speak to a jury, or to
argue publicly the fault of the defendant, Chesley campaigned to win the support of other
plaintiffs’ lawyers for a settlement class action. See GREEN, supra note 5, at 215-16, 252; Marcus,
supra note 4, at 239.
215. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1995) (governing former
client conflicts); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.4.9 (1986) (“Pooled
information cases will result in former-client conflict problems.”).
216. See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text (discussing Opinion 395 in the context of
the duty of confidentiality).
217. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 395 (1995).
218. See National Med. Enters., Inc. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Tex. 1996); see also
GTE North, Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp. 1575, 1580-81 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (disqualifying
a law firm’s representation against a former member of an allied agreement based on a written
promise of confidentiality and evidence of harmful knowledge).
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the Fifth Circuit held that disqualification of a plaintiff’s lawyer would
be proper, based on that lawyer’s former participation in coordinated
defense meetings with the plaintiff’s current adversary, if in fact
relevant confidential information was exchanged at the defense
meetings.219 Other cases, however, have rejected such
disqualification.220 To the extent disqualification is based on fiduciary
duties drawn from agency law, rather than based on the ethical duties
running from a lawyer to a client, there is some question whether
disqualification would be imputed to other lawyers within the same
221
firm.
As a practical matter, the most important conflict of interest
questions arising out of lawyer coordination—and perhaps the most
difficult questions as well—concern imputed disqualification. In
general, if a lawyer would be disqualified from a representation
because of a conflict of interest, then that conflict is imputed to her
222
entire firm, thereby disqualifying every other lawyer in the firm. But
219. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir.
1977). The Fifth Circuit remanded the disqualification motion for findings as to whether
relevant confidential information was exchanged in the coordinated defense meetings. See id.
The court stated:
Just as an attorney would not be allowed to proceed against his former client in a
cause of action substantially related to the matters in which he previously represented
that client, an attorney should also not be allowed to proceed against a co-defendant
of a former client wherein the subject matter of the present controversy is
substantially related to the matters in which the attorney was previously involved, and
wherein confidential exchanges of information took place between the various codefendants in preparation of a joint defense.
Id. On remand, the district court concluded that no confidences were exchanged, and therefore
denied the motion for disqualification. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel
Corp., No. 74-1899, 1979 WL 1614, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 1979).
220. See Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 607-09 (8th Cir. 1977) (rejecting
disqualifications for violations of Canons 4, 5, or 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility);
see also International Paper Co. v. Lloyd Mfg. Co., 555 F. Supp. 125, 133, 136 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(acknowledging a possible basis for disqualification based on a joint defense exchange of
confidential information, but nevertheless denying disqualification despite substantial
cooperation among counsel).
221. Compare GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1581 (imputing disqualification to the entire firm,
applying Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10), and National Med. Enters., Inc. v. Godbey, 924
S.W.2d 123, 132 (Tex. 1996) (imputing disqualification to the entire firm, reasoning that “[t]he
attorney’s promise places him in the role of a fiduciary, the same as toward a client”), with
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 213 cmt. g(ii) (proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996) (commenting that imputation normally does not apply to agency duties, in
contrast to duties flowing from the law governing lawyers).
222. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1995). In providing that
conflicts are to be imputed among “lawyers . . . associated in a firm,” Rule 1.10(a) leaves open
what constitutes a “firm,” and thus does not answer whether conflicts should be imputed within
the types of lawyer-coordination networks discussed here. See Thomas D. Morgan, Conflicts of
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what if a lawyer is working closely with lawyers from other firms? If
one of the coordinating lawyers is disqualified because of a conflict of
interest, must the others be disqualified as well? In particular, if
lawyer LX was privy to confidential information of former client X,
may another member of LX’s coordinating group handle a
substantially related matter that is materially adverse to X?
In Essex Chemical Corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity
223
plaintiff Essex Chemical Corporation (Essex) moved to
Co.,
disqualify counsel for all defendants in a declaratory judgment action
for insurance coverage brought by Essex against nine insurers.
Previously, Essex had been represented by the law firm of Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (Skadden) in connection with a hostile
takeover bid. During that prior representation, Skadden was privy to
confidential information concerning Essex’s finances and other
224
matters. When Essex brought its declaratory judgment action, one
of the primary insurers, Home Insurance Company (Home), retained
Skadden for its defense.225 All nine defendants entered into a joint
226
defense agreement. When plaintiff’s counsel became aware of
Skadden’s prior representation of Essex, it moved to disqualify not
only Skadden, but also the lawyers for the other defendants with
whom Skadden had cooperated pursuant to the joint defense
agreement.227 Skadden withdrew from its representation of Home,
which was clearly the appropriate move given its conflict of interest.228
Counsel for the remaining defendants, however, insisted that they

Interest and the New Forms of Professional Associations, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 215, 222 (1998). The
Comment to Rule 1.10 suggests that “firm” includes not only private law firms, but also
corporate legal departments and legal services organizations. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 cmt (1995). The Comment also points out that “[w]hether
two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts.” Id.
Neither the rule nor the Comment sheds much light on the imputed conflict problems presented
by informal aggregation.
223. 975 F. Supp. 650 (D.N.J. 1997), rev’d, 993 F. Supp. 241 (D.N.J. 1998).
224. See id. at 652.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 652-53. The defendants titled their agreement the “ECC Coverage Litigation
Joint Defense and Cost Sharing Agreement.” Id. at 653.
227. See id. at 653-54. Essex’s counsel was unaware of the prior Skadden representation
until a deposition brought it to light several years after the lawsuit was filed. See id. at 653.
Defense counsel certified that they were unaware of the representation until Essex brought it to
their attention. See id. at 653 n.6.
228. See id. at 652 n.1; see also N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a)(1)
(2001) (concerning successive conflicts of interest).
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had no conflict of interest because Essex was Skadden’s former client,
not theirs.
The magistrate judge decided to disqualify counsel for all of the
defendants.229 Based on the relationship among defense counsel, the
magistrate judge presumed that “confidential and privileged
information has been shared between all participants to the joint
defense agreement, despite defense counsel’s certifications to the
contrary.”230 With that presumption of shared confidences, the
magistrate judge reasoned that all of the coordinating lawyers
suffered from the same imputed conflict as Skadden: “Allowing all
defense counsel to remain indirectly creates the same risk that the
representation by Skadden posed directly, despite the lack of a prior
direct attorney-client relationship between Essex and the defense
counsel.”231 Defense counsel’s assertion of the common interest
privilege—they had objected to Essex’s interrogatories on that
ground—was turned against them: “Defendants cannot enjoy the
benefits of the privilege without accepting its burdens. In other words,
defendants cannot claim that Skadden did not share any confidential
information about Essex while maintaining that joint communications
are protected by a recognized privilege, and so cannot be inquired
into by Essex.”232
The defendants appealed the magistrate judge’s disqualification
233
order to the district court, and the district court reversed. The court,
troubled by the potentially harsh results of “double imputation,”234
insisted on a painstaking factual analysis before disqualifying

229. See id. at 657.
230. Id. at 656.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 657. Additionally, the magistrate judge concluded that disqualification was
warranted under New Jersey’s appearance of impropriety standard. See id. (“By their
participation in the Joint Defense Agreement, all of the defense counsel have created a
relationship with Skadden such that it placed them in a position to have access to confidences
regarding Essex. Such a relationship creates an appearance of impropriety.”); see also N.J.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7(c)(2), 1.9(b) (2001) (preserving the appearance
of impropriety doctrine for conflicts of interest under New Jersey law).
233. See Essex Chem. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 993 F. Supp. 241, 255
(D.N.J. 1998).
234. See id. at 251-52. By “double imputation” or “imputation-on-imputation,” the court
was referring to the two steps required for disqualification of the defense firms. Here, the
conflict of interest originally belonged to the Skadden lawyers who personally represented
Essex in the takeover matter. That conflict was imputed to the entire Skadden firm, including
the lawyers representing Home in the Essex case. The conflict was then imputed to the other
lawyers with whom the later Skadden lawyers had coordinated. See id. at 253.
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coordinating attorneys.235 The court reversed the disqualification and
ordered a hearing “to ascertain the material facts surrounding
Skadden’s participation in the joint defense consortium and to
determine to what extent, if any, confidential information which was
shared between Essex and Skadden was communicated to other
defense counsel.”236 If Essex’s confidences were actually conveyed by
Skadden to other members of the joint defense group, then the
district court would agree that counsel should be disqualified, but the
court refused to presume irrebuttably that such confidences had been
237
conveyed.
The district court concerned itself with the balance of hardships,
taking into account not only Essex’s concerns, but also the interest of
each defendant not to be deprived of its chosen counsel midway
238
through a litigation. Ultimately, without a clear showing that
Essex’s confidences had been revealed to the consortium, the district
court understandably refused to deny all the coordinating clients their
chosen attorneys.239 Nevertheless, Essex’s concerns were hardly
frivolous. A former client sees its former law firm meeting,
coordinating, strategizing, and presumably sharing confidences with a
group of other lawyers who now are aligned against the client.
Naturally, the client fears that its own confidential information has
been shared with the group, and naturally the client feels betrayed.240

235. See id. at 252.
236. Id. at 255.
237. See id. at 251. In a similar case, IMC Global, Inc. v. Moffett, No. CIV.A.16387-NC, 1998
WL 842312 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 1998), the Delaware Chancery Court rejected a disqualification
motion. Two of the defense attorneys had conflicts of interest based on prior representation, but
before they withdrew, they had commenced an allied agreement and exchanged information
with the other defense lawyers. See id. at *1-2. The plaintiff moved to disqualify the remaining
participants. The court, upon defense counsel’s disclosure of the specific documents that had
been exchanged, concluded that the exchanged information did not warrant disqualification. See
id. at *3-4.
238. See Essex Chem., 993 F. Supp. at 254-55; see also Thomas F.A. Hetherington, Note,
Confusing Conflicts: National Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Godbey and the Problem of
Disqualification When No Previous Attorney-Client Relationship Exists, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 909,
930 & n.133 (1997) (criticizing the Godbey court for failing to consider the importance of clients’
right to select and retain their counsel of choice).
239. See Essex Chem., 993 F. Supp. at 254-55. For a discussion of Essex Chemical from the
perspective of two defense lawyers highly critical of the magistrate judge’s disqualification
order, and supportive of the district court’s approach, see Slater & Kurien, supra note 87, at 1315.
240. Professor Thomas Morgan has urged that courts consider imputed conflicts of interest
by focusing on genuine concerns of loyalty and confidentiality, rather than by trying to define
“firm,” given the number and variety of modern forms of lawyer associations. See Morgan,
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These conflicts of interest do not admit of easy solutions. The
conflicts are real. Lawyer coordination, its benefits notwithstanding,
can create conflicts that threaten client interests because coordination
renders clients dependent upon the work and trustworthiness of
multiple lawyers, most of whom the client did not retain. Yet the
241
governing ethical norms provide little guidance. Without clearer
guidance, disqualification based on ad hoc coordination appears
likely to remain a rarity,242 and self-monitoring by lawyers appears
unlikely to provide clients with the same level of protection that
243
conflicts checks can provide in other representations.
Within formally aggregated litigation, by contrast, judges have
opportunities to protect against attorney conflicts of interest. For
example, members of class actions receive protection from conflicts of
interest at three stages. First, a court may refuse to certify a class
action based on a conflict of interest between members of the class or
based on a conflict between class members and the proposed class

supra note 222, at 243. In the types of situations that I refer to as “informal aggregation,”
Professor Morgan argues that some conflicts should be imputed among coordinating lawyers:
[I]f the cooperation between the firms is frequent, clients of each might properly be
concerned that neither firm would want to offend the other by fighting too hard in the
matters in which their clients are opposed. . . . [T]he possibility would be an
appropriate issue for the court to consider on a motion to disqualify either or both of
the firms.
Id. at 233. Similarly, “in cases where misuse of a present or former client’s confidential
information is a significant possibility, the fact that firms regularly share information and
strategy in prosecution and defense of particular kinds of cases could properly be the basis for
disqualification of more than one of the firms.” Id.
241. See Essex Chem., 993 F. Supp. at 246 (commenting that the law governing imputed
disqualification is “decidedly less clear” where a party seeks to disqualify counsel for members
of a joint defense consortium, and noting the lack of “any controlling or even persuasive
authority directly on point”).
242. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 97:
That neither [United States v.] Anderson[, 790 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Wash. 1992)] nor
any other reported decision has resulted in the disqualification of an attorney based
on participating in a joint defense does not eliminate the chilling effect that the threat
of disqualification and the necessity of judicial questioning of participants may have
upon a joint defense arrangement.
Id. at 121. See also Joseph J. Ortego & David J. Vendler, Recent Decision May Jeopardize Joint
Defenses, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 1, 1997, at C6 (observing, in connection with the magistrate judge’s
disqualification ruling in Essex Chemical, that “it is rare—possibly unique—for a court to
disqualify joint defense counsel in civil cases because one firm’s conflict ‘infected’ the others”)
(footnote omitted).
243. In contrast to the uncharted territory of conflicts based on coordinating lawyer groups,
conflicts based on a duty to one’s own client are guided by comprehensible, if difficult, rules. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7-1.11 (1995).
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counsel.244 Second, during class action litigation, the judge may
remove class counsel who fails to represent the class adequately,
whether because of a conflict of interest or otherwise.245 Indeed, the
lawyer representing the class has an ethical responsibility to request
that separate representation be provided to protect the interests of
subgroups within the class if divergent interests become apparent
246
during the litigation. Third, a court may refuse to approve a class
action settlement if the allocation among class members appears
unfair.247 Although virtually no class action remains entirely conflictfree, judicial supervision protects against at least the more egregious
conflicts. Judge Weinstein, writing of the importance of judicial
oversight to safeguard against client-client conflicts of interest in class
actions, asserts that “[t]his exercise of court oversight and discretion
is . . . the only available adequate substitute for traditional ethical
rules.”248

244. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring adequate representation as a prerequisite for
class certification); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831-32 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626-27 (1997).
245. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 505 (noting, in the context of lawyer-client conflicts of
interest, that “[i]n class actions where counsel representing the class is not effectively handling
the suit, he or she may be replaced by the court”).
246. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1176 (5th Cir. 1978)
(“[T]he attorney’s duty to the class requires him to point out conflicts to the court so that the
court may take appropriate steps to protect the interests of absentee class members.”). The
official commentary to the Massachusetts conflict of interest rule, adopted in 1997, reflects a
reasonable interpretation of ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 as applied to class
actions. The Massachusetts comment reads, in pertinent part:
A lawyer who undertakes to represent a class should make an initial determination
whether subclasses within the class should have separate representation because their
interests differ in material respects from other segments of the class. Moreover, the
lawyer who initially determines that subclasses are not necessary should revisit that
determination as the litigation or settlement discussions proceed because as discovery
or settlement talks proceed the interests of subgroups within the class may begin to
diverge significantly. The class lawyer must be constantly alert to such divergences
and to whether the interests of a subgroup of the class are being sacrificed or
undersold in the interests of the whole. The lawyer has the responsibility to request
that separate representation be provided to protect the interests of subgroups within
the class.
MASS. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.7 cmt. 14A (2000).
247. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring court approval of class action settlement);
Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 620-21 (emphasizing that Rule 23(e) functions as an additional
requirement and does not displace the requirements for certification under Rules 23(a) and
(b)); see also WEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 64 (“The class action gives the court ultimate
responsibility to consider fairness between present and future claimants and between the more
and less seriously injured claimants.”).
248. WEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 64.
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In other types of formally aggregated litigation as well, judges
may exercise their oversight powers to offer some protection against
conflicts of interest, although not to the same extent as in class
actions. In consolidated litigation, courts arguably possess the power
249
to remove counsel for failure to handle the litigation properly.
Moreover, a judge overseeing any formally aggregated litigation has
the power to designate lead counsel, steering committees, and other
leadership roles250 and may exercise that power to protect against
conflicts of interest.251
In sum, conflicts of interest in informally aggregated litigation
present particularly troublesome situations. The problem is not that
the conflicts of interest that arise in informally aggregated litigation
are any worse than those that arise in formally aggregated litigation.
Rather, it is that the greater judicial oversight in formal aggregation,
while no panacea, provides at least some protection for clients,
whereas clients in informally aggregated litigation get little protection
from either ethical norms or judicial oversight. As with other ethical
duties, concerns about conflicts of interest involving coordinating
lawyers can be alleviated somewhat by explicit written cooperation
agreements, which can facilitate conflicts checks and render certain
conflicts more apparent by making the underlying duties more
explicit. Even with such agreements, however, difficult conflict of
interest problems will remain, such as the imputed successive conflict
problem of Essex Chemical.
D. Legal Malpractice
Aside from whether coordinating lawyers owe ethical duties of
competence and diligence to each other’s clients, what about legal
duties enforceable through civil liability? In other words, may a
coordinating lawyer be held liable to those other clients for
249. Judge Weinstein reasons that such power should extend to consolidated litigation:
The same power [to replace class counsel] should be found to exist in a mass tort
subject to consolidation or bankruptcy. If the attorney with large masses of clients
cannot handle the litigation properly either because of lack of capital, managerial
skills, professional competence, or as a result of psychological problems, he or she
should be replaced.
Id. at 63.
250. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
251. See M.C.L.3d, supra note 9, § 20.224 (“The court should also ensure that designated
counsel fairly represent the various interests in the litigation; where diverse interests exist
among the parties, the court may designate a committee of counsel representing different
interests.”).
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malpractice?252 I know of no case in which a lawyer has been held
liable in malpractice to the client of a coordinating lawyer. The
argument for such liability, however, is strong.
When lawyers divvy up work in their coordinated efforts, each
client depends upon the quality and timeliness of each lawyer’s work.
Suppose a joint defense group, comprised of counsel for defendants
X, Y, and Z, seeks dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens and
assigns to LX the task of obtaining an expert affidavit establishing the
253
adequacy of the alternative forum. Suppose further that the
defendants’ grounds for dismissal are strong, and the court would
grant a properly presented motion. Suppose the court denies the
motion, however, because of the insufficiency of the affidavit
obtained by LX, which any reasonable lawyer in LX’s position would
have recognized. Alternatively, suppose X, Y, and Z are plaintiffs
with claims against a single defendant; in coordinated discovery, their
lawyers divvy up the task of searching for useful information in boxes
containing several hundred thousand documents, and LX negligently
fails to find the “smoking gun” document in one of his boxes.
Assuming X, Y, and Z can prove damages, would they have a valid
malpractice claim against LX? LX owed a duty to X to provide
reasonably competent representation. Having breached that duty, LX
has exposed herself to a malpractice claim by X. But what about Y
and Z? They were equally harmed by LX’s negligence, but their
malpractice claim against LX depends upon the untested question of
whether LX owed them a duty of care.
In defense, LX might argue that Y and Z should look to their own
254
lawyers to protect their interests. Many lawyer errors, however, are
invisible on the surface and become clear only when probed. The
holes in LX’s expert affidavit should have been obvious to LX, but not
to another lawyer who is not immersed in the details of the
alternative forum’s adequacy. The smoking gun document that should

252. Although the matters are related in the sense that both involve lawyers’ professional
duties, “ethical duties” as used here refers to duties under applicable rules of professional
conduct, enforceable through the lawyer disciplinary process, while “malpractice” refers to
breach of primarily common law duties enforceable through civil liability.
253. See generally Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254-55 n.22 (1981) (requiring
the existence of an adequate alternative forum in order to dismiss under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens).
254. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. c
(Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997) (noting, as a reason for the rule that lawyers owe no duty of care
to opposing parties in litigation, that litigants are usually protected by their own counsel).
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have been found by LX would not be found by the other lawyers
unless they searched LX’s boxes themselves. If LY and LZ have to
spend their time looking over LX’s shoulder or redoing LX’s work, it
defeats the purpose of dividing the work.
Perhaps LY and LZ behaved negligently by trusting LX to do some
of the work. If LY and LZ should have known not to delegate work to
LX, then Y and Z can hold them accountable for their own negligence
on a theory akin to negligent entrustment.255 But LX’s failure does not
necessarily mean that LY and LZ acted carelessly in dividing work with
LX and trusting her work. As shown in Part I, lawyers—including
plenty of reasonable, prudent lawyers—coordinate their efforts, often
256
relying on each other’s work.
Courts increasingly hold lawyers responsible to nonclients based
on various malpractice permutations and third-party beneficiary
theories. The cases include liability of a real estate seller’s attorney
257
for making a negligent misrepresentation to a buyer, liability of a
borrower’s attorney to a creditor for negligently drafting an opinion
258
letter on which the creditor foreseeably relied, and liability of a
decedent’s attorney to an intended beneficiary for negligently
259
drafting or executing a will. Applying malpractice liability to the
255. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 330 (2000) (discussing the doctrine
of negligent entrustment under which, for example, a defendant can be held liable for harm
caused by entrusting an automobile to a person whom the defendant knows or should know is
apt to use it carelessly).
256. Even if LY and LZ did not act negligently, their clients may attempt to hold them
vicariously liable for LX’s negligence. Such vicarious liability for a subagent’s negligence may not
be appropriate under agency law:
As between the principal and agent, an agent is not responsible where . . . it becomes
necessary to employ subagents, by reason of their particular profession or skill, or
where the appointment of a subagent has been authorized, if the agent has used
reasonable diligence and skill in his choice of the subagent. There is, in such a case, a
privity between the subagent and the principal, who must, therefore, seek a remedy
directly against the subagent for his negligence or misconduct.
3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 164 (1986).
In contrast, if an agent delegates powers to a subagent without implicit or explicit
authority to do so, the agent is liable to the principal for damages caused by the subagent’s
negligence or misconduct. See id. § 162. Thus, a lawyer who delegates work to other members of
a coordinating group, without the client’s authorization, risks exposing herself to liability to her
client for the negligent or wrongful acts of the coordinating lawyers.
257. See Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354, 1362 (N.J. 1995).
258. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318,
323 (N.Y. 1992).
259. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961); McLane v. Russell, 546 N.E.2d 499,
502 (Ill. 1989); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Or. 1987). See generally GILLERS, supra note
164, at 742-52 (cataloguing the “expanding universe” of attorney liability to third parties);
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case of the coordinating lawyer follows naturally from the cases
holding attorneys liable to nonclients.
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, in its chapter
on malpractice liability, suggests that a lawyer owes a duty of care to a
nonclient to the extent that “(a) the lawyer . . . invites the non-client
to rely on the lawyer’s opinion or provision of other legal services,
and the non-client so relies, and (b) the non-client is not, under
applicable tort law, too remote from the lawyer to be entitled to
protection.”260 Section 73(2) appears to be aimed primarily at transactional malpractice situations such as liability to beneficiaries for a
negligently drafted will, or liability to creditors for a negligent opinion
261
letter. Nevertheless, the language lends itself to arguments for
litigation malpractice liability based on negligent performance of
work within an allied plaintiffs’ or defendants’ group. By working as
part of the coordinating group, LX invited Y and Z to rely on her
provision of legal services; Y and Z so relied; and they are not so
remote as to establish a lack of proximate causation. The fact that a
client did not formally retain a lawyer does not end the inquiry into
the lawyer’s duty and potential liability.262 Still, it remains to be seen
whether courts will be willing to impose liability for harm caused to
someone else’s client in a common interest alliance.
As a matter of legal fundamentals, malpractice liability follows
from the principle of agency law that the client-principal is bound by
263
the lawyer-agent’s actions, including the lawyer-agent’s mistakes. If
RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§ 7.11-7.14 (4th ed. 1996 &
Supp. 1999) (discussing various bases for negligence liability to nonclients).
260. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73(2) (Tentative Draft
No. 8, 1997).
261. See id. cmt. e; id. Reporter’s Note cmt. e.
262. See David B. Lilly Co., Inc. v. Fisher, 18 F.3d 1112, 1122 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]hat Lilly
did not formally retain Cadwalader does not end the inquiry into Cadwalader’s duty.”). In
David B. Lilly Co., attorney G. Robert Fisher consulted another law firm, Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft (Cadwalader), concerning certain aspects of a client’s transaction. When
problems with the transaction surfaced, the other party to the transaction, who claimed to have
relied on Fisher’s advice, sued both Fisher and Cadwalader. See id. at 1114-16. Cadwalader
moved for summary judgment, arguing both lack of duty and lack of causation. The district
court granted summary judgment on both grounds. See id. at 1121-22. On appeal, the Third
Circuit upheld summary judgment on causation grounds and declined to reach the duty
question. See id. at 1122.
263. The First Circuit addressed this point in affirming the dismissal, for failure to prosecute,
of an apparently meritorious complaint:
[A]s matters stand, plaintiffs have quite likely been victimized by a series of blunders
on their lawyer’s part (for which they may have a claim against him). But in our
adversary system, the acts and omissions of counsel are customarily visited upon the
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the client were not adversely affected by the lawyer’s errors, after all,
there would be no injury to be compensated. Whether the same
principle can be applied to a nonclient is the crux of the question. Is a
nonclient bound by the coordinating lawyer’s negligent performance
in the same way as is the lawyer’s primary client,264 or does the
nonclient occupy a different position because he has the protection of
his own retained counsel and no direct attorney-client relationship
with the negligent lawyer? To whatever extent lawyers may avoid
malpractice liability to coordinating clients on “not my client”
grounds, that cannot alter the reality that each of the coordinating
clients may have depended on the lawyer and suffered injury from the
lawyer’s failure. Without a malpractice claim against the negligent
coordinating lawyer, it is conceivable that the injured client would be
left without any recourse.265
E. The Problem of Informal Ethics in Informally Aggregated
Litigation
Lawyers within a coordinating group depend on each other,
perhaps more than they generally admit to their clients. Clients, in
turn, depend on the competence, diligence, and trustworthiness of the
coordinating lawyers, probably more than they realize. Yet the ethical
safeguards for clients in coordinated litigation are, at best, fuzzy. If
the lawyers’ duties are not explicit, then when a lawyer arguably
breaches a duty to another lawyer’s client, consequences such as

client in a civil case, and we see no legally cognizable basis for departing from this
well-established principle here.
Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274, 281 (1st Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
264. Cf. Gonzalez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 27 F.3d 751, 762 n.12 (1st Cir. 1994) (rejecting
adequacy of representation as a requirement for virtual representation, because such a
requirement “would fly in the teeth of the general rule that, in civil litigation, the sins of the
lawyer routinely are visited on the client”). As a leading treatise sensibly notes, “the suggestion
that the rule that a client is bound by a lawyer’s misadventures should apply to a nonpartynonclient, simply because there are identical interests and notice of the earlier litigation, is
surprising.” WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 109, § 4457 (Supp. 2000).
265. As a practical matter, some clients probably could assert successful claims against their
own lawyers, who in turn might have third-party claims against the negligent coordinating
lawyer. As discussed earlier, however, it would be incorrect to assume that the client’s own
lawyer must have been negligent merely because the lawyer relied on another lawyer’s shoddy
work. The client’s claim against her own lawyer should be based either on the lawyer’s own
negligence or on vicarious liability for the coordinating lawyer’s negligence, which presumes a
valid basis for liability directly against the coordinating lawyer. See supra note 256 and
accompanying text.
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disciplinary sanctions, disqualification, and malpractice liability are
less likely to follow.
The problem is that informal aggregation, by its very nature,
leaves too many unanswered questions about the lawyers’ duties to
coordinating clients, at least in the absence of a well-drafted
cooperation agreement rendering duties explicit. Coordinating
lawyers have some obligation to maintain confidentiality, under
certain circumstances, but the source and scope of this obligation
remain unclear, including whether the duty is enforceable under the
rules of professional conduct.266 Coordinating lawyers are not entirely
free to ignore the interests of the other clients in the group, but no
one has defined the scope of any duty of loyalty to the coordinating
clients, or the extent to which it constrains the lawyer’s ability to
pursue single-mindedly the interests of her primary client.267 Conflict
of interest rules apply to coordinating lawyers, but their application is
268
sporadic, confusing, and weak. Finally, while a strong argument can
be made for malpractice liability for negligent work within a lawyer
network in informally aggregated litigation, that argument remains
untested.269
Formal aggregation mechanisms carry clearer safeguards for
clients who depend on the work of other lawyers. This is not to say
that ethical duties in formally aggregated litigation are well-defined.
Quite the opposite is true. The ethical obligations of lawyers in mass
270
271
litigation are notoriously murky; identifying duties in class actions
and MDL272 is particularly difficult. Nevertheless, formal aggregation
266. See supra notes 156-91 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 192-206 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 207-50 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 251-64 and accompanying text.
270. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 85 (“The traditional ethical rules, I believe, are
inadequate [in mass tort cases] due to their reliance on the single-litigant, single-lawyer
model.”); Rheingold, supra note 7, at 395 n.2 (noting that general treatises and authorities on
professional conduct “tend to have little discussion of the ethical issues in the context of masstort litigation”); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. L. REV.
469 (1994) (discussing ethical problems in mass tort litigation that are poorly addressed by
traditional legal ethics doctrines).
271. See G. Donald Puckett, Note, Peering into a Black Box: Discovery and Adequate
Attorney Representation for Class Action Settlements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1271, 1291 (1999)
(“Although courts uniformly recognize the existence of these fiduciary duties [owed by class
counsel to class members], they have struggled to define their specific content.”).
272. See GREEN, supra note 5, at 171 (contrasting MDL with class actions and noting that
“[t]he role of lead counsel in a multidistrict proceeding is blurred”); PAUL D. RHEINGOLD,
MASS TORT LITIGATION § 21:8, at 21-13 n.28 (1996) (“As poorly as any guidance is spelled out
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allows for better-defined attorney roles and closer judicial oversight
than does informal aggregation. In a class action, the class counsel
explicitly owes duties to the members of the class, not merely to the
named class representatives.273 In MDL, lead counsel and steering
committee members explicitly owe duties to the clients of other
lawyers in the litigation, inasmuch as it is their officially designated
responsibility to perform legal work on behalf of an entire side of the
litigation.274 Lawyers in coordinating roles in class actions and MDL
may quibble about who is their “client,”275 but they do not doubt that
for class lead counsel conduct, either in ethical or legal decisions, there is still less guidance
spelled out for multidistrict litigation counsel.”); Resnik et al., supra note 1, at 321 n.77 (“One
might ask who the clients of PSC members are. Courts have commented about obligations of
such lawyers to all plaintiffs, rather than only to those clients who had individually retained PSC
members. However, neither codes nor case law detail what duties that representative capacity
imposes.”) (citations omitted). For a look at a forgone opportunity to elucidate the duties of
MDL counsel, see Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1996), in which the court
acknowledged that “plaintiffs urge us to set forth the duties which lead counsel in multidistrict
litigation proceedings owe to other parties to the litigation, and to subordinate counsel,” but
refused to offer guidance on the grounds that it would be an advisory opinion. Id. at 1205.
273. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 221 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting
that class counsel owes a fiduciary duty to class members); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab.
Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that divergence of interests among class members
“presents special problems because the class attorney’s duty does not run just to the plaintiffs
named in the caption of the case; it runs to all of the members of the class”); Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1176 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that class counsel owes
fiduciary duties to each member of class); Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832
(3d Cir. 1973) (holding that class counsel has a duty to ensure that class members receive proper
settlement notice); Singer v. AT&T Corp., 185 F.R.D. 681, 690 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (“[T]he class
attorney has a fiduciary duty to the court as well as to each member of the class.”); Deborah
Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1203 (1982); Puckett, supra note
271, at 1290-91 (“The adequate attorney representation requirement imposes fiduciary duties
upon the class attorney that are owed to each individual member of the class.”).
274. See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 111 F.3d 220, 234 (1st Cir. 1997)
(“Whether or not there is a direct or formal attorney-client relationship between plaintiffs and
the PSC [Plaintiffs Steering Committee], the PSC and its IRPA [individually retained plaintiff’s
attorney] members necessarily owed a fiduciary obligation to the plaintiffs.”); In re San Juan
Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 888 F.2d 940, 942 (1st Cir. 1989) (“The PSC, as the district court
observed, represents ‘by its very nature . . . all plaintiffs.’”); In re Air Crash Disaster at Malaga,
Spain, 769 F. Supp. 90, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting the “duties to plaintiffs” owed by lead
counsel); see also M.C.L.3d, supra note 9, § 20.22 (advising judges to “ensure that counsel
appointed to leading roles . . . will fairly and adequately represent all of the parties on their
side”); id. § 20.222 (describing the powers and responsibilities of lead, liaison, and trial counsel,
and committee members); WEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 84 (stating that plaintiffs’ attorneys
seeking leadership positions in mass torts “violate their ethical duty to the community of those
seeking redress” if they engage in wrongful tactics to acquire power).
275. See Resnik et al., supra note 1, at 321 n.77; see also Stephen A. Sheller, Court
Appointed MDL Counsel: Who They Represent, Who They Don’t Represent and Who They
Should Represent, 3 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: FEN-PHEN/REDUX, Dec. 1999, at 22 (emphasizing
the importance of including representatives of divergent interests on MDL plaintiffs’ steering
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their role gives them some responsibility for the well-being of the
entire group whose interests they are assigned to protect.
In informally aggregated litigation, by contrast, that
responsibility is far from clear. Although clients may be dependent on
the coordinating lawyers to protect sensitive information, to do their
share of the legal work competently and diligently, and to maintain a
modicum of loyalty, it is entirely plausible, given the vagueness of
ethical safeguards, that the coordinating lawyers will not feel any
responsibility akin to a lawyer-client relationship with the other
lawyers’ clients.
The solution is not necessarily to impose more obligations on
coordinating lawyers, but rather to spell out their duties with greater
clarity. Formal aggregation and judicial oversight can provide a basis
for relatively explicit duties. Alternatively, a carefully drafted
cooperation agreement can clarify the duties of coordinating counsel.
In contrast to formal aggregation rules, cooperation agreements can
be drafted to suit the needs of the particular coordinating group.
IV. INFORMAL AGGREGATION AND NONPARTY PRECULUSION
It is perhaps the most fundamental rule of civil procedure: one
who was not a party to an action is not bound by the judgment. It is a
276
rule with powerful due process overtones, the essential message of
277
278
Pennoyer v. Neff, Hansberry v. Lee, and Martin v. Wilks.279 It is
also, of course, a rule with exceptions. If deemed to be “in privity”
280
with a party, then one can be bound. Class actions are another
committees).
276. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999):
[M]andatory class actions aggregating damage claims implicate the due process
“principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not
bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a
party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.”
(quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)); South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526
U.S. 160, 167-68 (1999); Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 797-805 (1996); James R.
Pielemeier, Due Process Limitations on the Application of Collateral Estoppel Against
Nonparties to Prior Litigation, 63 B.U. L. REV. 383, 387 (1983).
277. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
278. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
279. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
280. See, e.g., Albright v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 463 F. Supp. 1220, 1228 (W.D. Pa.
1979) (holding that the survivors and estate administrator bringing a wrongful death action were
in privity with the decedent and, therefore, bound by the decedent’s unsuccessful personal
injury action); Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. 1027, 1034-36 (E.D.N.C.
1978) (holding that the county board of education was in privity with the state attorney general
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exception to the rule against nonparty preclusion; class members are
bound by the judgment although they have not been made party to
the action in the traditional sense of having appeared or been
served.281
The question that remains is whether notions of nonparty
preclusion ought to extend beyond class actions and traditional
privity relationships, to bind a litigant who was not a party to the
prior lawsuit but whose lawyer coordinated with the lawyer for a
similarly situated party in the lawsuit. If informal aggregation
undermines assumptions of individual litigant autonomy and amounts
to treatment of the litigation as a single integrated whole, does it
provide a basis for nonparty preclusion?
A. The Argument for Nonparty Preclusion Based on Informal
Aggregation
Some courts have accepted the theory of “virtual representation”
282
for binding nonparties to prior judgments, and commentators have
and, therefore, bound by the antitrust consent decree), aff’d, 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1981). The
word “privity” does not describe any category of factually defined relationship or set of
relationships. Rather, “privity” describes the legal conclusion that a particular relationship
warrants binding one person to another person’s legal judgment. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.13 (3d ed. 1999); Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court”
Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 219 n.92 (1992).
281. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808-14 (1985) (holding absent class
members bound by the class action judgment despite their lack of minimum contacts with the
forum state); Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 39 (noting class actions as an exception to the rule that a
nonparty is not bound by a judgment).
282. See, e.g., Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 521 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 43
(1999); NAACP v. Metropolitan Council, 125 F.3d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1997), vacated on other
grounds, 522 U.S. 1145, reinstated on remand, 144 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 826
(1998); Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 453 (8th Cir. 1996); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 988
F.2d 252, 265 (1st Cir. 1993); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1975);
Chicago Tribune Co. v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 95C3917, 1999 WL
299875, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 1999); Dentsply Int’l, Inc. v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 385,
393 (D. Del. 1999), appeal dismissed sub nom. Dentsply Int’l, Inc. v. Dentsply Research and
Dev. Corp., 215 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Waldman v. Village of Kiryas Joel, 39 F. Supp. 2d
370, 380-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Petit v. City of Chicago, No. 90C4984, 1999 WL 66539, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 8, 1999); DeBraska v. City of Milwaukee, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1029-30 (E.D. Wis. 1998),
rev’d, 189 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 1999); City of Chicago v. Shalala, No. 97C4884, 1998 WL 164889, at
*8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1998), aff’d, 189 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1530
(2000); In re Air Crash Disaster near Dayton, Ohio, 350 F. Supp. 757, 766 (S.D. Ohio 1972),
rev’d sub nom. Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973); Citizens for Open Access to
Sand and Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass’n, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 1998); Holzer v.
Motorola Lighting, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 446, 454-55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Duffy v. Si-Sifh Corp., 726
So. 2d 438, 443 (La. Ct. App. 1999). See generally Jack L. Johnson, Comment, Due or Voodoo
Process: Virtual Representation as a Justification for the Preclusion of a Nonparty’s Claim, 68
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urged wider use of nonparty preclusion.283 The Fifth Circuit offered
this widely quoted, though overstated, articulation of the doctrine:
“[A] person may be bound by a judgment even though not a party if
one of the parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as
to be his virtual representative.”284
Many of the cases applying this virtual representation doctrine
fall into two categories. One category involves an initial action
brought by a state agency or other government entity, and a
subsequent action brought by a citizen. On the theory that the citizen
was adequately represented by the government entity, courts have
285
held the citizen bound by the prior judgment. The other category
286
involves private litigants pursuing classic public law litigation, such
as matters of statutory constitutionality or challenges to government
affirmative action plans, where an initial plaintiff pursues the
litigation unsuccessfully, and then a new plaintiff brings an identical
challenge. Courts have held the new plaintiff bound by the prior
judgment, on the theory that the earlier plaintiff represented her
interests.287
TUL. L. REV. 1303 (1994) (discussing the procedural fairness of virtual representation).
283. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 280, at 195 (advocating expansion of nonparty preclusion
rules); Lawrence C. George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery and the Collateral Class
Action, 32 STAN. L. REV. 655, 657 (1980) (urging the abandonment of the privity requirement
for binding nonparties); Allan D. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion: Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 357, 379-81 (1974) (arguing that, for reasons of judicial efficiency, preclusion principles
should apply more extensively to nonparties); Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1486 (1974) (arguing that collateral estoppel of nonparties is consistent
with due process).
284. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1975).
285. See, e.g., Alaska Legislative Council v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 1998)
(holding Alaska state legislators, suing both as legislators and in their individual capacities as
Alaska residents, bound by the claim-preclusive effect of a judgment from prior action by the
State of Alaska concerning implementation of the federal wildlife management statute), aff’d,
181 F.3d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Lucas v. Planning Bd., 7 F. Supp. 2d 310, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(holding that a citizens’ lawsuit to stop construction of a telecommunications tower was claimprecluded, based on a consent judgment entered in the municipality’s prior lawsuit against the
cellular telephone companies, on the grounds that “the Town’s elected officials were the virtual
representatives of all its residents in the prior suit”); Citizens, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88-89 (holding
that a citizens’ association was barred from suing to establish a public recreation easement, on
the grounds that the association and its members were bound by judgments in prior actions
between state agencies and coastal property owners, despite a prior court’s denial of the
association’s application to intervene).
286. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281 (1976) (introducing the concept and describing the characteristics of public law
litigation).
287. See, e.g., NAACP v. Metropolitan Council, 125 F.3d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding
that a class of Minneapolis public school students were bound by a prior judgment involving a
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The doctrine cannot be neatly contained in these two categories,
however. A number of courts have applied virtual representation in
other circumstances, using the presence of a “virtual representative”
288
as a basis for binding a nonparty. Moreover, the language courts use
to describe their holdings does not limit the doctrine to government
actions or public law litigation.289
Several themes permeate the virtual representation cases as the
factors that appear to weigh heavily in courts’ determinations of
whether to bind the nonparty. One, of course, is alignment of
class of minority residents of, and applicants for, Minneapolis low-income housing), vacated on
other grounds, 522 U.S. 1145, reinstated on remand, 144 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 826 (1998); Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 454-56 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that challengers
to redistricted St. Louis aldermanic boundaries were bound by the issue-preclusive effect of a
prior judgment upholding the same boundaries against a challenge by a partially different group
of objectors, and specifically mentioning that “[a]lthough virtual representation may be used in
the private law context, its use is particularly appropriate for public law issues”); Petit v. City of
Chicago, No. 90C4984, 1999 WL 66539, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1999) (holding that the Chicago
police officer plaintiffs in a reverse discrimination lawsuit were bound by the issue-preclusive
effect of a judgment upon a special verdict in a related suit challenging the Chicago Police
Department’s affirmative action plan for promotions, even though most of the plaintiffs had not
been parties to the prior suit); DeBraska v. City of Milwaukee, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1030 (E.D.
Wis. 1998) (holding that Milwaukee police officers and their union were claim-precluded from
bringing a lawsuit challenging the city’s labor practices, on the grounds that they were virtually
represented by the union and other police officers in a prior suit), rev’d, 189 F.3d 650 (7th Cir.
1999).
288. See, e.g., Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 521 (7th Cir. 1998) (binding a police chief
defendant in an individual civil-rights money-damages lawsuit with the issue-preclusive effect of
a prior judgment against the city), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 43 (1999); Chicago Tribune Co. v.
United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 95C3917, 1999 WL 299875, at *3-4 (N.D.
Ill. May 4, 1999) (holding that a government contractor was bound by an injunction against the
United States requiring that the information be disclosed pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act); Dentsply Int’l, Inc. v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 385, 393-400 (D. Del.
1999) (holding a corporation in contempt for failure to comply with an injunction entered in a
previous patent infringement litigation to which the corporation was not a party); In re Air
Crash at Detroit Metro. Airport, 976 F. Supp. 1076, 1081-82 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding the
executor of the estate of a flight crew member who died in an air crash bound by a prior
judgment determining that the flight crew engaged in willful and wanton misconduct, although
neither the decedent nor the estate was party to prior lawsuit); Duffy v. Si-Sifh Corp., 726 So. 2d
438, 443 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a proposed class representative was bound by a denial
of class certification for a different proposed class representative in an action against an
insurance company by burial insurance policy beneficiaries).
289. See, e.g., Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 F.3d 1054, 1070
(6th Cir. 1995) (“Virtual representation demands the existence of an express or implied legal
relationship in which parties to the first suit are accountable to non-parties who file a
subsequent suit raising identical issues.” (quoting Benson & Ford, Inc. v. Wanda Petroleum Co.,
833 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002, 1008 (1978))));
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Under the federal law of
res judicata, a person may be bound by a judgment even though not a party if one of the parties
to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be his virtual representative.”).
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interests between the party and the nonparty.290 Another is whether
the party had adequate incentive to litigate vigorously, and thus to
represent the nonparty’s interests.291 For our purposes, however, the
most interesting theme that runs through the virtual representation
cases is the involvement of the nonparty’s lawyer in the prior
litigation.
Involvement in the prior litigation, while not the primary
consideration in most cases, comes up routinely as a significant factor
mentioned by courts applying the virtual representation doctrine.
Many cases regarding virtual representation list participation in the
prior suit as a factor in determining whether to apply nonparty
292
In a recent and thorough analysis of virtual
preclusion.
representation, the Seventh Circuit offered factors that courts have
considered in addition to parallel interests and adequate
representation: “control or participation in the earlier litigation,
acquiescence, deliberate maneuvering to avoid the effects of the first
case, or the close relationship between the parties to the various
cases.”293 A number of courts have applied preclusion against

290. See, e.g., Aerojet-General, 511 F.2d at 719 (finding that “the interests of the state boards
and the County were closely aligned”); City of Chicago v. Shalala, No. 97C4884, 1998 WL
164889, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1998) (noting that plaintiff-intervenor class members “are
similarly situated to the plaintiffs in” the earlier suit), aff’d, 189 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 1530 (2000); Citizens for Open Access to Sand and Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass’n,
71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 89 (Ct. App. 1998) (“We do not find any indication in the record of a direct
interest of appellant in the current dispute that was unrepresented by the state agencies in the
prior litigation.”).
291. See, e.g., NAACP v. Metropolitan Council, 125 F.3d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1997)
(“Furthermore, the Hollman class adequately represented the interests it shares with the
student class because the Hollman class had a powerful incentive to establish the segregative
effects of the Met Council’s housing policies and practices.”), vacated on other grounds, 522 U.S.
1145, reinstated on remand, 144 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 826 (1998); Tyus v.
Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 455-56 (8th Cir. 1996):
Another factor to consider is adequacy of representation, which is best viewed in
terms of incentive to litigate. That is, one party “adequately represents” the interests
of another when the interests of the two parties are very closely aligned and the first
party had a strong incentive to protect the interests of the second party.
(citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
292. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 802 (1996) (pointing to “the fact
that petitioners neither participated in nor had the opportunity to participate in” the prior
action in deciding to deny preclusion) (citation omitted); Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 162
F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 1998) (listing “control or participation in the earlier litigation” as an
additional factor considered in precluding litigation by a nonparty), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1036
(1999); Tyus, 93 F.3d at 455 (naming participation in prior litigation as a guiding principle in
determining virtual representation).
293. Tice, 162 F.3d at 971.
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nonparties, based in part on lawyer coordination or client
participation in the first suit.294 Courts have been especially willing to
bind nonparties represented by the same lawyer who represented the
295
parties to the prior action. The presence of overlapping parties, too,

294. See, e.g., NAACP, 125 F.3d at 1175 (holding that the student class was virtually
represented by the housing class, noting that “the student members of the [housing] class
actually participated in that litigation”); Chicago Tribune Co. v. United States Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., No. 95-C3917, 1999 WL 299857, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 1999) (binding a
nonparty that was “fully aware of, and closely aligned with the named defendant”); Dentsply
Int’l, Inc. v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389 (D. Del. 1999) (holding a nonparty bound
based in part on the nonparty’s involvement in litigation decisions and sharing of information);
Waldman v. Village of Kiryas Joel, 39 F. Supp. 2d 370, 380-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that a
nonparty village resident bringing a section 1983 claim based on the Establishment Clause was
bound, because he “shared very closely aligned, if not identical, interests as,” and “participated
in a representative capacity” for, plaintiff synagogue in earlier action involving “virtually
identical” interests); In re Air Crash Disaster near Dayton, Ohio, 350 F. Supp. 757, 766-67 (S.D.
Ohio 1972) (holding a nonparty air crash victim bound by a judgment exonerating the
defendant, where the plaintiff’s counsel had participated in coordinated discovery, issueframing, and case order selection), rev’d sub nom. Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 671 (6th
Cir. 1973).
In Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 123 F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 1997), the dissenting judge
emphasized that virtual representation was warranted because the plaintiffs had coordinated
their efforts through an organization called Unified Tecumseh Products Hourly Retirees
(UTPHR):
Here, UTPHR authorized, financed, and controlled the investigation and prosecution
of both sets of plaintiffs’ suits. In fact, the group was explicitly formed for this
purpose. And, in both cases, UTPHR made the decision who the named plaintiffs
would be, hired the attorney, and assumed financial liability for the litigation. Thus,
UTPHR is precluded from relitigating claims it has already lost; it should not be able
to escape the effects of res judicata merely by naming a different plaintiff.
Id. at 886-87 (Ryan, J., dissenting); see also Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, supra note
283, at 1504 (arguing that where a nonparty has had the opportunity to participate in strategy
planning or consolidated discovery, “he has had a vicarious day in court” and therefore can
justly be precluded).
295. See, e.g., Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 457 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding nonparties bound
where the attorney for the plaintiffs in a subsequent suit had been substituted as counsel in a
prior suit); Petit v. City of Chicago, No. 90-C4984, 1999 WL 66539, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1999)
(holding nonparties bound where the same attorney represented plaintiffs in both cases);
DeBraska v. City of Milwaukee, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1030 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (holding nonparties
bound where one of the attorneys in a subsequent suit was also co-counsel in a prior suit and
where the same union served as lead plaintiff in both suits), rev’d, 189 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.
1999); City of Chicago v. Shalala, No. 97-C4884, 1998 WL 164889, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31,
1998) (holding a nonparty class of plaintiff-intervenors bound where the attorney for the
plaintiff-intervenors in a subsequent suit was also one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in a
prior suit), aff’d, 189 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1530 (2000); In re Air Crash
at Detroit Metro. Airport, 976 F. Supp. 1076, 1082 n.17 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding a plaintiff
bound by a determination in a prior multidistrict litigation (MDL) trial, where the plaintiff’s
lawyer had participated in some MDL pretrial discovery matters); Duffy v. Si-Sifh Corp., 726
So. 2d 438, 443 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (holding a proposed class representative bound by the prior
rejection of class certification for a different proposed class representative, where the two
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increases the likelihood that a court will bind the non-overlapping
parties on a virtual representation theory.296
A nonparty may also be bound by a judgment if the nonparty
297
financed and controlled the litigation. In Montana v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that the United States was bound by the
issue-preclusive effect of a judgment upholding the constitutionality
of a Montana tax on government contractors, although the United
States had not been a party to that action, which was brought by a
298
government contractor, Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. (Kiewit). The
United States directed Kiewit to file the suit, had controlled most of
Kiewit’s litigation decisions, and had paid the attorneys’ fees and
299
costs. The Court decided that “although not a party, the United
States plainly had a sufficient ‘laboring oar’ in the conduct of the
state-court litigation to actuate principles of estoppel.”300 The
Montana principle, that a nonparty can be bound if it controls and
finances an action, has been applied in several scenarios, including a
liability insurer’s control of an insured’s defense and a corporation’s
301
control of litigation involving its officers.
petitions were filed by the same attorneys).
296. See, e.g., NAACP, 125 F.3d at 1175 (applying the virtual representation doctrine to a
case involving overlapping classes of school children and low income housing residents); Tyus,
93 F.3d at 457 (applying the virtual representation doctrine to preclude a challenge to redrawn
aldermanic boundaries, where some of the same parties had participated in a prior challenge);
Petit, 1999 WL 66539, at *5 (precluding a plaintiff class of white patrol officers from bringing an
action alleging that the city committed racial or national origin discrimination by adjusting
promotional test scores based on race, in part because 19 of 326 plaintiffs overlapped with the
class in a prior action).
297. 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
298. See id. at 161-62.
299. See id. at 155. The Court left no doubt about the extent of the United States’ control
over the Kiewit litigation:
That the United States exercised control over the Kiewit I litigation is not in dispute.
The Government stipulated that it:
(1) required the Kiewit I lawsuit to be filed;
(2) reviewed and approved the complaint;
(3) paid the attorneys’ fees and costs;
(4) directed the appeal from State District Court to the Montana Supreme Court;
(5) appeared and submitted a brief as amicus in the Montana Supreme Court;
(6) directed the filing of a notice of appeal to this Court; and
(7) effectuated Kiewit’s abandonment of that appeal on advice of the Solicitor
General.
Id. at 155.
300.
301.

Id.
See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 109, § 4451, at 429; see also RESTATEMENT
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Counsel coordination need not rise to the level of Montana
financing and control, however, to create a risk of nonparty
302
preclusion. In a recent Delaware case, dental device manufacturer
Centrix, Inc. was held in contempt for violating an injunction issued
in a patent infringement action, an action in which Centrix was not a
party.303 Centrix manufactured the products at issue in the patent
infringement action and supplied them to Kerr Manufacturing
Corporation (Kerr), the defendant in that action.304 During the
infringement action, Centrix paid much of Kerr’s legal fees, suggested
litigation strategies to Kerr’s counsel, and after approximately one
year of litigation, took control of Kerr’s defense pursuant to an
indemnification and defense agreement.305 Unlike the United States
government’s role in Montana, however, Centrix had not instigated
the action, had not controlled the litigation from its inception, and
had a somewhat adversarial relationship with the named party. The
306
court, relying on “the ‘virtual representative’ concept of privity,”
rejected Centrix’s argument that it had not yet “had its day in
court,”307 and held that Centrix was virtually represented by Kerr, was
thus bound by the injunction, and, therefore, was subject to
308
contempt.
In informally aggregated litigation, the argument for nonparty
preclusion appears to follow naturally from the language and holdings
of the virtual representation cases. The virtual representation cases
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 39 cmt. a, illus. 1 and 2 (1982).
302. Mere involvement as a witness or an advisor in the prior action does not suffice to
establish privity or Montana preclusion. See Marine Office of Am. v. Vulcan MV, 921 F. Supp.
368, 372 (E.D. La. 1996); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 109, § 4451, at 430-31; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 39 cmt. c (1982).
303. See Dentsply Int’l, Inc. v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389; see also id. at 392-93:
Here, the Court is not faced with a previously adjudged infringer, but with an entity
who was not a party in the original litigation that prompted the injunction. Thus,
because Centrix is a nonparty, the Court must determine, as a threshold matter,
whether Centrix may properly be bound by the injunction.
304. See id. at 388-89.
305. See id. at 391. Centrix denied that it controlled the substance of the litigation, see id.,
but the court found otherwise. See id. at 399.
306. Id. at 393.
307. Id. at 394.
308. See id. at 399 (“[T]he Court concludes that the relationship between Centrix and Kerr
exemplifies the type of virtual relationship necessary to establish privity.”). Because Dentsply
involved an injunction, it implicated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) (concerning persons
bound by an injunction) rather than the usual doctrines of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.
See id. at 393. The court’s analysis, however, follows the reasoning of the preclusion cases. See
id. at 398 n.5.
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require aligned interests and incentives to litigate, both of which
generally adhere in informally aggregated litigation. They treat as a
prominent factor the presence of overlapping counsel or the
participation of counsel or client in the other lawsuit—precisely the
phenomenon of informal aggregation. Thus, the argument might go, if
lawsuits have been handled on an intensively coordinated basis, either
by the same counsel or through the arrangement of multiple counsel,
then one party may be virtually represented in another party’s
lawsuit, and, therefore, justly bound by the outcome. Even to the
extent some courts take a narrower view of virtual representation by
requiring “the existence of an express or implied legal relationship in
which parties to the first suit are accountable to non-parties,”309 one
might argue that contractual or fiduciary duties among coordinating
310
lawyers and clients satisfy this additional requirement for virtual
representation. If counsel coordination were weighed heavily in the
virtual representation analysis, the relatively obscure doctrine could
assume much greater significance, given the widespread phenomenon
of informal aggregation.
B. Against Nonparty Preclusion
Although informal aggregation does amount to treatment of the
litigation by the lawyers as a single integrated whole, that should not
be a sufficient basis for permitting nonparty preclusion. The usual
reason given for rejecting nonparty preclusion is the “day in court”
ideal.311 Every person, it is said, is entitled to her day in court.312 If a

309. Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002, 1008 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Bittinger v. Tecumseh
Prods. Co., 123 F.3d 877, 881 (6th Cir. 1997) (listing factors including “an express or implied
legal relationship in which parties to the first suit are said to be ‘accountable’ to parties to the
second”).
310. See supra text accompanying notes 187-91.
311. See, e.g., James Wm. Moore & Thomas S. Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of
Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 301, 308 (1961) (using the “day in court” ideal to argue against
relaxation of mutuality and privity requirements for preclusion, regardless of the perceived
judicial economy); Pielemeier, supra note 276, at 422-27 (arguing that nonparty preclusion
should not be extended without accounting for citizens’ “expect[ation] to have their proverbial
‘day in court’”); Elinor P. Schroeder, Relitigation of Common Issues: The Failure of Nonparty
Preclusion and an Alternative Proposal, 67 IOWA L. REV. 917, 921 & n.17 (1982) (generally
opposing expanded nonparty preclusion, emphasizing the value of participation and control);
Trangsrud, supra note 63, at 816-24 (chronicling the history of opposition to forced joinder of
personal injury claims and arguing that courts should continue to refrain from certifying
common question class actions when better alternatives exist). See generally Bone, supra note
280 (discussing the “day in court” ideal as it relates to virtual representation).
312. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996) (“This rule [against
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person has not had her day in court, her one bite at the apple, then it
seems unfair to consider her bound by the legal system’s resolution of
her controversy. She should have the opportunity, the argument goes,
to present her own side of the story. Her perspective and input may
differ from others who appear to be aligned in interest. And even if
her input would be identical to that of similarly situated parties who
skillfully presented the position to a court, why should she be denied
the opportunity to present the position herself? After all, it is her life,
liberty or property on the line.
In an era of informal aggregation, however, the day in court
argument rings hollower than it once did.313 Even if we could imagine
that clients in individual litigation feel that they genuinely participate
in the litigation or adjudicatory process—although most clients do not
feel that way at all314—it would be a leap to imagine that clients in
informally aggregated litigation have the same sense of participatory
power. It is difficult enough for clients to follow the strategizing of
their own lawyer; joint strategizing among aligned counsel removes
such planning one step further from clients. And clients have little
enough input into and supervision of the work product of their own
lawyer. When legal work is spread among coordinating lawyers, much
of the work product becomes largely inaccessible to the client. In
informally aggregated litigation, the individual client in many ways
lacks autonomy. Thus, while the day in court argument retains a good
deal of power as an ideal, a court might sensibly question whether
that argument justifies denying nonparty preclusion, if indications
suggest that the litigant’s day in court would be a replay presentation
by the same group of coordinating counsel, in which neither the prior
nor the subsequent litigant has much genuine litigation autonomy.

binding nonparties] is part of our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his
own day in court.’” (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62 (1989) (quoting WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 109, § 4449, at 417))); Mason v. Eldred, 73 U.S. 231, 239 (1867) (“The principle
is as old as the law, and is of universal justice, that no one shall be personally bound until he has
had his day in court . . . .”); Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 1998) (“It
is a fundamental principle of American law that every person is entitled to his or her day in
court.”), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1036 (1999); Ahng v. Allsteel, Inc., 96 F.3d 1033, 1037 (7th Cir.
1996) (“The Ahng plaintiffs are entitled to their own day in court.”).
313. See Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy
and the Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 833-37, 841-51
(1989); Lowenthal & Erichson, supra note 1, at 1020-23.
314. See Hensler, Myths and Realities, supra note 1, at 92-97 (discussing several empirical
studies indicating that many litigants feel that they do not exercise much control over how their
cases are handled).
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Even if a court does reject the day in court argument, at least two
reasons remain to reject expansive application of the virtual
representation doctrine based on informal aggregation. First,
nonparty preclusion based on counsel coordination should be rejected
because such preclusion would create disincentives to counsel
coordination, and coordination, on the whole, is valuable to the legal
process and should be encouraged rather than discouraged. Second,
nonparty preclusion based on informal aggregation should be rejected
to avoid circumvention of protections built into formal aggregation
mechanisms, especially the class action rule.
1. Avoiding
Disincentives
to
Coordination.
Informal
aggregation is valuable, not only for lawyers and their clients, but for
the legal system and the public as well. First, by enhancing litigational
efficiency, coordination slows the transfer of wealth from litigants to
lawyers and saves taxpayers’ money by reducing the judiciary’s
burden. Second, coordination enhances the quality of legal work, and
in many cases levels the playing field between large defendants and
315
individual plaintiffs. To the extent coordination improves the
quality of legal services and cancels out the resource advantage of
larger litigants and repeat players, it advances the goals of justice and
the substantive law.
A rule of nonparty preclusion based on coordination among
counsel would provide a substantial disincentive to counsel to
coordinate. In fact, one judge stated that a plaintiff could have
avoided nonparty preclusion based on virtual representation by
316
refusing to participate in a coordinated litigation group. Lawyers
will have to think twice before working together if they know that by
working together they may bind their clients to otherwise nonbinding judgments. Even based on the relatively minor risk of
Montana preclusion,317 lawyers for interested nonparties are cautioned

315. See Herrmann, supra note 15, at 44-45 (observing that cooperation among plaintiffs’
counsel has reduced defendants’ former advantage in access to information); Marcus, supra note
4, at 243-44 (noting, in Bendectin litigation, that defendant Merrell Dow exploited its resource
advantage in the initial individual lawsuit, but that plaintiff coordination leveled the playing
field).
316. See Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 123 F.3d 877, 889 (6th Cir. 1997) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting) (“A putative plaintiff could have merely refused to participate in the group in order
to protect his or her right to present a future claim.”).
317. See supra notes 297-301 and accompanying text (discussing Montana v. United States,
440 U.S. 147, 155, 161-62 (1979)).
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to maintain at least some distance from parties’ litigation decisions.318
If the theory of virtual representation were to extend to coordinated
lawyer groups, then this caution would take on a new dimension, and
lawyers in many cases would be well advised to steer clear of
cooperating on related lawsuits.319
This argument against nonparty preclusion raises at least two
questions. First, if lawyer coordination is as pervasive and inevitable
as I contend in this Article, then how can I be sure that nonparty
preclusion would discourage it? Second, if nonparty preclusion would
make lawyers think twice before working together, what’s so bad
about that? There is merit to each of these points. The urge to
aggregate is powerful enough to overcome impediments, and no
doubt many lawyers would continue to coordinate despite the risk of
preclusion. Moreover, lawyers ought to think twice about
coordinating, if only because of the ethical ramifications. In the end,
the possible disincentive to coordination provides at best a soft
argument against nonparty preclusion. The more important argument
concerns circumvention of formal aggregation safeguards.
2. Avoiding Circumvention of Formal Safeguards. Nonparty
preclusion threatens to permit inappropriate circumvention of the
procedural mechanisms of formal aggregation. For example, suppose
a dispute does not fit within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s
requirements for class certification, or jurisdictional barriers prevent
MDL consolidation. In the absence of the protections that accompany
these mechanisms, such as the class action requirement of adequate
representation, a litigant should not be permitted to obtain the

318. See Charles R. Bruton & Joseph C. Crawford, Collateral Estoppel and Trial Strategy,
LITIGATION, Summer 1981, at 50; Howard M. Erichson, Dealing with Issue Preclusion in
Complex Cases, 148 N.J. L.J. 204, 209 (1997) (“Counsel for an interested outsider, while
cooperating with a party, should take care not to let cooperation turn into control. When the
nonparty’s involvement is so substantial that it amounts to financing and controlling the
litigation, the nonparty risks being bound by the court’s determinations.”).
319. Professor Bone makes nearly the opposite argument. He argues in favor of nonparty
preclusion as a way to encourage cooperation among plaintiffs’ lawyers: “Because nonparty
preclusion reduces the free-rider effect by visiting the adverse consequences of a loss on all
parties, it should increase the incentives to act collectively and to invest heavily on the side of
the plaintiff in the first suit.” Bone, supra note 280, at 255. Professor Bone’s argument makes
sense as to a rule of nonparty preclusion that does not turn on counsel coordination. In the
scenario where counsel coordination is urged as a justification for nonparty preclusion, however,
it seems probable that the rule would discourage, rather than encourage, cooperation among
counsel.
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enforcement benefits of aggregation through the back door.320 If a
judge denies class certification, and nonparty preclusion nonetheless
is allowed, then the denial of class certification is meaningless. If a
plaintiff opts out of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, and nonparty
preclusion is applied against that plaintiff, then the opportunity to opt
out is similarly meaningless.321
In Tice v. American Airlines, Inc.,322 twelve former American
Airlines pilots sued the airline under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), challenging the airline’s “up-or-out”
policy under which flight officer positions were reserved as a training
323
ground for future pilots. The policy had the effect of rendering
sixty-year-old pilots, disallowed by a federal regulation from piloting,
ineligible to downbid to flight officer positions.324 The airline had
successfully defended its policy against an earlier ADEA challenge
325
brought by twenty-two pilots in Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc.
In Johnson, the airline prevailed in a jury trial, and the judgment was
upheld by the Fifth Circuit.326 In Tice, American Airlines contended
that the pilots’ lawsuit was claim-precluded by Johnson. The district
court agreed, holding that the Tice plaintiffs had been “virtually
represented” by the Johnson pilots.327
The Seventh Circuit, reversing, put its finger on the problem. To
bind the Tice plaintiffs with the judgment in Johnson, the court
recognized, would be to treat Johnson as a class action. If the Tice
plaintiffs were bound on the theory of virtual representation, then the
twenty-two Johnson plaintiffs served in effect as class representatives,
litigating on behalf of themselves and on behalf of a class of all
320. See Ahng v. Allsteel, Inc., 96 F.3d 1033, 1037 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the defendants’
argument that the current plaintiffs were virtually represented in prior action, because under
Rule 23 prior plaintiffs could not have represented a class including the current plaintiffs).
321. See Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 193 F.3d 415, 426-27 (6th
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (reversing the district court’s application of virtual representation
preclusion against plaintiffs who had opted out of an earlier settlement class action, noting that
preclusion would render the plaintiffs’ opt-out decision meaningless).
322. 162 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1036 (1999).
323. See id. at 968-69.
324. See id.
325. 745 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1984).
326. See Tice, 162 F.3d at 968-69 (describing the facts of Johnson). American also prevailed
in an ADEA action brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of
57 named pilots over age 40, who had been denied employment as flight officers because, under
American’s up-or-out policy, they lacked enough time to become captains. See id. at 969, 974
(citing EEOC v. American Airlines, Inc., 48 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 1995)).
327. See id. at 970.
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similarly situated pilots. But Rule 23 dictates that an action is not a
class action unless a court so certifies it,328 and a court may not so
certify it without finding that the class action meets the rule’s
prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation, and fits within one of the class action categories.329 No
such findings had been made in Johnson, and no court had certified it
as a class action. The Johnson plaintiffs and their attorneys were not
scrutinized under Rule 23’s adequate representation standard, nor did
the attorneys have any reason to believe they owed ethical or
fiduciary duties to unnamed class members. The Seventh Circuit
correctly observed that “the fact that virtual representation looks like
a class action but avoids compliance with Rule 23 is a weakness, not a
strength, of the doctrine. . . . There would be little point in having
Rule 23 if courts could ignore its careful structure and create de facto
class actions at will.”330
The Sixth Circuit, too, has recognized the tension between
virtual representation and the class action rule. In Bittinger v.
331
Tecumseh Products Co., a group of workers filed a class action
complaint against their employer, but the action was dismissed on
summary judgment before the class was certified.332 A second group of
workers filed a new action, which the district court certified as a class
action and then dismissed on grounds of claim preclusion, under the
theory of virtual representation.333 The court of appeals, while
sympathetic to the district court’s desire to disallow what was, in
effect, a refiling of the identical class action lawsuit that had already

328. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c).
329. See id. 23(a), 23(b).
330. Tice, 162 F.3d at 972-73. Similarly, in Ahng v. Allsteel, Inc., 96 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 1996),
the defendant in an employment lawsuit argued that plaintiffs were bound by a judgment from a
prior employment action to which these plaintiffs had not been parties. See id. at 1037. The
Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Diane Wood, the author of Tice, sensibly rejected the
defendant’s virtual representation argument, noting that under Rule 23, the prior plaintiffs
could not have represented the current plaintiffs as class representatives:
The doctrine of “virtual representation” recognizes, in effect, a common-law kind of
class action. . . . At oral argument, Allsteel conceded that the Meredith [v. Allsteel,
Inc., 11 F.3d 1354 (7th Cir. 1993),] plaintiffs could not have represented a class of
individuals that included members who retired after March 31, 1991, under Rule 23.
For the same reasons that they would fail to qualify as adequate representatives for
Rule 23, they also fail the test for virtual representatives.
Id.
331.
332.
333.

123 F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 1997).
See id. at 879.
See id.
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been dismissed, refused to allow the end run around Rule 23.334
Preclusion based on virtual representation, the appeals court
explained, is “particularly undesirable . . . where its application would
335
replace settled, rule-like procedures.” The formal limitations of
Rule 23 should not be replaced by “an unruly standard.”336 The
dissenter chided the majority for ignoring circuit precedent embracing
the virtual representation doctrine: “[T]he majority’s unhappiness
with the doctrine of virtual representation and preference for the
‘crisp rules with sharp corners’ of Rule 23 is water over the dam.”337
Despite these cases, in which courts have recognized the conflict
between Rule 23 and the theory of virtual representation, a number
of other courts have allowed virtual representation to replace, in
338
effect, the requirements of the class action rule. One court went so
far as to hold that a subsequent class action was claim-precluded by a
prior judgment against two individual plaintiffs, noting that the
individuals would have been members of the subsequent class.339 It
remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court’s most recent
reiteration of the rule against binding non-parties, in South Central

334. See id. at 882.
335. Id. at 881-82.
336. Id. at 882.
337. Id. at 888 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
338. See, e.g., Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 450, 458 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding nonparty
challengers to electoral redistricting bound by a prior judgment, although the prior lawsuit was
not brought on behalf of a class); Louisiana Seafood Management v. Foster, 46 F. Supp. 2d 533,
546 (E.D. La. 1999) (holding a party claim-precluded based on virtual representation, regardless
of whether the party was a member of earlier class); Petit v. City of Chicago, No. 90 C4984, 1999
WL 66539, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1999) (holding nonparty white police officers bound by a
prior judgment concerning an affirmative action promotions policy, although the prior lawsuit
was not brought on behalf of a class); DeBraska v. City of Milwaukee, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1026
(E.D. Wis. 1998) (holding police officers bound by a prior judgment, although the prior lawsuit
was not brought on behalf of a class of officers), rev’d, 189 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 1999); Citizens for
Open Access to Sand and Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass’n, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 89-90 (Ct. App. 1998)
(holding citizens bound by a prior judgment involving state agencies, although the state agencies
did not purport to represent a class in the prior action); Duffy v. Si-Sifh Corp., 726 So. 2d 438,
442-43 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (holding a putative class representative bound by a prior denial of
class certification against a different putative class representative).
339. See City of Chicago v. Shalala, No. 97 C4884, 1998 WL 164889, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31,
1998):
Members of the [subsequent] class are similarly situated to the plaintiffs in Zizumbo.
In fact, the Zizumbo plaintiffs would have been members of the SSI class. The court
also notes parenthetically that one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in Zizumbo also
represents the plaintiffs-intervenors in this case. Thus, identity of the parties and the
issues exists . . . .
aff’d, 189 F.3d 598 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1530 (2000).
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Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama,340 will stem the tide of virtual
representation decisions that circumvent the class action rule.
Virtual representation has allowed courts to circumvent MDL
limitations as well. In one air crash litigation, pending federal actions
were transferred for consolidated MDL handling, and the MDL court
conducted a “joint liability trial” to adjudicate claims between
341
McDonnell Douglas and Northwest Airlines. The trial resulted in a
jury finding that Northwest was responsible for the accident and that
342
its flight crew had engaged in willful and wanton misconduct.
Subsequently, the executor of the estate of a member of the
Northwest flight crew filed a wrongful death action against several
343
defendants. The court held that the executor was bound by the jury
finding that the decedent had engaged in willful and wanton
misconduct, on the grounds that “the Plaintiff’s interests were
adequately represented in the joint liability trial” by the decedent’s
employer, Northwest.344 Although the plaintiff’s action did not
commence until after the MDL trial, the court held that the plaintiff
“had a full and fair opportunity to pursue the decedent’s claims”
because he could have joined or intervened in the MDL.345 The court
340. 526 U.S. 160 (1999). In South Central Bell, the Supreme Court rejected a state court’s
application of res judicata to a taxpayer action, based on a prior action brought by different
taxpayers. The Supreme Court reasoned:
The two relevant cases involve different plaintiffs and different tax years. Neither is a
class action, and no one claims that there is “privity” or some other special
relationship between the two sets of plaintiffs. Hence, the Case Two plaintiffs here
are “strangers” to Case One, and for the reasons we explained in Richards [v.
Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996)], they cannot be bound by the earlier judgment.
Id. at 1185. Neither the plaintiffs’ awareness of the prior action, nor the overlap of one plaintiff’s
lawyer, created any “special representational relationship between the earlier and later
plaintiffs.” Id. One would think that this Supreme Court pronouncement would put an end to
the virtual representation argument, but one would have thought the same about Richards v.
Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996) (holding that nonparties were not bound by an earlier
judgment where they received neither notice of nor sufficient representation in that earlier
litigation), and Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that a group of firefighters was not
precluded from challenging decisions made pursuant to a consent decree where those
firefighters were not parties to the proceeding in which the consent decree was entered), and yet
the virtual representation cases appear to have continued unabated.
341. Dodds v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (In re Air Crash at Detroit Metro. Airport), 976 F.
Supp. 1076, 1078 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
342. See id.
343. See id. at 1078 n.2.
344. Id. at 1081-82.
345. Id. at 1082. The court continued:
Although the Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to pursue the decedent’s claims,
he apparently made a tactical decision to wait until after the commencement of the
joint liability trial to pursue his claims—almost three years after the air crash. Under
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may have felt satisfied with the plaintiff’s “full and fair opportunity,”
but nowhere does the MDL statute give judges the power to bind
nonparties with MDL adjudications. The MDL statute explicitly
limits itself to the transfer of pending civil actions;346 unlike class
action, MDL does not purport to achieve representative litigation. To
bind the executor, who was not party to the MDL proceedings, is to
treat an MDL adjudication as a class action, in contravention of both
the class action rule and the MDL statute.
This brings us full circle to the ethics problem and the boundaries
of the lawyer-client relationship. To bind a litigant with the outcome
of a case in which counsel lacked explicit duties to that litigant
amounts to circumvention not only of the procedural protections and
limitations of formal aggregation mechanisms, but also of the ethical
relationships built into such mechanisms. The controlling lawyers in
an informally aggregated litigation—those lawyers at the hub of the
hub and spoke network—to a significant extent control the fate of all
of the clients in the litigation. In this regard, clients in informally
aggregated litigation may find themselves similarly situated to clients
in a class action or MDL, but without the same level of judicial
oversight or procedural and ethical safeguards.
V. THE WORST OF BOTH WORLDS
A. Neither True Litigant Autonomy nor True Aggregation
Although it would be wrong to allow nonparty preclusion based
on informal aggregation, that is, based exclusively or primarily on the
coordinated conduct of the lawyers, it would be equally wrong to
pretend that the individual litigant in massive multi-suit litigation is
truly autonomous. Not only does the individual litigant often lack
significant control over his own lawyer,347 that lawyer often works as
part of a large and complicated network of interdependent lawyers.

Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he could have intervened in the
multi-district litigation. Thus, the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s decedent and
Northwest were in privity for collateral estoppel purposes.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1082 n.17 (noting that the plaintiff’s counsel participated
in MDL discovery); id. at 1082 n.18 (“The Plaintiff could have also joined in the multi-district
litigation prior to September 29, 1989.”).
346. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994); supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
347. See Hensler, Myths and Realities, supra note 1, at 92-97.
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Lack of client control is sometimes cited as a concern with formal
aggregation mechanisms in mass litigation. Professor Richard Marcus
has written of the distance between clients and lawyers in the
Bendectin litigation, for example:
Stanley Chesley negotiated a proposed settlement on behalf of
plaintiffs who had never heard of him, and without any prior grant
of authority to do so. The trial preparation and presentation were
done by a committee of plaintiffs’ lawyers who were sometimes in
conflict with one another and seemingly not in regular contact with
many of the over one thousand plaintiffs whose claims were before
348
Judge Rubin.

What should be added to this account is that it would probably
give an accurate description of the level of client involvement and
control even as to cases outside the MDL consolidation, and even if
MDL consolidation had been denied altogether. In informally
aggregated litigation, settlement negotiations may occur with little
control by the individual client, and trial preparation often is handled
“by a committee of plaintiffs’ lawyers” who lack regular contact with
most of the plaintiffs who rely on those lawyers’ work.
The incongruity of having extensive informal aggregation but not
having either preclusion or explicit ethical duties suggests that
something is awry. The extent of informal aggregation in mass
litigation contradicts the conception of individual lawsuits as
independent disputes to be resolved by a process controlled by
individual litigants. If the legal system cannot devise mechanisms for
addressing a coherent dispute as a unified whole, the litigation will
aggregate itself anyway.
The end result may be the worst of both worlds. Neither does the
client have individual litigant autonomy, nor does the legal system
obtain real finality and consistency by precluding the relitigation of
decided issues. Neither can the client rely on full control by the
client’s individually retained lawyer, nor can the client rely on explicit
ethical duties to the client by those who control the case.
B. A Better Way
Among the many implications of informal aggregation, perhaps
the most basic is the support it lends to initiatives to improve formal
mechanisms for aggregating litigation. Given the powerful drive to
348.

Marcus, supra note 4, at 251.
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coordinate, evidenced by both plaintiffs and defendants in a wide
variety of litigation, true litigant autonomy may be unattainable in
many situations involving multiple related claims. One way to solve
the worst of both worlds problem, then, is to bring procedural and
ethical safeguards, as well as consistent binding judgments, to
coherent multi-claim litigation.349 In other words, the benefits of
formal aggregation may come without much loss of litigant autonomy,
given the extent to which lawyers coordinate anyway.
Some courts and commentators have taken precisely the
opposite view: that informal coordination among lawyers provides a
basis for rejecting formal aggregation. One court, for example, noted
that “[i]nformal coordination among plaintiffs’ lawyers offers a means
for spreading the costs of litigation without the complexity of a class
350
action.” Similarly, attorneys opposed to class certification have
argued that counsel coordination offers a less drastic means to
351
achieve the benefits of class actions. Professor Michael Green, in his
study of the Bendectin litigation, urges a realistic perspective when
considering the benefits of MDL: “The point is not that multidistrict
consolidation is without its efficiencies—it surely is. Rather, more
modestly, the advantages of consolidation must be assessed against
the alternative—which is not the individual-lawyer-with-separateclient-litigating-independently paradigm that some have employed.”352
Professor Green is absolutely correct that the benefits of formal
aggregation should be weighed against the reality of informal
aggregation, rather than against an imaginary picture of
uneconomical individualized litigation. But I would add that the
downsides of formal aggregation, which have kept rulemakers,
legislators, and courts from creating comprehensive aggregation
349. See generally Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy
Issues, 10 REV. LITIG. 231 (1991) (favoring, generally, formal aggregation as the superior
method of achieving finality, fairness, and consistency, but noting concerns about various
proposed aggregation devices). In arguing in support of formal aggregation, Dean Sherman
notes the increasingly coordinated nature of discovery and pretrial strategy. See id. at 247-48.
350. Martin v. American Med. Sys., Inc., No. IP 94-2067-C-H/G, 1995 WL 680630, at *9
(S.D. Ind. Oct. 25, 1995).
351. See Theodore V.H. Mayer & Robb W. Patryk, Class Actions in Drug and Medical
Device Cases: The Trend Against Class Certification, ANDREWS MASS TORT LITIG. REP., Feb.
1997, at 12 (approving the trend away from class certification in products liability cases, arguing
that “[c]lass actions in many instances deprive plaintiffs of the freedom to control their own
cases, and there are other, less restrictive, procedural devices available—such as consolidated
pretrial discovery and ‘informal coordination’ among plaintiffs’ counsel—which can be used to
minimize the burden on the parties and the judicial system”).
352. GREEN, supra note 5, at 241.
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mechanisms, should be viewed in light of the reality of informal
aggregation, rather than in light of an imaginary picture of pure
individual litigant autonomy.
A point of agreement, I think, is that the phenomenon of
informal aggregation suggests that lawyers are filling a need
informally that the system has failed to fill formally. The
disagreement concerns whether we should be satisfied that the need is
being filled adequately. Although informal aggregation brings many
benefits, it cannot adequately protect clients from lawyer misconduct,
especially when the coordinating lawyers fail to describe their duties
explicitly in a written agreement. Nor can informal aggregation offer
the efficiency and consistency of a single binding adjudication, at least
not without a troubling and unwarranted expansion of the virtual
representation doctrine.
The quest for perfect formal aggregation is beyond the scope of
this Article, but various proposals for enhanced aggregation
mechanisms amply demonstrate that it is possible to devise workable
rules for increasing the reach of formal aggregation. Among these
proposals are the American Law Institute’s Complex Litigation
353
354
Project, the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, the proposed
Judicial Reform Act of 1998,355 and several rounds of proposed class
action rule amendments.356 Even proposed legislative solutions for

353. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 35 (proposing a statutory mechanism to allow
consolidation of related actions pending in dispersed federal and state courts). But see JAY
TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
251-53 (1998) (questioning the ALI proposal’s constitutionality).
354. 14 U.L.A. 201 (Supp. 2000) (proposing a uniform state statute to allow consolidation of
related actions pending in multiple state courts); see also Edward H. Cooper, Interstate
Consolidation: A Comparison of the ALI Project with the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, 54
LA. L. REV. 897 (1994) (favoring the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act over the ALI Proposal
but not suggesting that the ALI Proposal was ill-advised); Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation
and the State Courts: Constitutional and Practical Advantages of the State Forum over the Federal
Forum in Mass Tort Cases, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215, 268 (1994) (suggesting that states
could create a “real system of interstate transfer” by adopting the Uniform Transfer of
Litigation Act).
355. H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. § 7 (1998) (providing for multiparty, multiforum federal
jurisdiction in single accident cases involving at least 25 victims with damages over $50,000 per
person, based on minimal diversity of citizenship). The bill is largely identical to bills that passed
the House in the late 1980s and early 1990s. See Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of
1991, H.R. 2450, 102d Cong. § 2 (1991); Court Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1988, H.R.
4807, 100th Cong. §§ 301-07 (1988); see generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley,
Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7 (1987)
(proposing such multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction).
356. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Preliminary Draft of Proposed
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particular mass disputes such as the failed McCain tobacco bill357 and
the proposed Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999,358
despite serious problems and controversies, suggest avenues for
bringing related claims together for more efficient and consistent
resolution.
In the absence of aggregation by a formal judicial mechanism,
lawyers can and should replicate some of the same protections for
their clients by using written cooperation agreements. Currently,
coordinating lawyers often employ written agreements, both among
defendants and among plaintiffs, but some coordination occurs on an
uncharted basis, with lawyers working together without any written
agreement. Perhaps, with apologies for oxymoronic clumsiness, we
must distinguish between “formal informal aggregation” and
“informal informal aggregation.” Formal informal aggregation,
despite the lack of judicial aggregation of the litigation, involves
explicit guidelines and duties for the coordinating lawyers. Examples
include plaintiffs’ lawyers coordinating through ATLA litigation
359
groups or using the ATLA Exchange and defense lawyers working
under written joint defense agreements.360 A well-drafted written
agreement among participating lawyers and clients can make explicit
the duty of confidentiality, clarify expectations with regard to other
duties, and provide a relatively clear contractual basis for liability
based on a lawyer’s failure to perform her assigned role.
Formalizing the process of informal aggregation can protect
clients in some of the same ways formal judicial aggregation does.

Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate, Civil, and Criminal Procedure (Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure Aug. 1996); Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 23 (Feb. 1995 Draft and Nov. 1995 Draft), reprinted in Edward H.
Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, app. at 53-73
(1996).
357. Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105th Cong. §§ 701-03 (1997). See David E.
Rosenbaum, Senate Drops Tobacco Bill with ‘98 Revival Unlikely, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1998, at
A1 (discussing the failed Act, which would have protected tobacco companies from suits in
exchange for substantial payments and policies intended to decrease smoking among youth).
358. S. 758, 106th Cong. §§ 401-04 (1999). See Stephen Labaton, Asbestos Cases in for
Overhaul by Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1999, at A1 (describing the Supreme Court’s
request to Congress to devise a plan to resolve asbestos claims); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (urging Congress to pass national legislation to address “the
elephantine mass of asbestos cases”).
359. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text (explaining the functions and scope of
ATLA litigation groups and the ATLA Exchange).
360. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text (discussing the use of joint defense
agreements).
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Ordinarily, however, it cannot create the same opportunities for
judicial oversight that formal aggregation provides, nor does it allow
for a single binding adjudication. On the other hand, formal informal
aggregation has certain advantages over formal aggregation, including
much greater flexibility to allow private ordering by the attorneys and
clients involved.
The phenomenon of informal aggregation points to gaps in the
legal system’s formal devices for bringing together related claims.
That does not mean that all of those gaps should be filled. Formal
aggregation may prove unattainable in some cases due to justified
limits built into joinder and consolidation devices. It does mean,
however, that lawyer coordination often functions as a litigationaggregating device. Recognizing that lawyer coordination pulls
lawsuits together for coordinated handling, despite the legal system’s
formal treatment of those lawsuits as separate, suggests two
conclusions. First, it suggests that current procedural devices fail to
reach some lawsuits suitable for coordinated handling, and
procedural revisions might enable formal aggregation to reach such
cases. Second, in the absence of formal aggregation, it is important for
lawyers to formalize the relationship enough to provide the
safeguards that any litigation-aggregating mechanism warrants.
CONCLUSION
Litigation aggregates itself. Formal procedural mechanisms do
not always do it, but aggregation happens anyway.
Procedural rules and statutes offer a whole host of formal
aggregation devices: permissive joinder, compulsory joinder,
impleader, interpleader, intervention, class action, consolidation,
MDL. These devices can pull together vast numbers of related claims
on a formal, judicially recognized basis, with at least some procedural
safeguards, and at least some explicit duties among the lawyers. Many
closely related claims, however, remain outside the reach of these
procedural mechanisms, and proceed as formally separate actions.
Lawyers with similarly situated clients tend to coordinate their
efforts. Just as they coordinate when their clients are co-plaintiffs or
co-defendants within a single lawsuit, so do they coordinate when
their clients are parties to separate actions. To lawyers and litigants,
most of the benefits of coordination do not depend on whether the
actions are formally aggregated, but rather on the alignment of
interests and the overlap of legal and factual issues. Counsel
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coordination occurs to such an extent that, in many cases, it is fair to
say that the lawyers treat judicially separate actions as though they
were a single lawsuit—“informally aggregating” the litigation.
Informal aggregation raises important questions about the
boundaries of a dispute. If separate lawsuits are treated by the
participating lawyers as a single litigation, should the legal system
recognize that the essential dispute is not the individual lawsuit?
Informal aggregation offers litigants an attractive argument for
nonparty preclusion on the theory of virtual representation, but that
argument should fail. Although the language of many virtual representation cases suggests that coordinated efforts by counsel should be
counted as an important factor in determining whether a nonparty
may be bound by a judgment, it would be wrong to bind nonparties to
a judgment based solely or primarily on the joint efforts of their
lawyers. Such preclusion would have the unfortunate effect of
discouraging coordination. More important, it would circumvent the
procedural and ethical safeguards of formal aggregation.
The procedural and ethical safeguards built into formal
aggregation devices such as class actions and MDL, imperfect as they
are, are far better than nothing. For a court to certify a class, the court
must find that the class representatives and class counsel will “fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.”361 In many class
362
actions, moreover, class members may opt out. Class counsel are
obligated to pursue and protect the interests not only of the named
class representatives, but also of the absent class members. In
consolidated multidistrict litigation, the MDL court oversees the
handling of the litigation, and lead counsel and committee members
owe at least some identifiable duties to the parties relying on them.
Despite legitimate concerns about the vagueness of ethical and
fiduciary obligations in formally aggregated litigation, those duties
appear crisp in comparison to counsel’s obligations in informally
aggregated litigation.
Informal aggregation leaves litigants with little autonomy, but it
also leaves the legal system without the finality and consistency of a
broadly binding judgment. It leaves clients dependent upon the skill

361. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4); see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) (mandating
adequacy of representation as a constitutional requirement for binding class actions).
362. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810
(1985) (holding that opt-out rights are constitutionally required for money damages class
actions).
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and trustworthiness of multiple lawyers, but potentially without clear
lines of accountability. Informal aggregation thus presents a worst-ofboth-worlds scenario, but the problem is not counsel coordination
itself. Coordination carries palpable benefits for clients, lawyers, and
the legal system. Rather, the problem is the lack of a procedural and
ethical structure to protect clients when such coordination occurs.
Explicit written agreements among coordinating lawyers provide
clients with some of the protection that would be available through
formal aggregation. Such cooperation agreements may provide the
best balance between the flexibility of informal coordination and the
safeguards of procedural aggregation mechanisms. Taking the
argument a step further, the problems of informal aggregation suggest
the need for more comprehensive formal procedures for linking
claims. The various proposals for enhanced formal aggregation to
encompass more multi-claim situations, whatever their imperfections,
at least would provide judicial recognition and some procedural and
ethical safeguards for situations in which lawyers are likely to work in
teams.
I do not want to overstate my case for enhanced formal
aggregation. There are serious reasons to resist movement toward
greater aggregation. In particular, the value of litigant autonomy,
both to individual dignity and to litigant satisfaction with the legal
363
system, should not be underestimated. But we ought not resist
expansive formal aggregation mechanisms out of an illusion that as
long as cases are not formally united, each litigant in multi-suit
litigation enjoys the benefits of individual autonomy. Nor should we
resist more formal lawyer coordination structures on the misguided
assumption that clients’ interests are adequately protected by their
own lawyer’s involvement. Over and over, in diverse areas of law,
related claims aggregate themselves through the joint activity of the
lawyers, and clients depend on the work and decisions of the
coordinating lawyers.
In the end, the question is not whether we should opt for
aggregation or individual litigant autonomy. The real question, given
that lawyers do handle related cases on a coordinated basis, is
whether we should opt for aggregation with formal safeguards or
without.
363. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 93-106 (1988); John Thibault & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L.
REV. 541, 548-52 (1978).

